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UN's Catch-22 at Montreux

Shahriar Feroze
WE are closely following the United Nations-backed international peace conference on the future of Syria, called Geneva 2, being held at the Swiss city of Montreux. By rescinding Iran's invitation to participate in the conference, failing to hold a dialogue based on a mutual topic, and by acting on principles of an incomplete communique, Geneva 2, literally has all the characteristics of a Catch-22 situation.
Basically, the idea of political transition—the key Geneva communique article in question—is an end goal rather than the starting point of any process. Another inherent weakness of the Geneva Communique is that it gives no guideline about President Assad's future role in a transitional government. Though the communique urges Syria to form a transitional governing authority that "could include members of the present government and the opposition and other groups," it was imperative to have included a paragraph outlining the west's future plan regarding the Syrian dictator. We never support dictators. But in reality, forming an all-party transitional government in Syria is not possible without the olive branch extended by the Assad regime. It needs to be clarified.
For the representatives of the Syrian government, in general, it's Assad's presidency which is redline for all discussions. In this regard it's well-knit, but it is the coalition of opposition that needs to be categorised and characterised. It needs to be assessed whether there is a coherent arrangement to avoid a power vacuum once Assad is ousted from office.
With no representation from the combatants on the ground, for nearly 3 years since the conflict broke out in Syria, the coalition of opposition groups still remains complex and deeply divided. It became apparent when the Syrian National Council, a part of the Syrian National Coalition, withdrew from the coalition on January 20 in protest against the decision of the latter to attend the Geneva talks. The Turkey-based SNC is a sizable opposition force with 22 out of 60 seats of the Syrian National Coalition. Moreover, the coalition in any case exerts no authority over the overwhelmingly Sunni Islamist fighting groups, which are conducting the actual war in Syria.
The question naturally arise that, apart from removing Assad from power, shouldn't the western powers have played a more constructive and responsible role in pinpointing and developing a more united Syrian opposition force?
However, it's the common ground for a specific subject that's being haphazardly appearing in the table, which could lead up to a meaningful dialogue. If the two sides focus on humanitarian access and short term ceasefires only then a beginning of a process can be marked.
To conclude, we want a paved path for a momentous Geneva 3 while working on the weaknesses of the Geneva 2.
The writer is Current Affairs Analyst, The Daily Star.