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    <pubdata type="print" name="DailyStar" date.publication="20261015T000000+5.30" edition.name="Dhaka Edition" edition.area="MAI" position.section="DST15102606MAI-EDITORIAL" position.sequence="6" ex-ref="DST15102606MAI-EDITORIAL.indd" />
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		<lang class="3" colour="#000000" orgstyle="[No Paragraph Style]" style="Headline1"  font="Antonia H1" fontStyle="Bold" size="45">Constitutional reform is more than a parliamentary numbers game</lang>
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     <p style=".Bodylaser" ul="0" ol="0"  orgstyle="INDENTLESS BODY 2025">
	<lang class="3" style=".Bodylaser" colour="#000000" orgstyle="INDENTLESS BODY 2025" font="Antonia H1" fontStyle="Medium" size="9">Despite strong objections from the Jamaat-led opposition, the constitutional reform process initiated by the ruling party seems to be moving forward with a December deadline in mind. The special committee on constitutional amendments, which held its seventh meeting this Tuesday, seems to be sticking to that timetable, with an amendment bill based on its report potentially following in the first parliamentary session of 2027. A timetable can concentrate minds. It can also turn consultation into a race towards a predetermined destination. The committee’s first responsibility, therefore, is not to produce amendments quickly, but to demonstrate that those controlling the process do not own its outcome.
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<p style=".Bodylaser" ul="0" ol="0"  orgstyle="BODY 2025">
	<lang class="3" style=".Bodylaser" colour="#000000" orgstyle="BODY 2025" font="Antonia H1" fontStyle="Medium" size="9">This distinction is important because the rules governing political power should not become the property of whoever currently controls it. Under Article 142 of the constitution, an amendment bill requires the votes of at least two-thirds of all MPs. That is a threshold for exercising authority, not a transfer of the people’s sovereignty to the parliamentary majority. Constitutional reform must satisfy legal limits while earning a legitimacy that parliamentary arithmetic alone cannot supply.
</lang>
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<p style=".Bodylaser" ul="0" ol="0"  orgstyle="BODY 2025">
	<lang class="3" style=".Bodylaser" colour="#000000" orgstyle="BODY 2025" font="Antonia H1" fontStyle="Medium" size="9">In this regard, the Eighth Amendment judgment, in which the Supreme Court struck down a constitutional amendment passed by parliament for the first time in 1989, remains an unusually direct warning. In Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v Bangladesh, the court explained how the basic structure doctrine emerged in response to executives using overwhelming legislative majorities to rush constitutional amendments without meaningful public consultation or adequate deliberation. The danger was not confined to military rule; constitutional mechanisms themselves could become instruments for concentrating power.
</lang>
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	<lang class="3" style=".Bodylaser" colour="#000000" orgstyle="BODY 2025" font="Antonia H1" fontStyle="Medium" size="9">The Fifteenth Amendment litigation shows how consultation can take place without giving participants meaningful influence over decision-making. The High Court judgment records an account, not disputed by the then respondent government, of a special committee consulting 104 distinguished citizens and unanimously recommending the retention of the caretaker government system on May 29, 2011. But following meetings with the then prime minister, that position changed. The Fifteenth Amendment Bill subsequently received only four days of standing committee scrutiny, despite 14 days having been allowed, and was passed a day after the committee submitted its report (pp. 21-22).
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	<lang class="3" style=".Bodylaser" colour="#000000" orgstyle="BODY 2025" font="Antonia H1" fontStyle="Medium" size="9">We are not saying that today’s special committee is repeating that history. But the existence of a committee, the participation of distinguished invitees, and the number of meetings held cannot, by themselves, establish independence. Consultation becomes decorative when the executive can reverse its outcome without publicly explaining its departure from the recommendations. Citizens need to see not only who was heard, but also which arguments changed the draft and why others were rejected.
</lang>
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<p style=".Bodylaser" ul="0" ol="0"  orgstyle="BODY 2025">
	<lang class="3" style=".Bodylaser" colour="#000000" orgstyle="BODY 2025" font="Antonia H1" fontStyle="Medium" size="9">The Fifteenth Amendment judgment itself must also be read accurately. Despite identifying procedural flaws, the High Court declined to invalidate the entire amendment on procedural grounds (p. 31). Its operative order struck down specific provisions, including Articles 7A and 7B, and restored the referendum mechanism. The legality and propriety of other challenged changes were left for parliament to consider “in accordance with law” (pp. 136-138). The Appellate Division upheld the ruling on July 9, 2026. Neither judicial restraint nor that phrase, however, grants parliament unrestricted power to rewrite the constitution.
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	<lang class="3" style=".Bodylaser" colour="#000000" orgstyle="BODY 2025" font="Antonia H1" fontStyle="Medium" size="9">Equally, removing Article 7B’s sweeping prohibition on amending core sections of the constitution does not remove the basic structure doctrine. Textual entrenchment and judicially enforced constitutional limits are different things. A constitution can remain open to substantial reform while protecting the institutions and rights without which democratic choice becomes hollow.
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	<lang class="3" style=".Bodylaser" colour="#000000" orgstyle="BODY 2025" font="Antonia H1" fontStyle="Medium" size="9">The Thirteenth Amendment review judgment gives that distinction practical force. At page 44, the court characterises parliament’s Article 142 power as a trust delegated by the people, not original constituent authority. At pages 45-46, it examines what amendments do in practice: removing an institutional safeguard may imperil democracy even when democratic language remains untouched. A government cannot preserve the signboard while dismantling the institution behind it.
</lang>
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	<lang class="3" style=".Bodylaser" colour="#000000" orgstyle="BODY 2025" font="Antonia H1" fontStyle="Medium" size="9">There is, however, a tension requiring candour. At page 46, the same judgment accepts that the 1996 political settlement, which led to the introduction of the non-party caretaker government system through the Thirteenth Amendment, expressed the people’s constituent power—their authority to establish a constitutional order—and therefore stood beyond ordinary judicial review. That reasoning cannot simply be omitted because it complicates a tidy account of amendment limits. But neither can a parliamentary majority declare itself the embodiment of exceptional popular authority. The claimed mandate, its scope, and its means of expression must be demonstrated, not presumed.
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	<lang class="3" style=".Bodylaser" colour="#000000" orgstyle="BODY 2025" font="Antonia H1" fontStyle="Medium" size="9">Courts also owe the public principled explanations. The review judgment condemns the earlier divergence between the short order and the detailed judgment, describing the resulting defect as fatal to its legality and integrity (pp. 59-61). Judicial guardianship is indispensable, but it cannot mean that changing judicial preferences become constitutional truth without transparent reasoning. The doctrine should protect democratic conditions, not turn every inherited institutional detail into a permanent judicial preference.
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<p style=".Bodylaser" ul="0" ol="0"  orgstyle="BODY 2025">
	<lang class="3" style=".Bodylaser" colour="#000000" orgstyle="BODY 2025" font="Antonia H1" fontStyle="Medium" size="9">The Constitution Reform Commission’s report offered a starting point for further deliberation. It deliberately kept open proposals ranging from constitution amendment to rearrangement and rewriting, acknowledging competing approaches (p. 2). It also recognised that its consultation methods could not guarantee representation of every section of society, prompting a nationwide survey (p. 4). Today’s parliament should, therefore, build on that evidentiary foundation without treating negotiations among party leaders as the voice of the entire people.
</lang>
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<p style=".Bodylaser" ul="0" ol="0"  orgstyle="BODY 2025">
	<lang class="3" style=".Bodylaser" colour="#000000" orgstyle="BODY 2025" font="Antonia H1" fontStyle="Medium" size="9">The special committee should publish a working draft with an explanation alongside each proposed change: the existing position, the problem identified, the relevant judicial constraint, the alternatives considered, and the reason for its recommendation. Substantial revisions should trigger renewed consultation. A publicly announced minimum period for comment, accessible Bangla explanations, and opportunities beyond Dhaka would make participation something more than attendance at an invitation-only meeting.
</lang>
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<p style=".Bodylaser" ul="0" ol="0"  orgstyle="BODY 2025">
	<lang class="3" style=".Bodylaser" colour="#000000" orgstyle="BODY 2025" font="Antonia H1" fontStyle="Medium" size="9">Its independence should also be visible. Committee legal advice, hearing records, and reasons for departing from recommendations should normally be published. Members should be able to append dissenting opinions. The executive should present its preferred amendments openly rather than influence the committee through an undisclosed channel. These are proposed safeguards for credibility, not claims that every omission automatically invalidates an amendment.
</lang>
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<p style=".Bodylaser" ul="0" ol="0"  orgstyle="BODY 2025">
	<lang class="3" style=".Bodylaser" colour="#000000" orgstyle="BODY 2025" font="Antonia H1" fontStyle="Medium" size="9">Opposition participation matters, of course. But neither an empty chair nor a majority vote should be treated as a complete answer to legitimacy. The government should offer meaningful influence over deliberations, not merely an opportunity to endorse its conclusions. Opposition parties, should they choose to participate in any form, should explain their alternatives publicly. Women, minorities, workers, and citizens outside organised party structures must have routes into the discussion that do not depend on a party’s permission.
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	<lang class="3" style=".Bodylaser" colour="#000000" orgstyle="BODY 2025" font="Antonia H1" fontStyle="Medium" size="9">The committee should ultimately judge every proposal by a disarming question: would its authors still defend this rule if their strongest political opponent controlled the government? Reform that passes that test begins to resemble constitutionalism. Reform designed to secure today’s advantage merely prepares tomorrow’s grievance. The purpose is not to make power easier to exercise, but harder to monopolise.</lang>
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