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PRAFUL BIDWAI COLUMN

But can AAP deliver?

Praful Bidwai
AFTER its stunning electoral debut in Delhi, the Aam Aadmi Party finds itself in a dilemma. The Bharatiya Janata Party and Congress have offered to support an AAP minority government with 28 MLAs in the 70-strong Assembly. Should it accept this and assume governmental responsibility? Or, should it, being "idealist,” stay out?
If AAP does the first, it could take some measures in its supporters' interest and create a transparent-governance model. But that risks damaging its claim to being a "new force" which doesn't compromise with "corrupt” parties. Besides, AAP can't ensure its government's survival if the Congress withdraws support.
If AAP refuses the offer, its supporters may punish it for shirking responsibility, and make it lose some seats.
If no government is formed and the next Assembly election is held simultaneously with the Lok Sabha polls, the chances of voters favouring a national party over the as-yet-Delhi-centric AAP could increase, causing its decline.
AAP responded awkwardly to this dilemma. It stipulated 18 conditions for forming a government, which the Congress must accept — and also asked for 10 days' time. But the 10-day request doesn't sit logically with the conditions.
The illogic confirms the existence of divergent views within AAP on government formation. Faced with them, AAP invited SMS/email or personal opinions from supporters and mohalla committees. But this sounds less like a referendum than an effort to mask indecisiveness. Whether such methods will help AAP isn't clear. But internal differences are inevitable within AAP.
It's vital to grasp the AAP phenomenon in its complexity. AAP does represent something novel. With the exception of the 1970s' Jayaprakash Narayan (JP) movement in Bihar and the Navanirman agitation in Gujarat, it's the first party to be thrown up by a civil society mobilisation -Anna Hazare's 2011 anti-corruption movement, followed by year-long anti-rape protests.
Other such mobilisations - the decades-long Narmada Bachao Andolan, the Parivar's Ramjanmabhoomi campaign, or land, food and environmental movements -didn't throw up a political party. Rather, they got dissipated or politically co-opted.
The media played midwife in AAP’s birth. It's no coincidence that AAP was incubated in Delhi and got saturation coverage from India's Delhi-centric media. AAP's is a story of spectacular political marketing of a mission -fighting corruption through an anti-political identity. AAP says: ”[M]ost... parties are corrupt, greedy and thick-skinned, it's time to bring political power back into the people's hands."
The AAP brand tapped into sentiment against "normal" politicians by linking them with corruption. It focused more on their weaknesses than its own strengths or the feasibility of its extravagant promises like halving electricitybills.
AAP consistently and repeatedly conveyed the message that "normal politics" is "dirty." As a marketing expert says, this had a strong "brand-recall" value. This was enhanced by powerful symbols: the Gandhi cap (representing austerity and continuity with the Freedom Struggle) and the jhadoo (which suggests cleansing and also connects AAP with Dalits).
AAP is a product of some of the most energetic, imaginative election mobilising seen in India: door-to-door canvassing, collecting small donations as a token of commitment, and using autorickshaws as advertising platforms.Nobody has deployed flyers, FM radio, Facebook and Twitter as skilfully as AAP. All these activities gave a sense of involvement to volunteers and ordinary people.
AAP’s focus on certain slums - where Arvind Kejriwal's NGO "Parivartan" had worked since 2000 - paid it rich dividends. Many slum dwellers, exhausted with traditional parties, wanted to give the "clean" party a chance.
They added to AAP’s middle-class core-support, highlighted by its triumph in 8 of the 10 Assembly seats falling under the New Delhi Lok Sabha constituency, where businessmen, professionals and bureaucrats live.
In fighting Chief Minister Sheila Dikshit, Mr. Kejriwal took a calculated risk - "an important element of marketing." He won more votes than her and the BJP combined, boosting AAP's brand.
AAP trounced both its rivals among 18-22 age-group voters, and nearly beat the BJP in the 22-27 group. It also took some Dalit votes from the Bahujan Samaj Party. But Muslims voted mainly for the Congress.
AAP professes no particular ideology. It says ideology is "for the pundits and the media..." It itself is "solution-focused." It claims the "age old-tendency to pin down political parties” ideologically makes everyone forget "the issues at hand."
The greatest issue, "the biggest evil," for AAP, is corruption. Deeply-entrenched poverty, economic inequality and social injustice - at the root of society's misery and backwardness - aren't major issues. AAP isn't consistent about fighting corporate power. It once took on a Mumbai-based business house, only to beat a hasty retreat.
AAP has no stand on the aggressive Hindutva-communalism personified by Narendra Modi. Tackle corruption through the Jan-Lokpal, cleanse governance, and achieve Nirvana! This is also an ideological position.
AAP here resembles the JP movement which called for "Total Revolution," ignoring "ideology,” key social-economic agendas - and communalism. The movement legitimised the Jana Sangh and the RSS, till 1977 considered a pariah, and got dissolved into the Janata Party.
AAP is silent on the greatest threat India faces: Hindutva-communalism under Mr. Modi, who presided over the butchery of2,000 Muslims. He doesn't regret this. True, the Congress acquiesced in the killing of7,000 Sikhs. Although it didn't actively organise this, it at least apologises for it.
AAP’s silence on Mr. Modi is rooted in the same phenomenon for which it lambasts other parties: opportunism. AAP doesn't want to antagonise some of its supporters who say they will vote for Mr. Modi in the Lok Sabha.
AAP's top leaders differ among themselves on economic policy, affirmative action, Kashmir, etc. They brush these differences under the carpet. But they will surface.
Getting rid of red beacons, AAP's foremost demand -and its top criterion of moral degeneration - won't cover up differences. The Delhi government can't make beacons vanish from central vehicles.
AAP will probably take root in some metropolises, but not in a major state. One thing is clear, though. Unless AAP takes a strong anti-Modi stand, it will end up helping the BJP.
The writer is an eminent Indian columnist.
E-mail: bidwai@bol.net.in