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The two strategy dilemma

The liberals want a modern rational state structure that would take the nation forward. A segment prefers robust action. But conventional wisdom is against it. A steady and gradual advancement towards reformation of polity and society is more advisable

Sarwar Jahan Chowdhury
IT seems that the dust of the last round of political struggle in Bangladesh is settling down slowly; although it never takes much time here to flare up. Yet it appears that the Awami League (AL) led government has been able to wear down the opposition to a certain extent and baffle them as well with multidimensional communication and PR strategy.
Before another spell of agitation and repression in reaction steal the headlines it's time for some political strategic introspection. This is crucially important for us to understand certain sociopolitical grand strategies which are already at play in mapping the political future of this land. The most talked about topic of political and social commentators are the way government is handling the main opposition BNP and it chief ally Jamaat-e-Islami ()I). The core questions are, "Is such handling of the AL government right? Will it make things worse or better in the immediate and long run!
There has always been a debate among liberals and progressives from left to center right about how to manage the radical forces in a Muslim majority state. There are two broad grand strategies which have been debated. One suggests that the radical forces should be confronted head on by the state. The other subscribes to a more moderate approach that allows and even encourages the radicals to participate democratic politics.
Both the approaches would reveal advantages
and flaws when put in to certain socio-political context. Therefore it should be the other way round i.e. social and political setting in each case should dictate the precise variant of any of the strategies.
Direct clash with the radical forces could be a perilous affair. It may result in increased hostility and accompanying human and material cost. A direct confrontation may bring about extreme result - a crude win or elimination. The Iranian case demonstrated that when the Shah fought the radicals head on, half-heartedly and foolishly though, he faced Islamic counter revolution and was wiped out form the political landscape of Iran along with all other liberals, even those who opposed him. Again, bringing them to constitutional politics may have two outcomes depending on a host of diverse factors. The radicals may get softened and have a metamorphosis towards some sort of liberalism or they use democracy to destroy democracy. The latter possibility brings up another core question; whether the political entities, which don't genuinely embrace democratic values, should be allowed at al) to participate in democratic process.
In Bangladesh a group of centrist and centerright politicians and commentator always maintains that the Islamist here should be allowed access to the democratic polity and they advocate maintaining such status of the Islamists already granted by the erstwhile military rulers. Interestingly, this admission of the Islamist in the political space by Ziaur Rahman and H.M Ershad was more for political convenience and less for any deeper socio-
political understanding. It's true that the Islamists in Bangladesh are not modern Islamist like AK Party of Turkey; rather they have certain ideologies in their doctrine which grossly contradict democratic tenets and fundamentals of freedom and equality. They never managed to expand their share of vote substantially to turn themselves into a genuinely aspiring party or group to win a general election in Bangladesh. But this fact essentially corroborate the center-right argument to keep them in the political process so that they remain marginalized by default as the generally moderate Bangladeshi electorate are unlikely to vote the Islamist into power. The other point which people tend to articulate with caution is that the ouster of the Islamists from constitutional politics would push them underground. Their political expression then may involve gun, hostility and insurgency.
On the other hand, the hardcore progressives, who circularize the secular 1971 values and call for their full reinstatement, demand direct action against Islamist on the plea that most variants of political Islam that these groups propagate contradicts progression, secular modern values and the spirit of 1971. They simply want banning of religion based politics in Bangladesh. But although an ideological ally, the AL don't entirely subscribe to their views. The seasoned AL strategists prefer prudence and pragmatism rather than emotion. The AL at the moment is not talking about elimination of Islamist politics altogether. They have wittily
narrowed down their target to JI which has serious blemish on its face with their antiliberation stand in 1971 and involvement in atrocities committed at that time.
The mainstream AL leadership tacitly holds the view that it is impracticable to completely de-Islamize the polity as there are a plethora of Islamist entities in this populous land with their corresponding social bases. Rather, politically eliminating JI from Bangladesh is the right thing to do given their shameful and criminal past, and as such their policy received approval in 2008 election. Such narrowing down has actually negated the possibility of a wider unrest despite already evoking considerable reactionary retaliation from )I and its student wing. Some AL grassroots leaders, supporters and the poor minorities are already the victims of JI reprisals.
A proper value judgment of the two broad strategies from the larger liberal premise is not easy. Both the approaches have pros and cons. The liberals want a modern rational state structure that would take the nation forward. A segment prefers robust action. But conventional wisdom is against it. A steady and gradual advancement towards reformation of polity and society is more advisable. Perhaps that's the reason why the AL is sticking to limited objective, even that is no less costly.
The writer is an Associate Research Fellow in BIPSS, Email* sarwar558@gmall.com