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Pakistan-US: Eternal wait for review

Moeed Yusuf
**The point is not to question the logic behind and need for the review and reset. But by dragging one's feet on the review and taking questionable decisions in the interim, Islamabad is undermining its own goals vis-a-vis the US and peace in Afghanistan.***
SINCE the Nato strike on the Salala check post, Islamabad has been undertaking a "review" of the partnership with the US through Parliament. The rationale provided by the government: The manner in which the relationship was being handled no longer suited Islamabad’s interests.
Fair enough. States have the right to recalibrate ties as they see lit. And, as in this case, it is also well within Pakistan's right to raise the stakes by employing diplomatic brinkmanship. But then a state’s actions have to be consistent with the goal of enhancing its relevance and ensuring that the other side is compelled to accept its newly proposed terms. All this must be done in a manner that the state's key interests are not compromised.
Pakistan's move to pull back temporarily post-Salala was a setback for the US, and in that sense it did provide Pakistan the upper hand, tactically speaking. Islamabad's decision was not only meant to pacify the charged atmosphere at home but was also aimed at re-emphasising Pakistan's importance and the fact that its support remained critical to the US presence and mission in Afghanistan.
From an international relations perspective, one could argue that this logic makes perfect sense. Pakistan was using the reset to underscore its importance and relevance, both to get the US to give in to some of its demands regarding the tenor of bilateral ties and to assert its importance afresh in terms of its centrality to developments in Afghanistan.
A smart policy would further these goals without losing sight of the ultimate objective: A continued relationship with the US (to their credit, no one in Pakistan's decision-making establishment believes that a ruptured relationship is viable); and relative peace and stability in Afghanistan.
Islamabad's actions have done little to back these objectives. Let me point to two examples of counterproductive decision-making.
First, about Pakistan's trump card when it comes to its relevance vis-A-vis the US at the moment — the Nato supply route running through Pakistan. There is nothing worse in a brinkmanship game than playing your trump card and drawing a blank For the US, the Pakistan transit facility remains vital — there is no doubt about that.
And so, every time the route is disrupted, one has seen Washington seek a speedy reversal. This
time was no different, except that Pakistan's insistence on taking its time to decide meant that Washington would re-evaluate just what it would mean operating without this route more seriously than it had before.
As some have explained it to me in Washington, lesson number one for the American side has been that, while still critical, the route is not the make-or-break everyone believed it was. Those in the business of studying this seem surprised at how resilient the Isaf presence is in terms of surviving without Pakistan's transit facility. Indeed, given the previous disruptions in this route, the US had already been moving to diversify its options.
The route is now carrying less than 305 of the supplies, down from the time when most of the goods used this facility. As one would expect, Washington's efforts are now to seek ways to
reduce its dependence on Pakistan even further — and this time with the belief that it is not impossible to cut back on the Pakistan supply route and still survive with relative ease.
Does this mean Washington is in a position to do away with the route? Of course not. It would still like it to be reopened as soon as possible; it remains the cheapest option. However, this is not to take away from the fact that Pakistan seems to have decreased, not enhanced its relevance. The northern route is thriving just as Pakistan mulls over what to do next. Second, in terms of the Afghan peace process, how does one make sense of the decision to turn our back on the US Special Representative for Af-Pak, Marc Grossman, since Salala?
Islamabad's pretext: until our review is done, we won't re-engage.
As others before me have asked in this space: to what benefit? The answer I get from the policy community in Islamabad is that we wish to signal to the US that we are not desperate to engage on bilateral issues.
First of all, I am not sure why. For pushing this too far may bring us perilously close to a rupture after all. More importantly, what about reconciliation and stability in Afghanistan? Isn't one of Pakistan's stated policy objectives to assist in an intra-Afghan dialogue? And has Rawalpindi not been desperate to get a seat on the big table?
If so, how does avoiding conversations on Afghanistan help? And what is the parliamentary review likely to say which will negate the need to do so?
And if it does really help, then why allow mili-tary-to-military and intel-to-intel meetings behind the scenes? The inherent contradiction in the stance is obvious.
Already, Pakistan has provided a convenient excuse to others to point fingers at it for staying away from Bonn II. By deciding to opt out, it came across as the only relevant party not interested in supporting the Afghan transition wholeheartedly. And by delaying re-engagement with the US, it is now reducing the chances of its presence at the upcoming Nato summit in Chicago, which Washington will likely be willing to consider should bilateral ties resume. Again, if you are the country that wants "in” on reconciliation and rightly objects that your concerns are not always considered judiciously, why would you lose an opportunity to make your case at the Nato summit?
The point here is not to question the logic behind and need for the review and reset. But by dragging one's feet on the review and taking questionable decisions in the interim, Islamabad is undermining its own goals vis-a-vis the US and peace in Afghanistan.
Smart brinkmanship gets states closer to their self-defined goals. Reducing one's leverage and relevance and opening doors for greater frustration and finger-pointing from allies and foes alike does not count as such. It is time to lay out findings of the review, keep sight of the broader bilateral and regional objectives, and re-engage with the US.
The writer is South Asia adviser at the US Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.
© Dawn. All rights reserved. Reprinted by arrangement with Asia News Network.