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The "Arab Spring" that is no more

Hassan Mneimneh
Four years after the abdication of long-time Egyptian autocrat, President Husni Mubarak, in what seemed a watershed moment in recent history, the"Arab Spring - a succession of popular uprisings in Arab countries - seems depleted, defeated, and reset to zero.
In Egypt, Husni Mubarak, who the Revolution had convicted with crimes against the people, has seen his sentence overturned, while his successor, Muhammad Mursi, duly elected in the nation's first democratic exercise, lingers in prison, accused of treason. Since the January 25, 2011 revolution, Egypt has witnessed another transformative event, termed a coup and a counterrevolution by many, deemed by others a motion of national salvation led by the army. The"new new-Egypt meanwhile is facing persistent riots at home, while fighting, to its East and West, two full scale wars against the"Islamic State"in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which has found footholds in Egypt's own Sinai province and in neighbouring Libya. With the nation's security in question, its deeply rooted economic woes, believed to be a primary cause of the initial unrest, have not diminished, but have been demoted from being a foremost priority.
Libya, long ruled by the eccentric dictator Muammar al-Qadhdhafi, was able, with Nato's concerted air campaign, to see the despotic regime vanish. No effective assistance was however provided to erect an alternative. Libya has thus disintegrated into domains controlled by warlords, and the ample supplies of military hardware - accumulated by the defunct regime -- now
fuel Libya's own internal wars as well as others across its borders. In the persistent chaos, calls for secession, as well as declaration of religious rule by many factions have proliferated. ISIS has selected and franchised those factions that have displayed the most depravity. Libya, whole and prosperous, is certainly not a prospect for the foreseeable future.
Contrary to Qadhdhafi's intransigence built on delusions of personal grandeur, Yemen's dictator Ali Abdullah Salih attempted to engage the international community in a process of presumed reforms to avoid demise, and was in fact able to delay his departure. His maneuvers succeeded long enough to activate the country's dormant fault lines, summoning in the process multiple undeclared foreign interventions. Salih's influence has not vanished in post-uprising Yemen. The viability of the nation, now torn by sectarian and regional movements, in addition to a well rooted radical insurgency, with an open coup d'etat to crown it all, is no longer a certainty.
Syria's dictatorship, aided and abetted by Russia and Iran, sought to avoid the fate of its siblings by launching an all-out war on a civil protest movement that was ostensibly containable by reasonable reform. The result was the liquidation of Syria through the concerted destruction delivered by the regime, and through the largely induced militarisation, radicalisation, and fragmentation of the opposition. In a bid to recast its troubles as a combat against radicalism and to further divide its opponents, the regime enabled the expansion of the renegade Iraqi franchise of al-Qa'idah into Syrian territory. Its maneuver succeeded, transforming the battle in Syria into a tri-partite confrontation between
itself, the national opposition, and the newly concocted ISIS. Nearly four years later, the regime survives, albeit on life support; Syria, however, is in a state of irrevocable disarray.
The severe plight suffered by activists and society at large in Syria offers no sobering consolation to the civil protest movement in Bahrain. While it had maintained its non-violent approach, the Bahrain movement has so far been contained through calculated repression and abuse through which the government has succeeded in denying demands that ought to have already been met on the basis of past agreements, while avoiding the diplomatically costly blatant oppressive measures of other states in the region. The Bahrain government has thus achieved the illusion of stability, while tensions continue to mount, causing attrition at all levels in the country and threatening to usher a new, less non-violent, phase of the civil struggle.
Only Tunisia, where the first spark of the"Arab Spring" started, does not get a failing grade on the fourth anniversary of the event. Tunisia has been exposed comparatively to less violence and has successfully transferred power from the transitional government to the new constitutional order, and can thus claim success. However, the actual definition of this success is yet to be formulated. The Tunisian electorate re-instated the political forces associated with the removed pre-uprising autocrat. In their new incarnation, these forces have rephrased the national priority from dismantling the structures of autocracy, as was the demand in the early days of the revolution, to dealing with the chaos witnessed by the country since the uprising. Success may therefore be avoiding the slippage suffered by other
Arab countries and restoring state authority.
With such a dismal scorecard, the question why such an outcome, arises naturally. The"Arab Spring" experience has in fact uncovered the extent of the damage suffered by societies under dictatorship - individuals and communities were reduced to debilitating subservience and untenable dependence, conditions from which it is far harder to emerge than by the simple will power. In addition, it demonstrated that dictatorships create resilient institutions, willing to sacrifice nations for their own survival. It also revealed the sad, albeit not surprising, fact that the world community, the West in particular, and its leader the United States first and foremost, are available to provide eloquent lectures on the virtue of liberty and democracy, but are willing to offer precious little, and are capable of even less, in the form of tangible support for those yearning for freedom and justice.
Yet, the"Arab Spring"ought not be viewed as a failure. The dictatorships were custodian of a deeply corroded order that was bound to collapse. It is them, not the "Arab Spring", who created the current mayhem. Given the realities, it would have been unrealistic to accept the early enthusiastic Spring optimism as heralding actual success. The wall of fear has fallen, and while much of the region descends into the unknown, many progressive, liberal, and democratic forces --secular and/or religious - across the Arab world persist in their belief that human dignity will ultimately prevail. It is a tough and uneven battle, and it has barely started.
The writer Is Principal, Middle East Alternatives, Washington DC.