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Pillars pilloried?

Imtiaz Hussain
BANGLADESH independence was fought upon four pillars: democracy, socialism, secularity, and nationalism. How do they fare after forty-three years?
Given the December 1970 elections, democracy denial, which was at the heart of Bangladesh's Liberation War, continues to remain a contested term and practice. Although democracy was in full bloom in the country's first elections (in 1973), the assassination ofBangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975 erased it from the political firmament until the 1990s. His creation of Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (Baksal) also helped evaporation of democracy: Khondakar Mushtaque’s administration eliminated the other original flag-bearers of democracy (Tajuddin Ahmed, Syed Nazrul Islam, Captain Mansur Ali, and Kamruzzaman), while the subsequent military administrations simply toyed with democracy. Though it was resilient enough to triumph in the 1991 election, it had to rely on a caretaker government ever since. Even as the masses were fully mobilised, institutions were not built, leaving as residue a praetorian society.
Socialism was hacked apart more severely. Nationalised industries thrived under Bangabandhu, but neoliberal onslaughts after him irreversibly changed our economic infrastructure. With the public sector floundering, socialism was replaced by Adam Smith's "nation of shopkeepers." Without the noteworthy contributions of non-governmental organisations (like Brae), and benevolent economics (like Mohammad Yunus's microfinance), poverty would have long consumed the country.
Unlike our questionable democracy, the socialism volte-face blended with both prevailing domestic and international trends. Domestically, socialism conflicts with neo-liberal instincts, accumulation, and property-swallowing tendencies. Internationally, the widespread post-Cold War shift towards a neo-liberal order appealed to an economically hungry Bangladesh.
Secularism faced its own about-turn with Bangabandhu's passing. From officially dropping secularity as a pillar in 1978 to becoming an Islamic state in 1988, Bangladesh is now making up for lost religious time, with proportionally more subscribers today than ever before. It hosts global religious gatherings and invites all stripes of Muslims, from the moderates to the fanatic, without background checks - even as the persecution of minorities spirals beyond the East Pakistani level.
Defying global historical trends, religion in Bangladesh may be determining political priorities, rather than vice versa. Internecine warfare between the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has diverted so much institutional attention away from politics for the rural masses that it did not become hard for religious forces to quickly fill the vacuum, typically through madrasas, in turn, rattling the city-country divide. While Dhaka stands out as a "foreign” land to rural dwellers of the same country, actual foreign perpetrators (that is, from outside Bangladesh), capitalise on our domestic mayhem.
Of all the four original pillars, this one alone carries the wherewithal to destroy the country built in 1971. Though our democracy has not meshed with our external environment as our abandonment of socialism has, it is perhaps our shift from secularity that probably distances us more from our external partners than any other pillar.
Our fourth pillar, ironically, has strengthened while the others have weakened. Nationalism was a steadfast force under Bangabandhu, but so too under the military generals and democratically-elected politicians. One reason why could be that economic growth boosts confidence and, when properly channeled, strengthens self-identity. Another could be the sheer neo-liberal competitiveness between countries, breeding the "my country right or wrong” mindset. Even a third variant can be found as the byproduct of international isolation: the more a country disagrees with or diverges from external expectations, the more nationalism intensifies.
Of the three nationalism types, the third is the costliest since Bangladesh depends on external ties. The second is the least expensive since competition dilutes every policy approach: if nationalism gets in the way, deregulate; and if liberalism reduces competitiveness, become protectionist. The first fits in between the two others but shifts whichever way the wind blows: if it favours the market, that is, dependence on export markets, nationalism begins to weaken and wilt; but if it is pushed by politics, nationalism begins to deepen and darken.
BNP officially adopted "nationalism" in its identity from the very start; but though the AL adopted it in 1971, today nationalism serves as an instrument of defiance variably used against unsavoury external decisions rather than as a pillar. There is a co-relationship between growth and nationalism: the more resources one has, the more the swagger.
In the middle of 2014, Bangladesh is at odds with both its own history and the international context. Historically, only nationalism remains of the original four pillars, but it is precisely the one that should loosen up in a rapidly globalising environment. Evaporating socialism streamlines with the global post-Cold War Kantian setting, but predicts greater widening than narrowing of income-gaps in a neo-liberal order. Secularity meshes with globalisation and a market-economy, but as Bangladeshi nationalism and external/Islamic meddling intensify, more religious intolerance is expected.
For good or bad, today’s Bangladesh is not the one of 1971. Emerging post-independence generations will eventually determine, deliberately or by default, if we need any pillars at all - and if we do, what they should be. Without landmarks of sorts, we become a horse with no name.
The writer is Professor Emeritus of International Relations, Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico.