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Talking about the men in 'Black'

Shahriar Feroze
DEBATES and discussions about Rab would not be so intense had its alleged controversial role in the Narayanganj killings not been in the spotlight.
Queries about the formation of Rab and its operations need to be clearly answered. Why was Rab needed? How was it formed? What is the size of its officer's corps? What are its role and responsibilities? Has the elite force lived up to expectations? And, of course, whether we need such an elite force at all. Some other relevant questions follow too.
Let's try to respond to the unexplained issues with our counter-queries and comments one by one.
Against the backdrop of an ill-equipped and underperforming police force, Rab was a need of the time to function as an anti-crime and anti-terrorism unit. Consisting of members from Bangladesh Police, Bangladesh Army, Bangladesh Navy, Bangladesh Air Force, Border Guard Bangladesh and Bangladesh Ansar, Rab proved to be instrumental in combating militancy and drug trafficking, recovering illegal firearms and arresting dangerous convicts. It can be argued that if there was a force equally capable as Rab within the police then the need for Rab would not have arisen.
As far as its specific roles and responsibilities are concerned, based on its performance, Rab has fared quite well. The force became controversial due to its 'unwritten terms of reference,' and for being used for'assigned duties of the government' - from guarding a T-20 cricket match to almost anything. So, Rab could be used for both detailed and 'non-detailed' operations. About the extrajudicial killings, it may be assumed that the government may have given the elite force some special authority with impunity; but so was the police. So the question arises, why weren't the terms of reference of Rab clearly and completely defined? There is a technical matter about Rab's battalion structure which has never been discussed. Considering the formation of its 14 battalions there should have been 45 officers of various ranks per battalion. In reality, a Rab battalion is run by 8 to 10 officers. So, even if we take 10 per battalion we get 140 officers against the need of some 630 officers. A battalion consisting of approximately 700 troops is commanded by less than one-fourth of the officers required. The expected outcome in terms of performance is naturally not achieved. But the issues regarding its structure and performance never came under the spotlight.
If there was a shortage of officers then why were as many as 14 battalions formed? With this comes the question of how efficiently and professionally each of the battalions is handled. Does the force perform well or not? On top of it all, who monitors Rab?
Reportedly, some 2,000 members of Rab have been punished for their conduct since its formation in 2004; 700 received major punishment and the rest got minor punishment. Over 4,000 allegations were brought against Rab since its inception while 78 Rab men were sent to jail, and 76 suspended from their jobs. These figures are particularly disquieting for a force less than 15,000 strong, which is also considered as being 'elite.' The statistical figures of crimes and punishment of the members of police may be even worse. What's needed at the moment is an all-party participatory dialogue for deciding Rab's reform. Its success should be assessed, and alleged 786 extrajudicial killings and other crimes must be properly investigated.
Rab has been praised for meticulously carrying out a number of specified duties (e.g. recovering 3,000 plus arms, seizing huge amounts of narcotics and arresting over 500 wanted criminals). On the one hand, if doing away with Rab is to be considered, then the government must also think of another substitute crime and terrorism fighting unit, as our police needs reforms, expertise and advanced technologies itself. On the other hand, Rab cannot continue the spree of alleged extra-judicial killings and crimes either.
In view of its decade-long successes, failures and controversies, Rab needs independent and objective decision concerning the viability of its function as an elite force. We can introduce reforms within Rab and restructure it for making it a professional force. Corrupt officers of Rab must be handed out exemplary punishment, but at the same time Rab's extent of duties and authority should be specified. It should be held accountable for all its actions.
The success of Rab or any crime fighting wing largely depends on the conditions under which it is deployed, and also on the honesty and sincerity of its members. If the conditions behind the deployment are politically motivated and its members are dishonest then it is likely to get derailed.
It is felt that there is no point in breaking up a force because of crimes allegedly committed by some of its members. Those accusations should be dealt with as per law. Rab's flaws and weaknesses should be identified, and a comprehensive reform put in place.