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Significance of NAM

Ala' Alrababa'h
DURING the Cold War, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) constituted an influential bloc separate from the dominant eastern and western camps. Since the end of the Cold War, the significance of NAM has been doubtful at best. Nevertheless, the recent NAM Summit at Tehran is worthy of studying. It offers essential lessons about two Middle Eastern powers: Iran and Egypt.
In the days leading to the Summit, Iranian media laboured to overstate the importance of the meeting. In particular, the media has focused on Morsi's visit to Tehran. This was the first visit by an Egyptian president to Iran since 1979, when the two countries broke diplomatic relations. Since the US was not particularly thrilled about Morsi's trip to Tehran, Iranian state media claimed that the visit signifies a break in the Iranian isolation as well as a defeat to the US and Israel.
But Morsi's speech did not go as the Iranian leadership had hoped. So, Iran's official TV translated Morsi's criticism of the Assad regime as: "There is a crisis in Syria and we must support the ruling regime in Syria." Further, Iranian TV mistranslated the Arab Spring as the "Islamic Awakening."
But if Morsi is not the nice new ally Iran had hoped for, then why did their media portray things differently? One possible interpretation is that Iranian bureaucrats thought that Morsi would be kinder in his speech, but when this was not the case, they tried to cover their mistake by mistranslating the speech. This interpretation is not implausible. Bureaucrats in an authoritarian regime such as Iran's are chosen based on loyalty and patronage rather than skill. Thus, it is possible to imagine them making such a mistake. A more likely interpretation is that the Iranian leadership used the Summit to send a message to its own citizens. In its coverage of the Summit, Iranian media was effectively telling its audience that US efforts to isolate Iran are failing. Leaders and representatives of many countries as well as the Secretary General of the UN were all present in Tehran.
Many Iranians are unlikely to be deceived by their state media, especially as it is not their only source of information. But the fact that the government is going to such lengths to impose its interpretation has significance. Perhaps sanctions and efforts to isolate Iran are severely punishing. Hence, it is possible that the media wanted to tell Iranian opposition not to be so hopeful; the international community still supports Iran.
The Summit had another more important message; it showed a shift in Egyptian foreign policy. In the past weeks, Morsi called for a regional contact group that includes Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia to discuss the Syrian issue. Including Iran and excluding the US and Europe did not make Egypt favourable in the West. Then, Morsi decided to visit Tehran himself, making him the first Egyptian president to do so in more than thirty years. Again, the West was not thrilled.
When Morsi went to Tehran, he provoked Iran in its own capital. His criticism of Assad's regime was not surprising — he did that before. But Morsi's praise of Prophet Mohammed's companions was unnecessary. When he gave a speech in Tahrir Square in the end of June, he did not praise the Prophet's companions. Thus, praising the Prophet's companions in Tehran was designed to provoke Shiite Iranians, who view those companions as usurpers. By not siding with a single camp, Morsi was defining a new, non-aligned, Egyptian foreign policy.
But Egypt’s newly crafted foreign policy is unlikely to turn as radical as some neoconservatives warn. The strategic environment where Egypt exists has not significantly changed. Further, countries act according to their best interest, regardless of the type of regime in power. Thus, Egypt's foreign policy is not likely to be radically different than it used to be. As former Egyptian ambassador to the US, Nabil Fahmi, argues, Egypt is likely to have a more proactive, rather than reactive, foreign policy. This would better for Egypt and for the Arab world. There are three regional powers in the Middle East: Iran, Turkey, and Israel — none of which is Arab. The Middle East and the Arab countries would benefit from having an Arab regional power. Egypt could do just that.
Although the NAM is not significant anymore, the Summit in Tehran marked important changes in the region. It showed that the Iranian regime is taking desperate measures to convince its people of the international importance of their country. Further, the Summit showed that Egypt is establishing a new, independent foreign policy. It means that Egypt should not be taken for granted anymore, especially by its former allies. In fact, over the long run, the NAM Summit might usher in the rise of a regional power; Egypt, and in the fall of another; Iran. The writer, who attends Dartmouth College, is a blogger at ghurbeh.wordpress.com. He was a Davis Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.