

TAKEAWAYS FROM COP30

A milestone marked by missed chances



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When the 30th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) concluded on November 22, 2025, in Belém, Brazil, many left the Amazon-flanked venue with a sense that the summit had once again delivered more promise than payoff. On paper, the so-called Belém Package, a bundle of 29 decisions agreed by 195 parties, seemed to signal a renewed commitment to climate action. But digging deeper, one sees glaring omissions—no binding roadmap to phase out fossil fuels, no firm plan to stop deforestation, and climate finance pledges that remain vague at best.

From the perspective of many vulnerable countries, including Bangladesh, COP30 highlights just how creaky the traditional COP model has become. Consensus politics, once hailed as the global vehicle for climate cooperation, seems increasingly ill-suited to the urgency of our planet's crisis. If the world continues to lean solely on this old mechanism, the gap between climate ambition and climate reality will only widen.

What COP30 delivered, and what it left unresolved

COP30 was not entirely without achievements. By adopting the Belém Package, the summit committed, in principle, to a "tripling" of climate adaptation finances by 2035. For countries such as Bangladesh, which is already experiencing climate-induced floods, cyclones, salinity intrusion, and river erosion, this signal of increased support for adaptation could serve as a lifeline. A new Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) was formalised, encompassing, for the first time under the UN climate framework, technical assistance and capacity-building, as well as support for a just transition to low-carbon economies. The global *mutirão* spirit, emphasising collective action, suggests that COP negotiators aim

to shift from mere symbolic pledges to more implementation-focused cooperation. There was also renewed emphasis on nature, land, forests, agriculture, and inclusive climate action that centres on communities and vulnerable populations.

Yet, the summit's two highest stakes issues, fossil fuel phaseout and deforestation, were effectively sidelined. Despite strong pressure from more than 80 countries to adopt a roadmap for phasing out coal, oil, and gas, powerful fossil fuel-producing countries blocked any binding language. Similarly, though the Amazon rainforest formed a

potent backdrop to the summit, the deal lacked a credible global commitment to halt and reverse deforestation. In short, COP30 ended with many of the structural drivers of climate change, fossil fuels and deforestation, untouched.

Moreover, the promise to triple adaptation finance remains vague—no baseline was defined, the timeline stretched to 2035, and there is no clarity yet on who will foot the bill or how. For countries already beleaguered by climate shocks, such an open-ended commitment may feel too little, too late.

Why this matters for Bangladesh

For a low-lying, deltaic country like Bangladesh, with a high climate exposure factor, COP30's outcome is a bitter pill. On the one hand, the adjusted focus on climate finance, adaptation, and just transitions provides some glimmer of hope. As floods and cyclones get worse, and shorelines retreat, stronger adaptation finance can translate into better flood protection infrastructure, early warning systems for disasters, climate-resilient agriculture, and social support for



Members of the Belem Action Mechanism (BAM) hold a demonstration during the COP30 UN Climate Change Conference in Belém, Para state, Brazil on November 21, 2025.

FILE PHOTO: AFP

vulnerable communities. If the JTM were paired with actual resources, it could provide a means to transition away from climate-vulnerable livelihoods towards more resilient economic activities, especially in coastal areas and flood plains.

What this implies is that unless the global community addresses the root causes—fossil fuel dependency and ecosystem destruction—we are only rearranging deck chairs on a sinking ship. Bangladesh's vulnerability does not end with adaptation; long-term survivability depends on a deep reduction in global emissions and ecosystem protection worldwide. Without fossil-fuel phase-out or forest-protection guarantees, the greenhouse gas burden will keep increasing, sea levels will keep rising, and extreme weather will worsen.

The stalemate at COP30 reveals the Achilles heel of the traditional COP model—unanimity. As long as fossil-fuel producing countries can veto any binding commitment, the process will at best produce bland compromises. From this perspective, expecting meaningful global transformation through this mechanism feels like relying on miracles.

However, an alternate path may now be emerging, one that does not rely on global consensus but on flexible alliances. Some countries from COP30 have already indicated they will pursue fossil-fuel transition and forest-protection roadmaps outside the formal UN process, via "climate clubs" or coalitions of the willing. What this means is that progress might come not from universal consensus, but from a network of countries ready to act together.

For Bangladesh, this brings both opportunities and challenges. A climate club approach might offer a more direct path to decarbonisation, technology transfer, and financing, particularly through partnered action with developing countries suffering from the climate. But it also comes with risks. Will these alliances prioritise countries of economic or strategic weight to the exclusion of countries like Bangladesh? And what if "club climate action" ends up exacerbating just the sort of global inequalities that it is trying to overcome?

If we are to benefit, then Bangladesh, in collaboration with regional partners, must proactively engage with these emerging

coalitions. We need to ensure that climate clubs are inclusive and align with the interests of vulnerable nations. Otherwise, the shift in global governance may leave us behind.

COP30 shows that climate politics is evolving, but slowly. For Bangladesh, the summit should be a wake-up call—adaptation financing pledges are welcome, but cannot substitute for mitigation; consensus-driven diplomacy may stall when the stakes are highest; and new forms of cooperation, flexible, coalition-based, action-oriented, may produce more real change.

First, policymakers and civil society in Bangladesh should treat the COP30 adaptation pledge as a starting gun. They must engage immediately with multilateral funds, humanitarian agencies, and development partners to shape how adaptation financing will reach vulnerable communities. There is a narrow but real opportunity to secure funds for resilient infrastructure, climate-smart agriculture, and disaster management systems—investments that can save lives and livelihoods.

Second, Bangladesh must adopt a dual-track climate strategy, strengthen adaptation and social protection on one hand, while pursuing decarbonisation and integration with emerging climate-club frameworks on the other. Our export-oriented industries, manufacturing, RMG, and energy should be pulled into a low-carbon transition early, leveraging the rising global demand for greener supply chains.

Third, at the regional and global level, Bangladesh must join forces with other climate-vulnerable countries to pressure climate clubs to prioritise equity and inclusion. These should not be new venues for climate colonialism, but spaces for technology transfer, financial assistance, and shared adaptation-mitigation action planning. The country's diplomacy should embody this necessity.

Finally, Bangladesh should continue building its internal capacities in climate governance, climate-disaster risk management, renewable energy deployment, and social protection. Unless we build domestic resilience and adaptive capacity, external promises, even genuine ones, will not suffice.

A meagre outcome with major consequences



MIND THE GAP

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The Conference of the Parties (COP) 30 has ended, and the United Nations' reaction was immediate and unusually blunt: the results were meagre. In diplomatic language, such phrasing is rarely accidental. It signals not disappointment at the margins, but concern about the direction global climate governance is taking. COP30 was expected to mark a turning point. Instead, it confirmed how entrenched the political resistance remains and how limited the current frameworks are in producing meaningful outcomes.

The consequences are not abstract. Every delayed commitment, every softened line of text, and every diluted pledge translates into escalating risk for millions of people living in climate-vulnerable regions. Rising temperatures are no longer projections. They are now lived realities, with heatwaves, coastal erosion, flooding, and food insecurity becoming annual features of national governance challenges. When climate negotiations stall, those risks intensify.

Legally, COP30 reaffirmed the central weakness of the Paris Agreement architecture. It is cooperative but not binding, aspirational but not enforceable. The structure relies on voluntary commitments, peer pressure, and moral persuasion. These mechanisms work only if states are politically willing, and COP30 revealed a collective unwillingness to move beyond the minimum. The failure to secure concrete language on fossil fuel phase-out, financial obligations, or transparent implementation pathways means the world continues to operate under a framework that encourages ambition while legitimising delay.

For developing countries, the legal and practical consequences are immediate. Adaptation finance, which was meant to be a cornerstone of global climate equity, remains inconsistent and structurally insufficient. Commitments are made, celebrated, and quietly unmet. Funding that arrives is highly conditional, slow to disburse, and often directed through

intermediaries rather than directly to the governments that need it. This undermines national planning and forces countries to navigate an unpredictable and fragmented financial landscape.

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For Bangladesh, the inadequacy of COP30 is not a distant diplomatic concern but an immediate existential issue. As one of the most climate-vulnerable states in the world, Bangladesh faces the consequences of global inaction with disproportionate severity. Rising sea levels threaten to displace millions, salinity intrusion erodes agricultural productivity, intensified cyclones strain national infrastructure, and recurring floods impose heavy economic losses that exceed the state's adaptive capacity.

disproportionate severity. Rising sea levels threaten to displace millions, salinity intrusion erodes agricultural productivity, intensified cyclones strain national infrastructure, and recurring floods impose heavy economic losses that exceed the state's adaptive capacity. Without predictable financing, enforceable mitigation commitments from major emitters or a functional loss and damage regime, Bangladesh is forced into a position where

resilience must be built domestically while the international system fails to uphold its responsibilities. This is not merely inequitable; it undermines the core principles of climate justice that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was designed to protect. COP30 did not produce a clear liability structure, nor did it specify long-term financial sources. Without enforceability, the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) remains a symbolic victory rather than a substantive one. Countries facing inundation, displacement and economic loss are left without the legal certainty that international law should provide.

This ongoing failure has deeper implications. International climate law is increasingly at risk of becoming a patchwork of political gestures without operative force. The absence of binding obligations creates a structural inequality between nations that can afford adaptation and those that cannot. It erodes trust and undermines the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, which was intended to recognise historical emissions and capacity differences. If COP outcomes continue to shift responsibility downward while accountability remains diffused, global climate governance will lose legitimacy.

There are geopolitical consequences as well. As negotiations stagnate, more states are turning to litigation to fill the vacuum. Climate cases brought before national courts, regional tribunals and international bodies have surged in the past five years. Plaintiffs are no longer arguing broad moral responsibility. They are arguing breach of duty, negligence and violation of rights. Courts are beginning to define obligations in ways climate negotiations fail to do, and COP30's weaknesses will likely accelerate this trend.

If current patterns continue, we may also see a rise in unilateral and regional policy blocs. States that cannot rely on global agreements may begin forming smaller alliances with enforceable trade conditions tied to emissions standards and adaptation commitments. This shift would fragment climate governance further, leaving vulnerable nations outside decision-making circles where they need representation.

The humanitarian consequences are equally severe. With global mitigation stalled, climate-vulnerable states are forced to

adapt to changes that exceed their institutional capacities. This accelerates migration pressures, infrastructure collapse, disease outbreaks and economic instability. These impacts spread beyond borders and reshape regional politics, labour markets and security landscapes. COP30's failure, therefore, imposes cascading costs on states least equipped to bear them.

The legal community must now confront an uncomfortable reality. The current system, built on voluntary pledges and moral commitments, is not delivering outcomes proportionate to the scale of the crisis. It was designed to foster cooperation,

but cooperation has limits when it conflicts with economic self-interest. Without binding obligations, transparent review mechanisms and credible enforcement tools, COP agreements risk becoming statements of intent rather than instruments of governance.

The consequences of COP30 will not be felt in diplomatic halls. They will be felt in coastlines that recede, in dried farmlands, in cities that overheat and in communities that relocate because international law failed to protect them. Climate-vulnerable nations now stand at an inflection point. They cannot rely on global goodwill. They must push for

structural reform in negotiations, expand climate litigation strategies, strengthen regional alliances and invest in domestic resilience. The world does not have the luxury of waiting for political consensus.

COP30 did not deliver the outcomes that science demands or justice requires. The consequences of that failure are already unfolding. Unless the global community moves from symbolic progress to legally enforceable commitments, the climate crisis will continue to evolve faster than the institutions created to address it. The window for course correction is narrowing, and every weak COP outcome shortens it further.

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e-Tender Notice

For financial year 2025-26, e-Tender is invited in the National e-GP Portal (<http://www.eprocure.gov.bd>) for the procurement of

Sl. No.	Description	Tender ID	Procurement Method	Scheduled Tender Publication Date & Time	Tender Opening Date and Time
1.	Lentils (Musur Dal)	1181892	OTM	30-Nov-2025 12:00	18-Dec-2025 12:00
2.	Soyabean Oil	1182450	OTM	30-Nov-2025 12:00	18-Dec-2025 12:00
3.	Grinding wheat (Gom pesai)	1183081	OTM	30-Nov-2025 12:00	18-Dec-2025 12:00
4.	Polao Rice	1183185	OTM	30-Nov-2025 12:00	18-Dec-2025 12:00
5.	Firewood (Jalani Khor)	1183632	OTM	30-Nov-2025 12:00	18-Dec-2025 12:00
6.	Handling and Transportation	1183748	OTM	30-Nov-2025 12:00	18-Dec-2025 12:00

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