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Embracing Obama in an unequal alliance
A euphoric Indian media highlighted a claimed "breakthrough" on the India's nuclear liability law as the greatest outcome of Barack Obama's Delhi visit. This would operationalise the 2008 US-India civilian nuclear cooperation deal, described by Narendra Modi as the "cornerstone" of the India-US "strategic partnership."
The media got it wrong. There was no "breakthrough." The visit's significance lies overwhelmingly in the "Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region.”
The "Vision" accords India prominence in a vast area, "from Africa to East Asia," by involving it in "safeguarding maritime security ... navigation and overflight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea."
It commits India and the US to "promote the shared values that have made our countries great" (read, democracy, absent in China). It also chides China for provoking regional tensions.
This is the first time that India has agreed to a close long-term military relationship. The document also "welcomes" India's entry into the US-and-Japan-dominated Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.
The US-India partnership's rationale is to contain China's military and economic power as part of the US "pivot" to Asia. When this was first proposed in 2012, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh resisted it.
This is not because India practised non-alignment. That was abandoned when the Soviet Union collapsed. But there was a policy consensus against India becoming a permanent ally of any state.
The consensus eroded, especially with the 2005 civilian nuclear deal. To get the deal, India voted -under "coercion," a US diplomat said publicly - against Iran's nuclear programme, undermining the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. To please US business lobbies, India has periodically compromised its people's interests - e.g. loosening price controls on essential drugs.
Now, there's a wholesale alignment with the US. Modi has completed what Singh started. Modi is naturally proUS - in keeping with affiliation to US Cold War allies RSS-Jana-Sangh-BJP, and his intimate links with the US non-resident conservative Gujarati community.
Obama brought a long list of issues to discuss, but the bilateral talks were dominated by China for the first 45 minutes, thanks to Modi. To the Americans' pleasant surprise, he accepted US language on China without negotiation.
It's hard to say if Modi's China position stems from visceral antipathy (traceable to the 1962 war), China's reported incursion into Ladakh during Xi Jin-Ping's September visit, or recent Chinese moves in Sri Lanka, India's "backyard."
The fact is, Modi has strategically embraced the US.
This carries three major risks. First, the US has made the world more dangerous with recent interventions in Iraq, Libya and Syria. This has served to strengthen the brutal violence of Right-wing Muslim jihadi movements like the Taliban and Islamic State, which must be condemned unequivocally.
The US is the principal author of “Washington Consensus" policies which have visited economic devastation worldwide, and are undermining the working people's greatest social gains.
Strategically embracing the US means courting popular hatred, besides accepting a subordinate relationship.
Second, China has reacted negatively to Obama's visit. It would be counterproductive for India to enter into a hostile relationship with China - when negotiated solutions are viable. If India can have trade agreements with China, it can also have a strategic crisis-resolution understanding.
More than 50 years after the China war - fought primarily because India refused to negotiate its colonially inherited borders - India is close to discussing the same "package deal" that China first proposed.
Third, by antagonising Beijing, India would only facilitate a strategic understanding between China, Pakistan and Russia: the last two have developed significant military relations, and China is Pakistan's "all-weather friend." This isn't good for regional security.
Obama signed numerous deals. The defence framework agreement was renewed for 10 years, and a Defence Technology and Trade Initiative launched to help India build an aircraft carrier. There was an agreement on energy-related loans, but none on climate issues. Some of these "framework” agreements have to be fleshed out.
The much-touted nuclear liability deal reinterprets India's 2010 liability law to indemnify US reactor vendors from the consequences of accidents caused by design defects. The government proposes a publicly-funded insurance pool so American liability can be redirected back to Indian taxpayers. This is grossly unfair. Yet, it's unlikely that US corporations will sell reactors to India: insurance or no insurance, they want no liability.
US has no attractive reactors to offer: Westinghouse's AP-1000, and General Electric's new boiling water reactor are both untested. According to independent estimates, the cost of electricity from them may exceed Rs 15 per unit - three times higher than from competing power sources.
So what is the net result of Obama's visit? Modi hugged him and addressed him by his first name (an unreciprocated gesture) as many as 19 times. Modi has certainly gained legitimacy from a country that refused him a visa for a decade. US strategic interests have been advanced, but India's sovereignty stands diminished.
Yet, just before he left Delhi, Obama - probably under pressure of human-rights activists - rightly told a student audience that India cannot succeed without religious freedom, plurality and tolerance. That's the visit's sole positive outcome.
The writer Is an eminent Indian columnist.