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Fresh Churn for the Muslims of Assam
Pallab Bhattacharya
is a special correspondent for The Daily Star. He writes from New Delhi, India
PALLAB BHATTACHARYA
THE complex web of religious and linguistic fault lines in the northeastern state of Assam in India is once again set for fresh churn, with implications for the Muslim population there.
On April 22, 2022, Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma said that the state government had accepted the definition of “native Muslims of Assam”—a long-pending demand of indigenous Muslims—as recommended by cabinet sub-committees. In July last year, the state government had set up seven sub-committees to suggest measures and recommendations for the overall development of indigenous Muslims, whose mother tongue is Assamese and who are numerically much smaller than the “immigrant” Bangla-speaking Muslim population in the state. One of the sub-committees suggested recognition of “Assamese Muslims” as a distinct group. Among other suggestions by the committee was issuing identity cards as well as conducting a census to “identify and document” the Assamese Muslim community.
As per the last census in 2011, Muslims comprise 34.22 percent of Assam’s 31.2 million population. In real terms, there are an estimated 11.8 million Muslims in the state, of whom only about 4.2 million are “natives”—who are broadly known as Morias, Ujanis, Deshis, Julas and Poimals—who either converted to Islam or were war prisoners during the Mughal conquest of Assam. While Deshis are 13th-century converts from indigenous communities such as Koch Rajbongshi and Meche, Moriyas trace their origin to converts as well as soldiers and artisans who came to the region during the Ahom rule. Smaller groups like Julha Muslims also fall under this category. All these groups have always seen themselves as distinct from the Bangla-speaking Muslims who migrated from East Bengal and then Bangladesh.
Two crucial questions that arise are: Is the recommendation of the cabinet sub-committee on “indigenous Muslims” practical? And will it solve the religious and linguistic issues confronting Assam? The BJP-led government in Assam, led by Himanta Biswa Sarma, has its own political calculations.
Sarma said all the recommendations of the sub-committees were “implementable,” but in a calibrated manner within short, medium and long time frames. Then, as he pointed out, there would be “legislative mechanisms, administrative decisions and financial support” to indigenous Assamese Muslim groups, and increasing their representation in parliament and Assam legislative assembly. The committee also suggests the creation of legislative council (other than the existing legislative assembly) as per Article 169 of the Indian Constitution and reservation of a certain number of seats in it for the Assamese Muslim community.
Politics seems to have creeped in when Sarma reportedly rooted for the definition of religious minorities on the basis of district-level demography. Citing the example of South Salmara Mankachar in western Assam, where Muslims account for nearly 95 percent of the population, he said, “Hindus can also be a minority in a particular state depending on the geographical situation, population pattern and threat perception.” It was not the first time Sarma talked about the “threat to Hindus in Assam.”
Analysts say that Assam’s Muslim-majority districts—Dhubri, Goalpara, Barpeta, Morigaon and Bongaigaon, Nagaon and Darrang, Hailakandi and Karimganj—have been a weak point for the BJP electorally. In the 2021 assembly elections, which saw the saffron party returning to power in Assam, out of the 49 assembly seats in the Muslim-majority districts, 29 were bagged by the Congress-All India Union Democratic Front alliance, and 12 by BJP. That must be a cause for worry for BJP, for whom making a deeper dent in these areas may not be easy.
The formal recognition of “indigenous Assamese Muslims” may not guarantee the kind of political dividend the BJP would like to look at, if the 2021 assembly poll results are anything to go by. It is possible that a majority of Muslims in Assam, irrespective of linguistic barriers (which are not as glaring as they seem), may remain a homogenous bloc when it comes to voting.
This is where Sarma’s idea of district-wise definition of religious minority comes into play, because it would give them access to the government’s social welfare schemes and financial assistance. BJP’s argument is that if a community is a majority in a state but not in a district, they miss out on government benefits. This is clearly directed at benefitting Hindus in a Muslim-dominated district.
Hafiz Ahmed, who heads the Char Chapori Sahitya Parishad, the largest literary body representing the Bangla-speaking Muslims of Assam, recently said that one needed to assess the socio-economic status of minority groups, particularly in char (riverine) areas, where many Muslims of Bangla-speaking origin live and which have for long been backward. Any solution to the plight of Assamese Muslims, indigenous or of immigrant origin, needs a viable comprehensive socio-economic approach that transcends polarising politics.
Is the cabinet sub-committee’s suggestion on “indigenous Muslims” practical? And will it solve the religious and linguistic issues confronting Assam?