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How Bangladesh can survive in a geopolitical age
After spending months studying the issues related to the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy, the foreign ministry of Bangladesh has finalised a draft strategic paper on Dhaka’s position on this matter. The paper, provisionally titled “Indo-Pacific Outlook,” expected to be released in April, is meant to clarify Dhaka’s stance on how it sees the Indo-Pacific Strategy and what it wants to achieve in the context of the growing geopolitical contest between the United States and China in the region. By highlighting the importance of not leaning towards any side, the responsible foreign ministry officials suggested that Dhaka considered the Indo-Pacific Strategy mostly from the economic point of view.
As a rising middle power, Bangladesh is being wooed by major powers as a market, investment destination, and strategic outpost. Its rising importance is recognised in the protracted great power competition (GPC), particularly between China and the US. Qin Gang, China’s former ambassador to the US and the newly appointed foreign minister, made a surprise “technical stopover” at the Dhaka airport, meeting his Bangladesh counterpart Dr Abdul Momen before making his first diplomatic trip to Africa on January 10.
Just four days after the Chinese foreign minister’s visit, US Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia Donald Lu arrived in Dhaka for a two-day visit on January 14. This was the second high-profile visit by a US government official within a week, following the four-day visit of US National Security Council’s Senior Director for South Asia Rear Admiral Eileen Laubacher on January 7.
These visits by high-ranking US and Chinese government officials were soon followed by Anne-Marie Trevelyan, UK’s minister for the Indo-Pacific, who visited Bangladesh on March 10.
With Bangladesh becoming the site of major power rivalry, Dhaka needs to understand the unfolding dynamics of the great power competition by figuring out a more effective way to ensure its survival in this new geopolitical age. Dhaka’s ability to handle foreign affairs and relationships with other countries will determine whether Bangladesh is torn apart by the rivalry of bloc politics or succeeds in preserving its political independence by safeguarding its national interest.
One overriding national interest of Bangladesh is its physical survival as an independent sovereign state. In order to preserve and defend its hard-won independence, Dhaka has a vital stake in ensuring that the region as a whole is peaceful while the neighbouring countries remain friendly (or at least not hostile) towards Bangladesh. The rationale behind “Friendship to all, malice to none,” therefore, is to dissociate Bangladesh from military alliances by avoiding alienating major powers.
Another important national interest of Bangladesh is its economic security for the people. In order to continue the growth of exports, the flow of foreign investment, and official development assistance, it is in Bangladesh’s economic interest to keep friendly relations with other countries for trade, assistance and support.
The fact that Bangladesh, as the foreign minister suggested, is getting so much geopolitical attention means the country can no longer fully insulate itself from major power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific region. Bangladesh has successfully established good relationships with different countries and major powers by adopting a policy of peace and non-alignment. However, with South Asia and the Indian Ocean region increasingly becoming a significant site of major power competition, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for Dhaka to continuously adopt this middle-ground approach.
Bangladesh wishes to avoid upsetting China, since China is crucial for its socioeconomic and infrastructural development. As Foreign Minister Abdul Momen puts it, “[W]e need to help develop our economy, and they (China) have baskets of money. They come with the baskets of money with affordable and aggressive proposals.” On the other hand, the US has exerted great efforts to persuade Bangladesh to join the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).
But the reality facing Dhaka is, while the US is keen to incorporate Bangladesh into the Indo-Pacific Strategy, China has (already) made its displeasure known over the possible consequences of Dhaka’s participation in the anti-Beijing “club.” In this context, maintaining a good relationship with both Washington and Beijing at the same time, even as Momen admits, is a challenging task.
Furthermore, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put Bangladesh in an awkward position. Except voicing its support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and peaceful settlement of all disputes, Bangladesh has abstained on every UN resolution condemning Russia. Since the US seeks to intensify sanctions against Russia, Bangladesh’s “neutral” stance may amount to a form of tacit support for Russia’s act of aggression. Dhaka’s room to manoeuvre by maintaining a balanced foreign policy is, inevitably, shrinking.
Bangladesh’s vital national interest lies in its extensive decision-making autonomy. Therefore, rather than paying attention to the attitudes of major powers towards the country (in order not to upset them), Dhaka has to demonstrate its ability to conduct an independent foreign policy by evaluating whether becoming part of US Indo-Pacific Strategy, including joining the QUAD and the IPEF, is in its national interest.
With the Russia-Ukraine war dragging on, and both the US and China vying for influence in the Indo-Pacific, there is no better time than now for Bangladeshi policymakers to think and reflect on their country’s geopolitical value, re-evaluate its relationship with major powers, and have the nerve to come to grips with some tough decisions. After all, siding with a major power on the basis of common interests instead of having the best of the two worlds may be crucial to Bangladesh’s fundamental survival in this geopolitical age.