& çâÌæÚUæð´ ·¤è ¥ôÚU Îð¹Ùæ ÁæÚUè ÚU¹ð´ ¥ÍæüÌ ¥ÂÙð ÜÿØ ÂÚU ŠØæÙ ÚU¹ð´Ð ãæÚU Ù ×æÙð´, €UØô´ç·¤ ·¤æ× ·¤ÚUÙð âð ¥æÂ·¤ô ©gðàØ ·¤è Âýæç# ãôÌè ãñ ¥õÚU ÁèßÙ ·¤æ ¹æÜèÂÙ ÎêÚU ãôÌæ ãñÐ ÖÜð ãè ÁèßÙ ×ð´ ç·¤ÌÙè Öè ·¤çÆÙæ§ü €UØô´ Ù ¥æ°, çÁ™ææâæ ¥õÚU ©ˆâæã ÕÙæ° ÚU¹ð´Ð ŠØæÙ ÚU¹ð´, ÜÿØ ã×ðàææ ¥æÂ·Ô¤ Âæâ ãôÌð ãñ´ çÁ‹ãð´ ÂæÙð ·Ô¤ çÜ° ÂýØæâ ¥æÂ ·¤Öè Öè àæéM¤ ·¤ÚU â·¤Ìð ãñ´Ð

Xinjiang: Answer to China's energy shortage?

With the ultimate goal being to secure over the long term, energy resources, China will have to demonstrate to its neighbours that its interests are wholly economic and nothing beyond that.

Syed Mansur Hashim
CHINA'S present energy policy to a certain extent is dictated by the supplydemand imbalance faced in the energy sector. Its existing production capacity requires far greater access to raw materials, particularly energy resources that cannot be produced or sourced domestically. Another shift that is being witnessed is the shifting of production of resources (coal being
the primary energy source) from the more populated parts of the country to outlying areas. However, given that China still does not possess a full "blue water" navy, its ability to protect vital sea lanes far from home has made it imperative for policymakers to take a second look inwards as a fallback position.
This is where Xinjiang comes in. The area, as explained by Stratfor, an independent geopolitical think tank "It is far more remote than other traditional buffer regions such as Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. Urumqi, the provincial capital, is more than 3,100 kilometres (1,920 miles) from Beijing, while Kashgar, the westernmost Chinese city and his-
torically a major Silk Road trading hub, is nearly 4,400 kilometers from the coast. Xinjiang has also played a less-prominent role in Chinese history than the other buffer regions Moreover, Xinjiang is largely a desert wasteland cleaved in two by the Tianshan Mountains. The majority of its 22 million inhabitants live clustered in one of three subregional cores: the Uighur-dominated Tarim Basin to the south (cantered in Kashgar), the majority Han Chinese Junggar Basin to the north (home to Urumqi), and the smaller Hi River Valley wedged in between. Today, Xinjiang accounts for 17 percent of China's total landmass - an area roughly half the size of India - but less than 2 percent of its population. The physical environment of the region is simply too harsh to support large populations (by Chinese standards), even with modern agricultural and industrial technologies." Xinjiang's bleak surroundings and sparse population makes it ideal for mining operations. Yet substantial investments will have to be made to develop the region in terms of infrastructure - roads, rail, pipelines, etc. all of which involve billions of dollars.
Yet the investments will be made because of Xinjiang's strategic geographical location. As explained by Stratfor, "Xinjiang is indeed blessed with some of the world's largest untapped reserves of thermal coal, and its coal output could reach 750 million metric tons by 2020 (up from 141 million metric tons in 2012). But compared with well-developed coalfields in western Inner Mongolia and northern Shaanxi province, much of Xinjiang's reserves remain untapped and understudied." It could very well prove to be mainland China's bridge to Central Asia, a region that holds one of the largest proven finds of oil and gas. It is hardly surprising to find China's plans to invest an estimated US$196billion on upgrading both power generation capacity and ultra-high voltage transmission lines that will link the region's coalfields to population centres more inland. Xinjiang's star is certainly on the upswing as China's planners intend to spend $392billion to connect the region with national freight transportation network over the next five years.
Xinjiang poised to enable China to make inroads into Central Asia to transport much needed oil and gas. Indeed Kazakhstan is very much central to securing China's future energy needs. It is estimated that by 2014, China will be importing from Kazakhstan around 1.5million barrels of crude oil and anywhere between 60-65billion cubic metres of natural gas from Turkmenistan annually. Yet, questions have been raised whether such ambitious targets can be met on the timelines being planned. This is more so because the resource-rich nations of the region are all former Soviet
States which all suffer from varying degrees of dilapidated infrastructure that was the result of decades of centralised planning. There is also the question of political will for Central Asian states to go along with such ambitious plans, especially when one takes into account the historic distrust of "Chinese intentions".
Beijing will have to tread carefully here. As it has already had the bad experience of seeing years of political and economic investments suddenly going sour in a "democratic” Myanmar, it would be wise for China to woo its neighbours with some "goodwill" projects which would not necessarily carry much economic benefits. With the ultimate goal being to secure over the long term, energy resources, China will have to demonstrate to its neighbours that its interests are wholly economic and nothing beyond that. As 2014 draws near, Beijing will have to factor in the planned withdrawal by the United States from Afghanistan, which will have direct security repercussions on the region that has enjoyed relative peace over the last couple of years. These are all variables that will have to be factored in as China expands into Central Asia, for at the end of the day China needs those resources to keep the wheels of its economy moving.
The writer Is Assistant Editor, The Daily Star.