& çâÌæÚUæð´ ·¤è ¥ôÚU Îð¹Ùæ ÁæÚUè ÚU¹ð´ ¥ÍæüÌ ¥ÂÙð ÜÿØ ÂÚU ŠØæÙ ÚU¹ð´Ð ãæÚU Ù ×æÙð´, €UØô´ç·¤ ·¤æ× ·¤ÚUÙð âð ¥æÂ·¤ô ©gðàØ ·¤è Âýæç# ãôÌè ãñ ¥õÚU ÁèßÙ ·¤æ ¹æÜèÂÙ ÎêÚU ãôÌæ ãñÐ ÖÜð ãè ÁèßÙ ×ð´ ç·¤ÌÙè Öè ·¤çÆÙæ§ü €UØô´ Ù ¥æ°, çÁ™ææâæ ¥õÚU ©ˆâæã ÕÙæ° ÚU¹ð´Ð ŠØæÙ ÚU¹ð´, ÜÿØ ã×ðàææ ¥æÂ·Ô¤ Âæâ ãôÌð ãñ´ çÁ‹ãð´ ÂæÙð ·Ô¤ çÜ° ÂýØæâ ¥æÂ ·¤Öè Öè àæéM¤ ·¤ÚU â·¤Ìð ãñ´Ð

The emerging paradigm of Libyan democracy

Muhammad Ruhul Amin
ON July 7, general election has taken place in Libya after more than four decades. There has been debate among the intelligentsia, academics and politicians on the emerging paradigm of democracy in this oil-rich country. The apparent electoral victory of National Forces Alliance (NFA) led by Mahmud Jibril, who is projected as a secular, has made some people believe that the country is moving to secular democracy. There may be some truths to this claim. However, this secular democracy hypothesis seems to fade away in view of emerging cultural blend growing out of the fusion of different cultural extremes. This constitutes a second strand of thinking about the post election political paradigm.
From the secular democrat’s side, first argument is NFA’s electoral gains. They argue that the secular and liberal ideology of NFA will form the foundation of secular democracy. Their second argument concerns the involvement of the secular West in the anti-Gaddafi revolution. For example, the NATO air strikes were very instrumental in the struggle to oust the tyrant. Thus they view that the post-Gaddafi political paradigm will incorporate the secular and liberal values. The third line of their argument is based on the anthropological construct of Libyan society. They think that the Libyans are not disorganized or undisciplined like other Arabs; rather they are goal-oriented and civilized like the West. Thus they will be inclined to either soft secular paradigm in line with Norway or Sweden or will be interested in
the hard secular model like France. The fourth argument reflects the impossibility of the spill-over effect of the cultural infiltration of Arab spring. The 'Brotherhood era' following Arab awakening will not find any space to get in here.
The secular democracy hypothesis is criticized as over simplification by those who forecast a consensus democratic paradigm. The exponents of consensus democracy observe unique cultural blend creating the common cultural bondage based on Libya's long-cherished socio-cultural identity. The emerging cultural union will contribute to a unique model of Libyan democracy embracing the social-cultural ethos of religion and tradition of Afro-Asian Arab countries. Thus, to them, the prospect for secular democracy is quite far from reality. For instance, NFA’s chief Mahmud Jibril despite being known as secular has urged not to label him as anti-Islamic. The involvement of significant numbers of Islamic parties in the sixty party NFA coalition also forecast the prospective cultural blend. Most political analysts have explained Jibril's post-election appeal for national unity as the testimony to consensus democracy in the making. The consensus democrats also argue that mere political parties are not the soledeterminants of the Libyan political system. For example, out of 200 seats, only 80 seats have been allotted for competition among the political parties. The independents were to contest in the remaining 120 seats. This indicates that the individual leadership is given much more preponderance in the Libyan politics over the
collective leadership. Thus one can say, for sure, the beliefs, ideals and ideologies of individuals will be more contributory to shaping Libya's emerging democracy. The consensus democrats have raised the claim of Justice and Construction Party (JCP) that most of the independent candidates hold Islamic ideology and rejected the prophecy of secular democracy. The arguments of the denial of secular democracy are also underpinned with the fragile fabrics of the NFA coalition. On the contrary, JCP has been fortified with the principles of Muslim Brotherhood as its Libyan extension. According to the consensus democrats, JCP possesses a clear vision of domestic and regional politics, and encompasses innovative mission of effective interaction with international community. Thus the proponents of consensus democracy postulate that the emerging Libyan democracy will largely be influenced with JCP's religious ideals.
Above two arguments, regarding the emerging paradigm of Libya's democracy, need to be assessed. Secular democrats’ judgment of NFA as secular liberal is not without question. It is obvious that NFA is a coalition of both secular and Islamic parties. The consideration of NFA as anti-religious is also wrong. The cultural blend argument of consensus democracy may also be questioned. It is very difficult to find the elements of cultural homogeneity along the heterogeneous tribal and ethnic groups of Libya. However, the realities of the post-revolution period have attached to Libyans so many common values that have provided them with unique bond of togetherness, unity and solidarity. Thus the arguments of consensus democrats seem to be closer to truth.
I see a unique paradigm of democracy to be brought up by the Libyan leaders who, like I said before, have already agreed upon certain distinct features of democracy. This consensus democracy has achieved adherence in both secular and religious parties. Libyans have all stood at the point—consensus. A Libyan secular does not resemble an ultra secular or pseudo secular or quasi secular, or confused secular of other developing countries. They are reared with, and accustomed to the long-cherished socio-cultural ethos that does not eschew religious values. Similarly, a religious Libyan is not also fundamentalist, conservative or backward. This broadness of a Libyan's character could tie up many Islamic parties with the NFA’s secular coalition. Libya is most likely to move to a unique paradigm of consensus democracy which is born out of Arab-Islamic roots and be brought up with progressive diversifications of both endogenous and exogenous variables.
The big challenge now is to accommodate different political parties and political beliefs and to construct the bedrock of Libyan solidarity. The emerging model of consensus democracy will not ignore the religious contributions to shaping representative governance, nor will it bypass the secular promises of progressive democratization. These two extremes of ideological waves seem to merge in a vibrant consensus democracy in shaping a democratic Libya.
The writer is Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka.