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Why is Iraq in this quagmire?

Ruby Amatullah
AFTER eleven years of bloodshed, violence and dysfunctional state in Iraq, since the American invasion in March 2013, finally the threat coming from radical Sunni group 'Islamic State' woke the Western leaders up to the reality that the country needs an inclusive power-sharing political arrangement among the three main ethnic groups - Shiia 60%, Kurds 21% and Sunni 18%- in order to keep Iraq together.
However, if this realization had come 11 years sooner this long ordeal could have largely been avoided. Knowing that these three groups, in spite of their unequal sizes, have their respective connections with the regional powers and interests America should have realized that simple majority rule would never have worked in Iraq. The only way the country - with a long difficult history full of sectarian conflicts -could be kept together if all three groups were made interdependent and indispensable regarding governance. It was unlikely at that time that Shiia-Sunni communities would come together on their own to share power. Therefore the Occupier had a greater role and responsibility in establishing a permanent arrangement so that Iraq could stabilize, integrate and prosper.
There were many blunders in Iraq; the most critical among them was the very extensive 'de-Baathification' process. Most of the Baath party members were Sunni and they had run the country since the time of the Ottoman Empire. Not only were the top people removed but also anyone that worked during Saddam’s rule were fired from their jobs. This was a strategic blunder when the reconstruction of the country remained the top priority and the services of most of the Baath members were essential. If the top masterminds were taken off, the rest that took orders could have been rehabilitated
and integrated into the system, as was done in the cases of Japan and Germany during the post-War period. It was a wrong to think that Shiia majority rule could manage the country. This unintelligent policy humiliated and marginalized the entire Sunni community and they went on the offensive.
Furthermore, holding election in such volatile situation, without building a consensus among the major rival groups was another blunder. It was not difficult to foresee that a Constituent Assembly, overwhelmingly Shiia would lead to the Sunni boycott, and then the Shiia rule would be untenable. Ever since the Sunni boycott of the Assembly and their rejection of the government, there have been prolonged bloodshed and violence that finally lead to this present crisis with the Islamic State. It is expected that many of the 300,000 Sunni Iraqi army that was disbanded by the Coalition Provisional Authority [CPA order no 2| as part of the de-Baathification policy in 2003 later joined the Islamic State and now has become a humongous problem. It was an expensive mistake to sack 300,000 professionally trained military men back home with arms, but no jobs or future.
Another blunder that followed was to refuse the Iranian
its full cooperation. Geographically, this should have been taken as a golden opportunity as Iran is flanked by Iraq and Afghanistan. If Iran was made an ally at that time perhaps the fierce fighting between the forces of Muqtada al-Sadr's Shiia group and the US forces and other skirmishes could be avoided saving tens of thousands of lives.
A better relationship between America and Iran could lead to a huge windfall but Israel has ruined it all both for America as well as for the region. The Israeli powerful lobby that infiltrated the entire American decision making process has been working like a parasite. Now the giant is on the ground obeying orders from its tiny master.
No one gained in Iraq after the invasion - neither the Iraqis nor the American taxpayers - except the militaryindustrial complex and its multinational contractors like Halliburton and Bechtel and their local cronies and the terrorists and extremists.
The ultimate responsibility rests on the Iraqis. They should not have wasted it over Shiia-Sunni power struggles. After the invasion the Iraqis had a legitimate claim on the USA to help rebuild their country and they would see that the superpower was obliged.
Everything that could go wrong did go wrong in Iraq under American occupation. Bob Woodward's writing has reveled that the real trouble was that the Bush administration was deeply divided, uncoordinated and inconsistent about Iraq. The right hand did not either agree or know what the left was doing. The most mind boggling fact is that there was no post-invasion plan for Iraq. The administration had this naive mindset that after the UN takeover America's responsibility would largely be over. As soon as the UN arrived in Baghdad a bomb blast killed the UN top personnel and the UN packed bags and left. America got stuck with Iraq for the next nine years.
Iraq after 23-year Saddam's tyranny, 8-year bloody war with Iran, and 350,000 Shiia slaughtered, 100,000 Kurds gassed, and 50,000 children starved to death became an inferno with sectarian tension. American leadership remains answerable to the world why it aggravated the sectarian conflicts even more through its most irresponsible handling and as to why the superpower failed to leave the country better than it found Iraq at the time of invasion?
The writer is Executive Director, US based Justice, Peace and Progress.
E-mail: rubyamatullah@yahoo.com