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For sustainable Rohingya repatriation, citizenship and security are must
After multiple failed attempts at repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar, the recent China-led initiative gave the refugees hope for a dignified return to their homeland. However, this initiative has also stumbled upon a major roadblock over the issue of the refugees’ accommodation in Myanmar. Despite Chinese Special Envoy for Asian Affairs Deng Xijun indicating earlier that the refugees would be taken back to their own villages, it has now become obvious that the Rohingya are only being offered a few “model villages” as their destination in Myanmar. A 30-member Myanmar delegation—during their recent visit to Cox’s Bazar—failed to make any commitment to the refugees regarding their request for repatriation to their original homes.
Of course, the proposition of Rohingya repatriation to these model villages should not come as a surprise, because their original villages—hundreds of them—have been razed to the ground by the Myanmar military junta to make room for new installations, including government buildings, police barracks and military bases. In fact, grand economic infrastructures are being set up in Rakhine state using Chinese and Indian investment, leading to speculations that it was the implementation of these so-called bigger economic plans that led to the ethnic cleansing and forced displacement of the Rohingya in the first place.
The Rakhine state has been cited as a lucrative destination for foreign direct investment in Myanmar because of its abundant natural resources and strategic positioning on the coastal belt, with access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. As early as in November 2017, it was reported that the then Myanmar government, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, had designated 1.27 million hectares of land in Rakhine for “agricultural development; the Chinese port and Special Economic Zone (SEZ) being constructed at Kyaukphyu; and an existing oil and gas pipeline running from Kyaukphyu to China.” Over time, India has also heavily invested in these economic ventures, which can explain its reluctance to push Myanmar to take back the refugees.
However, under mounting pressure from the international community, especially Bangladesh and China, Myanmar has built about 20 model villages for the Rohingya. There were talks of building these model villages for some years, with news website The Irrawaddy reporting as early as in 2018 that the then Myanmar government was building 12 model villages in northern Rakhine’s Maungdaw Township. It was also reported that, under the watch of the Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development (UEHRD) in Rakhine, “modest houses” were being built for the refugees, in addition to these villages. What happened to these modest houses, though, remains a mystery.
In May this year, a Rohingya delegation visited two of the model villages built for a pilot repatriation project. According to reports, these villages consist of small homes, each of which can accommodate a family of four to five. Of the two villages, one consists of 215 homes and the other has 99 homes. The Rohingya will have to use common washrooms and the kitchens are also not separate. For the first month, the Myanmar authorities will provide furnaces and firewood, after which the families will have to fend for themselves. Media reports citing the Bangladesh foreign ministry suggested that the Rohingya would be given farming land—along with seeds and fertilisers—as part of economic opportunities. The children are to get lessons from local schools, and healthcare support can be sought from local medical facilities. After an initial settlement phase, the Rohingya will also be able to purchase residence, it has been suggested.
We need to keep in mind that Rohingya refugees are currently living in either the sprawling, unhealthy camps in Cox’s Bazar or on the isolated Bhasan Char (slammed by many quarters—including international rights groups—as resembling prisons due to the stringent regulations and monitoring, and a lack of refugees’ access to the mainland).
While the new model villages are not the ideal repatriation destination for the Rohingya—who have already refused to be repatriated there—there are more pressing questions they should raise to better understand what awaits them after repatriation.
First comes the question of citizenship. Without citizenship, the Rohingya run the risk of receiving second-class treatment upon their return to Myanmar. While the refugees have, from the very beginning, rightfully demanded citizenship and voting rights as part of the repatriation deal, the Myanmar junta has only agreed to give them a National Verification Card, with no clarity on when or if they will be granted citizenship. Without citizenship, how are the Rohingya supposed to identify themselves? For the Rohingya to return without citizenship will be counterproductive, since their statelessness has been a key enabler of their persecution for decades.
Secondly, the Rohingya should be asking what security measures will be put in place to ensure their safe stay in Myanmar, given that the notorious juggernaut—the military junta—is still in power, with accountability to no other but itself. In 2017, Bangladesh pragmatically proposed that UN-monitored safe zones be created in Myanmar, so that the genocidal brutality of the past is not repeated. To add to this, UN peacekeepers—including from Bangladesh—could also be deployed to ensure the security of the Rohingya. Could the model villages be turned into safe zones, monitored and guarded by UN peacekeepers?
At the same time, as suggested earlier, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees should be provided access to the returnees so that the latter can share their experiences and discuss their concerns, as part of international protocol. This will also minimise the risk of these “model villages” being turned into concentration camps.
The repatriation document should be vetted by the UNHCR, and the Myanmar military junta should be made accountable for its treatment of the Rohingya post their return to the homeland. Perhaps China, as the key mediator in the repatriation, could take on this responsibility as it also wields significant influence with the ruling Myanmar junta.
In light of the prevailing realities, the emphasis of the Rohingya on returning to their exact land of origin is perhaps misplaced. They should be pragmatic and focus on making the most of the repatriation deal by asking for citizenship and detailed security measures. And these should be enshrined—in black and white—in the repatriation agreement, with a neutral guarantor responsible for upholding the agreement’s integrity and transparent execution.
If Myanmar is to take back its people, it should do so by affording the Rohingya their basic human rights, including their right to citizenship, along with the dignity and security they deserve. If the Myanmar junta is not able to offer the Rohingya their original villages upon repatriation, the least it can do is make it a point to give them their due citizenship. This will also boost confidence among all parties regarding the true intentions of the Myanmar junta.
Myanmar, Bangladesh, China, the UN, and other actors involved should make sure the repatriation is in favour of the Rohingya refugees—so that they can live their new lives free of violence and prejudice.