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Imperative of updated police legislation

Muhammad Nurul Huda
AS the establishment celebrates the three-day Police Week 2012 from today, the imperative of updated police legislation after forty years of independent existence assumes special significance. Since there is universal agreement that the purpose of police legislation is to establish an efficient and effective police service that gives top operational priority to servicing the needs of the public, the fitness of the Police Act, 1861 can certainly be called into question.
The 1860 Police Commission entrenched the use of Irish constabulary system in British India because it afforded the most effective means available to quell indigenous movements or rebellions. It is only natural that such a system no longer has a place in modern democratic Bangladesh.
Broad political agreement, however, is essential for enactment of new police law and reforms to be successful. The major political parties have to accept that direct political control of the police has to stop if democratic policing is the objective. This has been the case in Northern Ireland and Kenya. If "grand political bargain" cannot be struck, there should be earnest efforts to achieve bipartisan consensus on the issue of police reforms.
To avoid the confusion created by the undefined use of "superintendence" in the Police Act 1861, it is critically important for updated police legislation in Bangladesh to
unmistakably demarcate the roles and responsibilities of the police and the executive. There has to be a formal articulation to ensure that no one is able to control or direct the Inspector General to investigate a particular offence, enforce a law against a particular person, or make a personnel decision that is properly
within his power.
In the light of Bangladeshi's constitutional and democratic status strict dual control is no longer an appropriate form of oversight. The dual control of our police that has been in practice for 150 years needs to be changed. In our context it is important that we succeed in providing a clearly articulated and circumscribed role for the executive magistrate in relation to the police that acknowledges the former's position in overall district coordination.
The Police Act, 1861 does not establish anybody to insulate the police from illegitimate control, and does not set up an independent mechanism to monitor and inspect police performance. Bangladesh may look for such a system in Northern Ireland, South Africa and Kenya in particular and seek to secure the maintenance,
efficiency and effectiveness of the police service it monitors.
Public trust in the oversight body will be weakened if it is seen as a government functionary. The inclusion of independent members will strengthen public perception that the body is truly non-political in nature. In Bangladesh, while creating
an oversight body in pursuance of updated police legislation, one has to consider making appointments on the basis of merit and not political considerations.
The proposed oversight body should formulate specific performance standards that the police organisation can meet, and draft policing plans that the police can follow. We can gain helpful insight from the Indian State of Kerala that appoints three external experts each year to assess police performance.
We need to pass new policing legislation that is consistent with Bangladesh's constitution and reflects the democratic aspirations of the people. For clearly defining the police-executive relationship, creating institutions that can properly monitor the police for both performance and conduct, and ensuring that the police
effectively engage with the community it is meant to serve, the provisions of the Police Act, 1861 are demonstrably inadequate.
Kerala has transparently drafted and passed new police legislation that has ushered in an era of greater police professionalism. Conversely, Pakistan illustrates the dangers of attempting police reform without political consensus.
Experience in other countries has shown that if the requisite political will is brought to bear on the issue of modern police legislation, the passage and implementation of progressive police legislation can help a country's transition from regime style policing to one that is more democratic in nature. Such legislation creates an opportunity to improve the delivery of its policing services.
The draft police ordinance, 2007 of Bangladesh intends to promote effective and efficient policing. It attempts to deliver fair and impartial policing that is free from partisan control and ventures to provide for accountability, both to the law and the community. It also aims to protect and vindicate the human rights and human dignity of all.
The draft police ordinance, 2007 does a reasonably good job of addressing the deficiencies of the Police Act, 1861. It charts out a modern approach to policing that is encouraging. Enactment of updated police legislation brooks no further delay.
Muhammad Nurul Huda Is a columnist for The Daily Star.