The result of the just-concluded West Bengal legislative assembly election is significant not only because of the change of power but also because it marks the emergence of a new structural phenomenon in eastern India and, in addition, a new variable for Bangladesh-India relations. Winning by gaining 206 seats and nearly 46 percent of votes (an increase of almost eight percentage points from last year) was the result of not only the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) electoral campaign but also its ability to consolidate its political base in one of the most problematic states for the right-wing party.

Among the reasons behind BJP’s victory are obviously the powerful anti-incumbent sentiments among West Bengal’s citizens. Growing concerns about lack of employment opportunities, the non-expansion of industrial enterprises, cases of corruption associated with the recruitment practices of Trinamool Congress (TMC), and the functioning of local political patronage networks contributed significantly to it. Welfare programmes, mainly aimed at benefiting women, created a social buffer against discontent but failed to cover demands related to economic development and administration.

Moreover, the BJP succeeded in changing some elements of its previous campaign strategy. Having learned from its failures in 2021, the party made efforts to diminish its “outsider” perception by leveraging local leadership, language, and culture, while developing its organisational capabilities in North Bengal and in border areas.

A third element of the BJP’s success can be attributed to changes in social coalitions on which the TMC relied before. The fact that Hindus consolidated their political preferences and there emerged some division among minorities has become a critical point. Certainly, it cannot be said that the BJP achieved its goal largely through social polarisation; however, the transformation of social coalitions became a crucial factor in this victory.

One of the most controversial features of this election is its pre-campaign phase called Special Intensive Revision (SIR). As a result of the process, about nine million names were removed from voter rolls. It decreased the number of registered voters from around 76 million to about 68 million, with about 2.7 million people not reinstated after SIR. Though it may seem quite normal, its criteria raised significant concerns, specifically regarding “logical discrepancy.”

SIR has caused a paradoxical situation. First, despite the deletion of voters’ names, turnout reached nearly 93 percent. Nevertheless, in 48 constituencies, the number of registered voters decreased, representing a disproportionately large proportion of those deleted. In this case, even though the overall voter turnout increased, the competitive equilibrium shifted in certain areas where this factor was especially important.

Having mentioned all of this, it would be incorrect to claim that the BJP gained victory exclusively thanks to SIR. Various factors influenced the process, including anti-incumbent sentiment, the BJP’s strengthening of its organisational power, the reconfiguration of social coalitions, and the messages the party delivered to voters.

However, one of the main themes of the election was precisely the message dominating it. The slogan “detect, delete, deport” reflected a specific attitude towards Bangladesh and its alleged infiltration of West Bengal. These issues were directly associated with the region and its borders and thus constituted an extremely important element of BJP’s strategy.

Border constituencies played a decisive role in determining the election outcome. As calculations show, 44 seats bordering Bangladesh, along with adjacent regions, proved crucial to the BJP’s victory.

From the perspective of Bangladesh, the outcome of the election has significant implications as well. The Petrapole-Benapole corridor is responsible for more than 70 percent of land-based trade between Bangladesh and India. Besides, about 2.8 million people use the border region for transit each year. Therefore, political changes there affect not only the issues of border crossings, visa access, and trade facilitation, but also Bangladesh’s economic interests. Although Dhaka responded pragmatically, focusing on bilateral issues, new opportunities emerged to resolve some of them in Bangladesh’s favour.

For example, the issue of the Teesta water-sharing agreement, long blocked by West Bengal’s state government, may face fewer obstacles now that interests align between the state and the centre. However, further events remain unpredictable. Consequently, the post-election political situation is characterised by two contradictory features: coordination with West Bengal on specific problems and politicisation of Bangladesh-India relations, which might lead to further mutual mistrust.

Against the backdrop of unstable, somewhat fragile relations that have existed since August 2024, such a political strategy can entail adverse consequences beyond diplomatic channels. Cross-border movement and people-to-people contacts may become complicated. Since August 2024, the number of visas and medical travel permits has decreased; in addition, the use of transshipment sites has increased trade costs. The current situation may deteriorate due to a harsher line on border issues.

The West Bengal election should be seen not as an isolated phenomenon but as part of the process of political realignment in India. From the perspective of Bangladesh, its implications will be seen through a gradual change in relations depending on the extent to which electoral rhetoric turns into practical actions.