

Is no one safe from police excesses?

Assault on cricketer Nayeem shows lack of strong accountability measures

It is disturbing to learn of yet another incident of police misconduct, this time involving Bangladesh spinner Nayeem Hasan in Chattogram. According to reports, Nayeem was returning home on Friday night after playing a Dhaka Premier League match in Savar when he was stopped by a patrol team near Lalkhan Bazar. There, he was allegedly manhandled, taken to Khulshi Police Station, and subjected to further harassment. Once his identity was established, however, the situation quickly shifted to damage-control mode, leading to the “closing” of two police personnel, the formation of a probe committee, and the initiation of departmental proceedings.

But when a national cricketer needs saving in this way, it says a lot about policing in general even after so-called reforms targeting police accountability following the uprising. It's not hard to understand the immediate trigger for the subsequent actions: public outrage. Besides ordinary fans, the Bangladesh Cricket Board (BCB), the Cricketers' Welfare Association of Bangladesh (CWAB), and several national cricketers have condemned the incident and called for appropriate action against those responsible. The Chattogram Metropolitan Police has, meanwhile, expressed regret, stressing that any misconduct is the responsibility of individual officers, not the force. But such a statement, involving a high-profile figure, is defensive at best and does not address the deeper concerns that such incidents repeatedly expose.

We are all too familiar with this pattern of abuse of power. Too often, and not in the distant past, citizens have had to encounter coercive authority whether on the roads or within the confines of their homes, and in dealings with the police on charges either genuine or fabricated. They have had to face the punishing consequences of a lack of police action when situations called for it. Many have had to endure custodial torture. The manner in which police authority is still exercised—with insufficient oversight, and existing accountability mechanisms remaining largely internalised, reactive, and unevenly enforced—has allowed a culture to persist where excess is often corrected only *after* it becomes publicly visible, and embarrassing for the higher ups, rather than at the point of excess.

This is why isolated disciplinary measures, however swift, do not convince us that the culture of impunity will be addressed. Citizens need to see not just punishment after the fact, but also an overhaul of how policing in general is supervised, monitored, and held to account at all times. There must be clear operational protocols (a necessity again highlighted by Nayeem's case), independent investigative mechanisms, enforceable standards of conduct, and regular disclosure of disciplinary outcomes. Without these, each new incident may only reproduce the same cycle of denial, outrage, and forced administrative response. The mass uprising, at its very core, demanded a clear break with this culture.

We need to keep talking about Gaza

The world must unite to end Israel's endless brutality

The war in Iran, and the consequent spillover of higher fuel prices, have largely kept Israel's genocide in Palestine out of domestic headlines in Bangladesh. But despite the signing of a ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas in October last year, there has been no let-up in the former's attacks on Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. On Thursday, the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said that the number of settler attacks causing casualties or property damage in the occupied West Bank has surpassed 1,000 this year. Moreover, more than 2,200 Palestinians have been displaced so far this year due to settler violence and access restrictions, alongside hundreds more displaced by home demolitions carried out by Israeli authorities. The current rate of attacks by the settlers is notable because, at an average of six incidents per day, it is reportedly higher than in any previous year on record.

While Israel's violence against Palestinians has been ongoing since 1948, it reached unprecedented levels after it launched its retaliation in response to Hamas's attack of October 7, 2023. A recently published analysis by Oxfam International stated that more Palestinians have been killed by the Israeli military and settlers in West Bank in the last three years—1,244—than in the previous 17 years combined. And more than one in five victims was a child. The numbers are, of course, far worse in Gaza, where Israel, by its own acknowledgement, has killed at least 70,000 and injured more than 171,000 since October 2023.

Despite the Palestinian statehood being recognised by 81 percent of the UN's 193 member states, Israel continues to enjoy staunch support from powerful countries such as the US, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Of the support Palestine does have, much seems to exist only on paper. According to an investigation by Al Jazeera, military-related goods originating from at least 51 countries and self-governing territories have continued entering Israel even after the ICJ's January 2024 warning of “a plausible risk of genocide in Gaza.” The five largest countries of origin for military-related goods entering Israel—the US, India, Romania, Taiwan, and the Czech Republic—all recorded increased shipments starting in October 2023.

So, the blood of innocent Palestinians is not just on the hands of policymakers in Israel and the US. Too many countries around the world remain somehow complicit in these ongoing atrocities. Since last year's ceasefire declaration, Israel has violated the agreement at least 3,201 times as of June 9. We are witnessing, in real time, the destruction of entire bloodlines. Therefore, just as South Africa took the initiative to challenge Israel at the ICJ, other countries must find the courage to do more than merely voice support for Palestine. They must take other practical measures, including diplomatic, economic, and legal actions, to help bring this genocide to an end.

The language of denial in the 57th BGB-BSF border talks



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When diplomatic talks fail, the language of their conclusion is usually the last to admit it. The joint press release from the 57th Director General-level Border Coordination Conference in New Delhi between the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) and India's Border Security Force (BSF), issued Friday after a day's delay, is a document worth reading with that in mind. It describes a conference held in a “cordial, positive, and forward-looking atmosphere,” reflecting “enduring cooperation and mutual trust,” where both delegations “expressed satisfaction with the outcome.” None of this is untrue in the way that lies are untrue. It is untrue in the way that omission or dilution is untrue.

Let's begin with the language itself. The joint press release says both sides discussed, among other things, “border deaths” and “illegal, inadvertent and forcible crossings.” That single clause contains the entire crisis, drained of urgency. “Border deaths” is the term the joint release uses for what the human rights organisation Ain o Salish Kendra documented as 34 Bangladeshi citizens killed by the BSF in 2025 alone — 24 in shootings, 10 after physical torture. “Forcible crossings” is the phrase used for what the BGB foiled at least 39 times over the past few days when these talks were taking place: coordinated attempts to push men, women, and children across the border without verification, through land points in districts such as Panchagarh and Thakurgaon, through river routes along the Sundarbans coast in Satkhira, at night with border security lights switched off.

Neither “push-in” nor “BSF killings” appears anywhere in the joint press release. Rather, the sanitised vocabulary of this release is in stark contrast to BGB's own separate press release on the same meeting. BGB's one explicitly refers to border killings as “deaths of unarmed and innocent Bangladeshi nationals resulting from the use of lethal and non-lethal weapons by BSF personnel,” describing such incidents as “clear violations of human rights.” It also repeatedly uses the term “push-ins” to describe recent cross-border expulsions and frames them as violations of the Joint India-Bangladesh Guidelines for Border Authorities and the Coordinated Border Management Plan (CBMP). It also records specific grievances regarding alleged unauthorised border infrastructure within 150 yards of the international boundary and multiple instances of attempted fencing deviations.

The contrast in language shows that the disagreement is not whether these issues were discussed, but how much of



This photograph, taken on June 3, 2026, five days before the 57th Director General-level Border Coordination Conference began, shows a soldier of India's Border Security Force (BSF) standing behind the Benapole-Petrapole border fence.

FILE PHOTO: AFP

that discussion is allowed to survive in the jointly authored diplomatic record.

Even last year's joint press release on the 56th BGB BSF conference, held in Dhaka in August under the Yunus-led interim government, did not have such sanitised language. That statement recorded both sides agreeing to curb border killings and halt the use of lethal weapons at the frontier. The conference concluded with a joint press conference at which both directors general spoke on the record. The 57th, however, produced no joint press conference. The press release itself was delayed until the morning after the talks ended.

What explains this regression? The 56th conference was held under a non-elected government in Bangladesh, the 57th under a political government. On June 2, Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed told reporters that deaths occurring when someone is “involved in crime or illegal intrusion” within a border force's territory should not be called border killings. It was a redefinition offered voluntarily, six days before Bangladesh sat across from the BSF, that effectively endorsed India's long-standing justification for its use of lethal force. On June 9, Information Adviser Zahed Ur Rahman described push-ins as West Bengal's internal political matter, not the Indian government's intention to “create tension in Bangladesh.” Both statements reduced Bangladesh's negotiating position before and during the talks, and neither produced any reciprocal Indian gesture.

What India's side had to say was equally revealing in its omissions. BSF Director General Praveen Kumar's position, according to the diplomatic sources in New Delhi, mirrored the Ministry of External Affairs line: actions against illegal foreigners are being taken in accordance with domestic laws and established bilateral procedures. West Bengal Chief Minister Suwendu

Amendment Act framework that specifically exempts Hindus and migrants from other faiths while targeting Muslim Bangladeshis. At the same time, it is very likely that the border will see more push in attempts, more people stranded in no-man's land, and the BSF will continue operating with a level of impunity that a half-century of DG-level talks since 1975 has

Adhikari had already put a number to those actions on June 7—claiming 4,800 “Bangladeshi infiltrators” deported, with 836 more in custody. BGB Deputy Director General Colonel Abul Hasnat Mohammad Mahmud Azam contradicted that figure, stating that “none was pushed into Bangladesh in the past one month.” Two sides, one forum, irreconcilable accounts of what has actually occurred. That the talks concluded without resolving even this factual dispute shows what the joint record of discussions is actually worth.

The joint press release says both sides agreed to “strengthen coordinated patrols, enhance vigilance, improve real-time information sharing, and intensify joint efforts against trans-border criminal networks.” These commitments, if they can be called that, are indistinguishable from what the previous conferences said. There are no timelines, no benchmarks, and no consequences for breach. The Joint Record of Discussions is not even an agreement, when India's countless violations of the 2011 CBMP, which is an agreement intended to reduce killings and the incidence of crime, are considered.

Perhaps the most consequential line in the document is the announcement that the next conference is “proposed to be held in Dhaka in November at a mutually convenient time.” However, between now and November, the West Bengal government's “detect, delete, and deport” campaign is likely to continue operating under a Citizenship

never seriously challenged.

The talks have a legitimate function. They allow field commanders to share information. They create channels that are better than silence. But they cannot do what is being asked of them now, because the current crisis is not a border management problem. It is the execution of an electoral promise made by India's ruling party to its base in a state of one hundred million people, enabled by a legal architecture that has formally encoded religious discrimination into immigration enforcement. An institution designed to resolve cattle-grazing disputes and coordinate smuggling interdiction cannot address that. No number of DG-level meetings, joint records, and reaffirmed commitments will change a political calculation being made not at the BSF headquarters in New Delhi but in the BJP's West Bengal apparatus.

The media reported that in the press release of the 57th conference, the Bangladesh and Indian delegations expressed confidence that the decisions and understandings reached during the meeting would further enhance bilateral cooperation. On the evidence available, there is no reason to share that confidence. People are still being pushed. People are still being shot. As recently as on Friday evening, yet another Bangladeshi youth was killed in firing by the BSF along the Kulaura border in Moulvibazar. However, the language used last year in a joint press release, “without any killing on either side,” is amiss.

Who pays for a fossil-free future? Bonn talks must answer the question



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As negotiators engage in Bonn, Germany for the ongoing UN climate talks, there is a risk that these meetings might be dismissed as being technical. But beneath all the procedural language lies a political question that will define the climate century: who pays for the transition away from fossil fuels, and who bears the risks if finance never arrives?

The science is clear, and so is the reality of communities facing floods, droughts, heatwaves, and displacement. The world must move beyond fossil fuels, and the question is whether governments are willing to finance this transition at the speed and scale required.

That is why Bonn matters. It is the first major test of whether commitments emerging from recent climate summits, including the political momentum from COP30 in Brazil's Belém, will be translated into implementation. But there is a deepening gap between ambition and finance that becomes acutely apparent when developing countries that did little to cause climate

impacts are asked to decarbonise while facing debt pressures.

Climate finance is now the central fault line. Adaptation finance remains far below what vulnerable countries require. Mitigation finance is insufficient for equitable energy transitions. And just transition finance also remains fragmented and underdeveloped.

Bangladesh offers a stark illustration of these inequalities. Despite contributing a minute share of historical emissions, it faces intensifying cyclones, flooding, and salinity intrusion that strain public finances and livelihoods. Yet, it continues to invest heavily in adaptation, effectively paying twice for a crisis it did not create, while climate finance remains insufficient and difficult to access.

A feminist lens deepens this critique further. Climate finance too often flows to large infrastructure while bypassing women-led organisations, Indigenous networks, and local resilience systems. But these actors are often the ones sustaining the everyday work of climate

survival through care, food systems, water access, and community health. It reveals how climate policy reflects deeper systems of inequality, where power, gender, and economic structures determine whose work is valued and whose lives are most exposed to risk. A just transition must therefore recognise care as climate infrastructure, not an invisible subsidy.

If finance continues to lag behind ambition, the transition to renewables will become politically unstable. Communities facing economic insecurity will resist change. Developing countries under fiscal pressure will struggle to invest in clean energy. Adaptation gaps will widen, and climate impacts will intensify, worsening inequality. The alternative is a well-financed, equitable transition that reduces poverty, creates jobs, strengthens public services, and builds resilience.

Belém should therefore be understood not as an endpoint but as a signal moment in a longer struggle over climate justice. It reflected a growing recognition that fossil fuel transition, adaptation, and transition cannot be separated in policy design. However, recognition without implementation risks begetting another cycle of deferred responsibility, where political language advances faster than financial commitments.

At the heart of the dispute in Bonn is not only the scale of finance but the architecture through which it is

delivered. Many developing countries argue that existing systems reproduce dependency rather than enabling autonomy. Across negotiations, a broader coalition is emerging that links climate justice with gender justice, Indigenous rights, and economic transformation. Feminist movements, in particular, are reframing climate policy as a question of power: who decides, who benefits, and who is excluded. This shift is reshaping the moral language of climate negotiations, even when institutional change lags.

Global leaders must stop treating climate finance as a bargaining chip and recognise it as the foundation of collective climate action. As the talks in Bonn continue, the question is no longer what governments promise, but whether they are willing to pay for the future they claim to support. They will be judged by one test: who paid and who was protected.

We are now in a phase where credibility depends on delivery, and delivery depends on finance. Without this shift, climate promises will continue to accumulate while the political and ecological costs are pushed onto those least responsible for the crisis. Incremental ambition is no longer sufficient; what is required is structural alignment among climate goals, financial systems, and global equity if the transition is to hold politically and socially. That is the test Bonn must confront if it is to mean anything at all.