& çâÌæÚUæð´ ·¤è ¥ôÚU Îð¹Ùæ ÁæÚUè ÚU¹ð´ ¥ÍæüÌ ¥ÂÙð ÜÿØ ÂÚU ŠØæÙ ÚU¹ð´Ð ãæÚU Ù ×æÙð´, €UØô´ç·¤ ·¤æ× ·¤ÚUÙð âð ¥æÂ·¤ô ©gðàØ ·¤è Âýæç# ãôÌè ãñ ¥õÚU ÁèßÙ ·¤æ ¹æÜèÂÙ ÎêÚU ãôÌæ ãñÐ ÖÜð ãè ÁèßÙ ×ð´ ç·¤ÌÙè Öè ·¤çÆÙæ§ü €UØô´ Ù ¥æ°, çÁ™ææâæ ¥õÚU ©ˆâæã ÕÙæ° ÚU¹ð´Ð ŠØæÙ ÚU¹ð´, ÜÿØ ã×ðàææ ¥æÂ·Ô¤ Âæâ ãôÌð ãñ´ çÁ‹ãð´ ÂæÙð ·Ô¤ çÜ° ÂýØæâ ¥æÂ ·¤Öè Öè àæéM¤ ·¤ÚU â·¤Ìð ãñ´Ð

NEWS ANALYSIS

A terribly wrong signal

Inam Ahmed
Should we be surprised, flabbergasted, sad or outraged?
Probably we should not react at all to what Finance Minister AMA Muhith said on Tuesday about the Sonali Bank scam. Because after the passage of almost four years of the Awami League government, we have come across several incidents of gross irregularities and in each case, we have found our finance minister reacting in the most subdued and strange manner.
And yet we react because we are worried. Because we believe that is
FROM PAGE 1
the only way we can try to put in some sober thinking, some prudence into the heads of the policymakers. When you are blinded by political exigency, all such words may sound bitter. Still we try.
The moment Mr Muhith underrated the grossness of the Sonali Bank scam in which about Tk 4,000 crore was siphoned off and berated the media for making a 'hue and cry' about the scam, he actually showed how tolerant his ministry and his government was to corruption and corrupt people.
His understanding that the Tk 4,000 crore scam is not a crisis shows how remotely removed he is from reality.
The amount of the money by itself is important. More important is the fact that it was swindled out of the state-owned bank of which the people are the owners and depositors. Whose Tk 4,000 crore the finance minister thinks is a small amount? It is the depositors' and the people's. It is his legal and moral duty to safeguard every taka of it. The finance minister cannot say something which will condone fraudulence. And yet he has.
Let's have a look at Sonali Bank. It has a total loan portfolio of Tk 32,000 crore of which Tk 7,000 crore or 21 percent is classified (meaning these loans are not being
repaid and may not be recovered in the foreseeable future).
Now add this Tk 4,000 crore that has been swindled out of Sonali. That makes the amount of risky/classified loan amount to 31 percent.
When one third of the loans of a bank goes awry, what chance does the bank have of surviving? If a 32 percent figure is nothing to worry about, then perhaps we have to learn about banking anew.
Today what we find is that the four state-owned banks, including Sonali, are all in dire straits. Once upon a time they had inherent strengths.
Take Sonali. It is a brand name. People trust it and place their deposits in it. Small depositors have built its vault and these depositors are not the kind that will flock to other banks in a flicker. This means Sonali's deposit base is solid. It has an extensive network of branches and a huge retail banking power.
Instead of utilising such strengths, the government (or rather subsequent governments) has repeatedly weakened the state-owned banks.
But there was once a genuine effort to strengthen the banks. If we recall, during the last caretaker govern-ment, the then finance adviser Mirza Azizul Islam had taken an initiative to strengthen the state-owned
banks by corporatising them. He wanted the banks to be truly commercial and run on commercial principles.
So the boards were reconstructed and staffed with people with good reputation. The boards were empowered and the finance ministry took its hands completely off the state-owned banks.
The result was visible. The asset quality of the banks improved along with all key indicators. For the first time, the CAMEL rating (a measure of a bank's capital, asset, management, earning and liquidity) improved to 3 from as low as 5. And this all happened within a span of less than two years.
Then came this government and the rot of the state-owned banks began again. The boards were reconstituted mainly with people with political links, some of them with debatable backgrounds.
The boards started reducing the financial discipline of the banks and started giving loans to parties of their own choice. Appointments and promotions became a matter of 'Tadbir' (lobbying).
The state-owned banks suddenly saw an excessive growth in credit. From being the net lenders in the money market, they became net borrowers within a short span. Their classified loans increased.
The cash crisis of these banks has peaked and Sonali's borrowing from the inter-bank market stood at Tk 3,028 crore every day. It has also shelved its plan to finance Biman to buy two aircraft because of a liquidity crisis.
As a result of the state-owned banks being kept under the finance ministry (because that way it is easier to politically use the banks), the Bangladesh Bank governor informed his board about the decadence of the state-owned banks.
The board advised the governor to write to the finance ministry about the situation, which he did on January 4, 2011. The governor described how the boards were interfering in the affairs of the bank which they should not.
What happened next was quite bizarre. The finance minister, instead of taking action on the letter, called a meeting of the board members of the state-owned banks and the governor at a state guesthouse.
The board members got the upper hand and castigated the central bank. The central bank cowered before the political salvos. A wrong message was sent to everyone.
The central bank was demoralised while all these scams went on. Now that the truth has come out, the central bank is being blamed.