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How a US act revived Sino-Indian confrontation over Tibet
PHOTO: REUTERS
On June 12, 2024, both houses of US Congress passed a bipartisan bill called “Promoting a Resolution to Tibet-China Dispute Act,” better known as “Resolve Tibet Act.” The act calls on China to find a “peaceful settlement” to the 65-year-old Tibet issue through dialogue with the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, who is in exile in Dharamshala, India. The Dalai Lama was rescued from Lhasa to India in March 1959, when Chinese troops were about to take over the Tibetan capital. He still heads a “Tibetan Government in Exile,” based in the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh, despite strong Chinese disapproval.
Almost six decades after the Sino-Indian war over the Tibetan border issue and the Dalai Lama’s ambivalent stand on Tibet’s sovereignty, the US’ Resolve Tibet Act would certainly bring the issue out of historical obscurity. The issue was thought to have been frozen after the China-US rapprochement and the US’ acceptance of the One-China policy in 1972, while India is also said to have reconciled with the claim that Tibet is an integral part of China.
The issue was settled to an extent when China reconciled with India’s takeover of Sikkim, considered one of the five fingers of Tibet, during the visit of India’s late Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 1979. But China never gave up its claim over outer Tibet including Aksai Chin, Tawang and Arunachal Pradesh—declared as one of the five fingers of Tibet by Mao Zedong—in the northeast.
Since its creation in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has denied the outcome of the Shimla Convention of 1914, which was attended by representatives of autonomous Tibet and the Republic of China (ROC). Though the ROC attended the meeting, it refused to endorse the border agreement, claiming that the entire Tibet had historically belonged to China and would always remain an integral part of it.
The India-China dispute particularly centred on the western border in Eastern Ladakh, involving Aksai Chin—with there being controversy over the acceptance of the Macartney-MacDonald Line versus the Johnson Line. PRC claimed the Karakoram watershed line to be the correct dividing line, rejecting India’s claim based on the Johnson Line further to the east. During his official visit to India in 1960, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai refused to adjust the border along the Karakoram Range in exchange for recognition of the McMahon Line in Arunachal Pradesh. This refusal, despite efforts by then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, regarding the Tibet and Dalai Lama issue, dashed hopes for a peaceful settlement between the two governments.
The complex relationship soured not only over the border dispute but was compounded by the involvement of CIA, India and Pakistan in the Tibet uprising and the extrication of the Dalai Lama, primarily facilitated by India, which provided him refuge. As a result, what began as an exemplary third-world relationship between China and India soon turned bitter.
These issues were central to the 1962 Sino-Indian war, in which India suffered defeat in both Aksai Chin in the west and Arunachal Pradesh in the east. The events of the war remain ingrained in the Indian psyche and continue to influence its military strategy and geopolitics. China unilaterally withdrew from Arunachal Pradesh but retained control over Aksai Chin. And the Chinese claim over outer Tibet in Arunachal Pradesh remains a contentious issue.
During that war, India faced significant supply and troop deployment issues on the northeast through the Siliguri Corridor, also known as the Chicken’s Neck. East Pakistan at that time stood in the way of any alternative supply route to the Chicken’s Neck. And it’s worth noting that China was increasing its presence at Nathula Pass in Sikkim and the Namka Chu Pass in Tawang region, posing a threat to the Siliguri Corridor between Tetulia, Bangladesh, and Nepal.
India learned an important lesson about its strategic handicap, vis-à-vis Arunachal Pradesh, which could be a flashpoint in any Sino-Indian conflict. But things have changed drastically since 1962, and both countries are now nuclear powers. And yet, reports indicate that both have heavily militarised along the McMahon Line, especially after the Sino-Indian Doklam standoff on the Sikkim-Bhutan border.
Chinese presence in Doklam makes it easier to threaten the corridor in the event of a wider conflict. Therefore, India’s strategic pursuit of alternatives, such as the Kaladan route, is insufficient due to its longer and more perilous journey. And so, the other obvious alternative being talked about in many leading Indian newspapers is through Bangladesh.
While the US was in the process of enacting the Resolve Tibet Act, Chine issued a new official map showing the entire Arunachal Pradesh as being a part of Tibet, changing its name to Xizang. What is interesting is that, within a week of the Act passing on June 18, a bipartisan seven member US Congressional delegation visited Dharamshala and met with the Dalai Lama.
Moreover, the act says that, “claims made by officials of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that Tibet has been a part of China since ancient times are historically inaccurate.” And that, “United States public diplomacy efforts should counter disinformation about Tibet from the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party, including disinformation about the history of Tibet, the Tibetan people, and Tibetan institutions, including that of the Dalai Lama.” It further calls on China to negotiate with the Dalai Lama’s government in exile.
After meeting the Dalai Lama, the US delegation also visited India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The fact that the Indian PM decided to meet with the US delegation sends a clear message to China as regards to India’s position. Predictably, the delegation’s visit drew angry responses from the Chinese authorities, who view the act as interfering with China’s internal matters.
Given these circumstances, it’s important to ask where Bangladesh stands in regards to the geostrategic tensions between China and India. Bangladesh also needs to seriously think about the implications of allowing Indian logistical routes to bypass the critical Chicken’s Neck for potential military-logistical buildup, perhaps against China in the future. Thus, it is essential to clarify whether India is seeking transhipment, transit, or a corridor through Bangladesh—which India has been trying to get since the time of Bangabandhu’s government.
Brig Gen (retd) Dr M Sakhawat Hussain,
former election commissioner of Bangladesh, is senior fellow at the South Asian Institute of Policy and Governance (SIPG), North South University (NSU). He can be reached at hhintlbd@yahoo.com.
After meeting the Dalai Lama, the US delegation also visited India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The fact that the Indian PM decided to meet with the US delegation sends a clear message to China as regards to India’s position. Predictably, the delegation’s visit drew angry responses from the Chinese authorities, who view the act as interfering with China’s internal matters.