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Has BNP served its supporters well?
FILE PHOTO: SAJJAD HOSSAIN
So far, we have written a lot about the general election and how the ruling party and the present government have miserably failed (in fact, they never really tried) to create an appropriate atmosphere for a free and fair election. We have also written highly critical pieces regarding the way in which they have treated the main opposition, BNP, with hundreds sentenced, thousands arrested, and many thousands more on the run to stay out of the police’s clutches. Our legal system stands weaponised to punish the dissenters, with the police having been given full immunity to misuse their powers to punish, harass and intimidate political opponents, terrorising them beyond belief.
But what about the other side? Did BNP play its part in living up to the wishes of its workers, leave alone the wishes of the people who are dissatisfied with the government and disillusioned with the Awami League? Was BNP’s decision to boycott the election taken in any consultative manner, or was it simply imposed on the party workers?
Given the tradition of anti-incumbency among our voters, the unending stories of misuse of power, corruption, and the nepotism in AL, it is not unreasonable to think that people may have wanted a change. Did BNP build on that? Our own reporters’ briefings, the studies that remain unpublished for fear of reprisal, and the rumoured intelligence reports all suggest that support for the opposition was considerable, if not overwhelming. What did BNP do with that support?
Immediately after the 2018 election, BNP declared that it would not participate in any future election under the AL regime, and demanded a caretaker government. Its division-level mobilisation late last year resulted in massive rallies despite severe obstacles, such as transport strikes and various impediments imposed by the government. It gave the BNP and its sympathisers the impression that the party’s campaign was bearing fruit.
However, perhaps missing in its calculation was how overwhelming the governmental response would be, and when it came, how BNP would tackle it. Alarmed by the public support for BNP, the ruling party unleashed all sorts of undemocratic and extralegal measures to curb the opposition. The actions post-October 28—most oppressive, by any standard—severely affected the BNP’s capacity to continue its programmes. The arrest of the party’s secretary general, followed by arrests of many top BNP leaders (and with the rest being kept on the run), literally incapacitated this massive party.
To put it simply: BNP launched a movement to oust AL from power—demanding a caretaker government amounts to that—without adequate preparation, and this is now becoming more and more evident. The BNP failed to reap anything effective from the huge public support that it was able to garner late last year.
BNP also made the fatal mistake of not having a Plan B. Demanding Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s removal from power was bound to trigger retaliation. There seems to have been no clear thinking on how to survive that. If the purpose was to loosen the incumbents’ hold on the election mechanism, there could have been proposals for power-sharing during elections, or select portfolios being given to the opposition or neutral people under some constitutional arrangement agreed to by both sides. Since the role of police is the key during elections, there could have been special proposals for reducing the ruling party’s hold on them. Alternative views would have shown voters that BNP was flexible and open to negotiations. Shutting down all prospects of this was another vital mistake on the BNP’s part. This is where the “external pressure” that the BNP was counting on felt completely let down. In all the talks that the BNP had with ambassadors, none supported the idea of an election under a caretaker government, while all insisted on the need for a free and fair election, for Bangladesh’s own democratic future. BNP did not absorb this message.
It can be argued that AL never really wanted BNP in the poll contest in the first place, and that BNP never realised that its boycott was actually serving the AL’s goal of keeping it out of the political process as a whole.
It appears that the biggest opposition party never really conducted any in-depth analysis as to whether a boycott would really serve its long-term interests. One wonders what lessons the BNP learnt from its boycott of the 2014 election, if any. Among many other issues, it can be argued that, had the BNP not boycotted the 2014 election, Khaleda Zia would not have lost her position as the leader of the opposition and perhaps would not have faced persecution and incarceration. Even if that had happened, Begum Khaleda Zia would have been far better placed to fight those cases as the leader of the opposition than as just a political leader. Her eclipse from having an active role in leading the party has had a devastating impact on the BNP. Could this have happened if the party hadn’t boycotted the election in 2014? Did it take any of this into account?
This election boycott would be the BNP’s second one. There are no instances in our region—perhaps none in other democracies either—of a political party surviving after boycotting two elections over a span of one decade. Could this situation present an existential problem for the BNP?
BNP’s approach appears to be that, unless assured of victory, the party deems it of no use to participate in the election—a fatal mistake, in our view. The advantage of being a powerful opposition never seems to have appealed to BNP. It did not consider that the parliament would provide a powerful forum through which to propagate its own policies and visions for the future, and thereby create an image of it as a viable alternative.
The truth is, however sad and damaging it may have been for the growth of parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh, neither of our two big parties ever took the role of being the opposition seriously. Both AL and BNP always wanted power, and never the role of a responsible critic to keep the government in check.
As said earlier, anti-incumbency, a government’s failures, widespread corruption, and arrogance have all contributed to a feeling for a need for change, which the BNP failed to build on. It might not have gotten the majority votes to form the next government, but it definitely could have formed a powerful opposition, giving it an effective stage to strive for power in 2029. But such a strategy does not appear to have interested BNP at all. It was an “all or nothing” gambit that led BNP to opt for boycotting the election, for which the country and democracy will have to pay a high price.
If BNP had decided to participate in the election, there would have been 300 BNP (or, in partnership with others) nominees in every nook and corner of the country campaigning for themselves and exposing AL’s corruption, power abuse, and misdeeds. The campaign itself would have held the ruling party to some account and significantly strengthened BNP’s hold on the public mind. If nothing else, BNP’s campaign itself would have had some sobering effect on the ruling party. Its participation would have encouraged foreign observers to take notice, which definitely would have helped to make our election better.
Today, BNP supporters are nothing more than mere onlookers as village after village prepares for the polls, now buoyed by the participation of AL’s “rebel” candidates.
Today, all BNP can do is call hartals that nobody follows, enforce blockades which are nowhere to be seen, and declare mass protests that are practically non-existent. All that the opposition on the streets are able to do is create disruptions, which further raise questions about its success.
What a pitiable state to be in for our second-largest political party.