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Indian foreign policy: Continuity or change under Modi?

India is a democracy and it is rarely a one man show in Indian foreign affairs. Even with a popular leader like Modi in power, it is highly unlikely that there will be big changes in Indian foreign policy.

Tahmina Rahman
ALTHOUGH there is about a week to go before the Election Commission can finally declare the winner of India's 16th Lok Sabha election, pundits and practitioners are pondering over how a 63 year old Hindu nationalist leader who rose to power and popularity through his much publicised 'Gujrat Model of Development' and earned notoriety for his alleged involvement in the 2002 communal riot in Gujrat will manage the external relations of the country.
Narendra Modi might be a genius when it comes to miraculous economic development, but he has little foreign policy expertise. But this shortcoming has been compensated with his rhetoric of a more aggressive regional policy with a xenophobic undertone. For example, in December 2013, he promised to get tougher on Pakistan and not show any sign of compromise on the disputed coastal border in Sir Creek, where Gujrat faces Pakistan. Earlier, in October, he expressed concern over Indian descendants living in Sri Lanka, hinting on an interventionist orientation in regional policy. But threats to send the so-called 'Bangladeshi infiltrators' back home tops it all. Surely, it struck a chord with a section of general population and opportunist political entities of the peripheral states of India who have long been complaining about this 'illegal cross border movement' between the countries. The state- ment also might have triggered the Assam massacre last week.
The foreign policy of any country in the world depends on a combination of internal and external factors ranging from domestic public opinion, political culture and institutions, level of socio-economic-military development, to the country's status and aspirations in the regional and the international systems, its capacity to project national power outward and the prevailing normative trend in the international system. Keeping all these variables in mind one does not need to dig very deep to see that Indian foreign policy is more about continuity than about change. No matter how tough BJP might seem, it was under the last BJP government led by Vajpayee that relationship normalisation efforts with Pakistan like the 1999 'bus diplomacy,' the 2001 Agra Summit and the 2004 Islamabad Summit took place. BJP government criticised the historic 1996 Treaty between Bangladesh and India on sharing the water of the Ganges, but it did not nullify it after coming to power.
But Modi is no Vajpayee. His extreme Hindu nationalist temper might win him public support at home, but it also earns him infamy abroad. Restrictions on his entry to the USA prove that. But India is a democracy and it is rarely a one man show in Indian foreign affairs. Even with a popular leader like Modi in power, it is highly unlikely that there will be big changes in Indian foreign policy.
Speculators say Modi has great respect for bureaucrats. If made prime minister, he will have an expert pull of advisors and bureaucrats at the ministry of external affairs who will guide him through the terrain he is not very familiar with. Modi understands the importance of economic development and his foreign policy is likely to be directed by the desire to transform India as an economic giant.
His zeal for sending the 'illegal immigrants' back to Bangladesh or protecting the Indian interests within Sri Lanka will likely be tamed with more pressing needs such as salvaging its bilateral relations with the USA, which is still shadowed by the Khobragade incident, securing Indian interests against Pakistani opposition in Afghanistan in post troops-withdrawal phase, improving energy trade links with Central Asia, a more vigorous attempt at winning that lucrative seat of the permanent membership at the United Nations Security Council and presenting India before the world as a model for inclusive economic development. Modi has already visited Singapore, China and Japan as the chief minister of Gujrat to attract foreign direct investment. He can be expected to continue wooing these countries in future to strengthen the trade and investment ties.
India's foreign policy decision making process has been heavily influenced by regional political developments since the rise of the coalition govern-
ment culture. Since there is not much prospect of BJP securing a sweeping victory that can assure it a majority government, it will have to rely on state governments while interacting with neighbouring countries. Viewing from that perspective, some of Modi's regional policies like concern over Indian descendants in Sri-Lanka will be influenced by the election performance of the AIADMK in Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry.
When it comes to India-Bangladesh bilateral relations, the list of irritants is quite long. It ranges from sharing the common rivers and cross-border movement of people to balance of trade deficit and border disputes. History tells us that regime change does not affect India-Bangladesh water negotiations that much. For example the Joint River Commission was established in 1972 when Mrs. Gandhi was in power, the five year long Ganges Agreement in 1977 was signed during the Janata government led by Moraji Desai, the Moll in 1985 on dry season flow regulation was signed under the initiative of Rajiv Gandhi, and the historic 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty was concluded during United Front government headed by Deve Gowda. Of course, the political will of the West Bengal government and the active involvement of late Jyoti Basu helped signing the Treaty in 1996. Since Indian constitution provides the state governments the prerogative to decide on natural resource sharing issues, the
next Indian government at the centre will invariably rely on these governments in formulating and implementing relevant policies.
Veteran journalist Kuldip Nayar has opined that BJP will not follow through its promise of sending 'illegal immigrants' to Bangladesh. West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee also challenged Modi to expel her from the country before expelling 'Bangladeshis.' But even at the rhetorical level, statements like the ones coming out of Modi lately can cause tension in bilateral relations between two unequal powers like Bangladesh and India.
Finally, in this globalised world people and governments are much more aware about the issues of human rights violations and religion and ethnicity based discrimination. In this regard, Modi has a lot of work to do in rebuilding his reputation internationally. Being an aspirant great power, India has to prove it to the world that it is not regressing into an era of communalism under Modi's premiership, and that commitment has to be reflected in its external affairs too. India undoubtedly is the biggest power in South Asia. But it has to learn to act like a responsible one in the region it considers as its 'traditional sphere of influence.' No matter who heads the next Indian government, they have to keep in mind these local, regional, international and global dynamics.
The writer is a Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka.