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Constitutional safeguard and democratic local governance

Mohammad Rafiqul Islam Talukdar
ARTICLES ll, 59(1) and 152(1) of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh help constitute the local government institutes as administrative units of the state and term them advance democratic local governance, while Articles 59(2), 60 and 83 entrust power to the national parliament to determine the nature of power, scope of work and autonomy of the local government bodies.
Thus, power of the local government, national-local government relationship, magnitude of democratic as well as fiscal decentralisation, and functions as well as functionaries of the local government depend, to a great extent, on the mode of the legislature. In practice, legislators hold wide-ranging control over local government bodies. Furthermore, local government institutions are not just constituted by the Acts of the legislature, but also have to comply with the rules and regulations of the government. In practice, rural local government institutions are controlled through imprecise orders and circulars from different agencies and/or ministries, which sometimes contradict the original Acts.
Furthermore, local government institutions cannot impose new tax or increase the rate of imposed taxes or even finalise their budgets without approval of the government. The government also exercises substantial financial and administrative control over local government institutions in different ways. The annual budgets of local government units are scrutinised and approved by different levels of the government agencies.
Though local government regulations and model tax schedules have empowered local government institutions to mobilise their own resources - through tax assessment and levying, and leasing of local hats/bazars, water bodies, etc - in practice, they do not have absolute authority over the generated resources. Moreover, local government institutes have very limited access to the other locally mobilised resources, for instance, the distribution of land transfer tax between government and local government is undermining the local government.
In addition, local government institutions are entitled to receive the Annual Development Plan (ADP) block grants from the government, while the local government regulations have strict instructions that the block grant must be used specifically in certain sectors determined by the government. This pre-determined sector allocation seriously limits the scope of local level planning as well as the flexibility of local bodies to utilise the financial resources in order to satisfy the immediate needs of the community. This also runs contrary to the concept of functional autonomy of the local government units.
Importantly, our local government institutions cannot freely exercise their powers, even those bestowed upon them by the government, within the limits defined by legislation. The authority of local government institutions is undermined by other authorities, even by an individual legislator or bureaucrat. The wide-ranging authority of the legislators over the local government and local governance, somewhat dampens the spirit of democratic decentralisation. Same is true in the case of excessive bureaucratic control over local government affairs.
The appointment and payment of salaries of local government staff members, for instance, are managed by the government bureaucracy. The government also exercises control over the internal functioning of the local government. For example, the Union Parishad can constitute standing committees as determined by the Act, but for the formation of any additional committee it needs the formal approval of the Deputy Commissioner (DC). Such practices have turned the local government institution into mere extension of the government.
Furthermore, the provision of separation of authorities for revenue assignment, expenditure responsibilities and public services deliver); as well as for robust local government administration and political and/or social justice management within a local government body, is neither legislated nor planned. As such, basic public services are not being delivered properly. Local political office holders get directly involved in implementation instead of overseeing and making the other implementing authorities accountable. More importantly, participation of local government representatives in national and/or regional decision making and planning as well budgeting process is not evident here and, consequently, balanced national development is not possible.
All this shows that the inclination of the legislation is not conducive for building effective local governance. As such, this write up advocates for Indian model of constitutional safeguard. The 73rd and 74th amendments to the Indian constitution ensure the autonomy of the sub-national government, though there is evidence that constitutional assurance is not enough to build up high-quality local government.
The success of the local government in Britain, for example, without such constitutional safeguarding, shows us that democratic practice is central to democracy and democratic decentralisation. In Uganda and South Africa, political authorities passed statutory and constitutional guarantees for local government development just 17 years ago, and now both countries are noted as examples for democratic development of local government. The success of those counties has underpinned a lesson that the constitutional pledge is as important as democratic commitment for building a robust local governance system, particularly fora country like Bangladesh.
The writer Senior Programme Manager at BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD), BRAC University, and Chairman at Center for Decentralization and Governance Society (CDG). Email:rafiqul.talukdar@gmail.com