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Constitutional amendments and primacy of PM

Given the prevalent realities, what are the possible ways to bring a balance to the rising primacy of PM without compromising the spirit of parliamentary democracy?

Ahmad Mahmudur Raza Chowdhury
OF late, the subject of constitutional amendment has generated considerable heat in the political arena of Bangladesh. Among the issues, two aspects stand out prominently, one related to the religious aspect of the constitution and the other is regarding the CTG. Both are fraught with dangers of appalling political fallout of uncertain magnitude. But there remain some other aspects of the constitution that affect the efficiency of the government and stand as a stumbling block in achieving transparency, efficiency and good governance.
During the last four decades, Bangladesh oscillated between presidential and parliamentary forms of governments with intermittent spells of military rules. The 1972 constitution envisaged an unalloyed Westminster type of parliamentary democracy. But within 4 years of its birth the constitution was hastily amended to facilitate one party presidential rule.
The parliamentary form was reintroduced in 1991 through a massive political movement that reflected the peoples' abhorrence for authoritarian rule. But the experience of the last 20 years' of parliamentary democracy betrayed much of their wide-eyed enthusiasm. Yours truly had the privilege to work in the same highest office on two occasions, first with the executive president and then with the executive PM where he could see from a very close angle how the government worked under the two different systems.
What was the reality?
The president secretariat was renamed as prime minister's secretariat with all its paraphernalia and organogram remaining virtually unchanged, its working procedure further constipated; ultimately making it a super secretariat. Line ministries lost initiatives, bureaucracy shirked responsibility and the ministries refrained from taking decisions by conveniently passing on decision-making task to the super secretariat of the PM.
Officials in the PM's secretariat were no less eager to usurp powers and authorities. Ultimately, it became a one-person show of the government. The only conspicuous difference was that there was lesser number of people in uniform and more advisors in the PM secretariat.
The president being a titular head, except on two occasions (namely, appointments of prime minister and the chief justice,) must depend on the advice of the PM. Even the exclusive privilege of granting clemency, bestowed upon the president by the constitution, cannot be exercised without explicit recommenda-tion/advice from the PM.
The file has to be sent to the president by the PM only. The PM appoints any number of ministers anytime and can remove them at his/her will. Appointments of Supreme Court
judges and other constitutional/statutory posts by the president need the recommendation of the PM. Thus all powers got concentrated in the office of the PM, thereby paving the way for an emergence of authoritarian pattern in the "primacy of the PM."
Such a situation is not unknown in history. Despite century old existence of a Westminster type democracy, an enviable tradition and strong institutions, Margaret Thatcher's emergence as an "Iron Lady” could not be thwarted. Indira Gandhi too, at times tended to brandish her primacy, albeit at the end it was rolled back by the commanding heights of Indian judiciary. Sonia Gandhi’s political sagacity showed how to remain aloof and untainted yet powerful.
So the primacy of PM, as we see today, is the result of country’s weak political institutions, disregard for rule of law, sycophancy, erosion of values and fear among the cronies that offering correct advice might lead to losing perks. To this has been added the "dynasty consideration."
Given the prevalent realities, what are the possible ways to bring a balance to the rising primacy of PM without compromising the spirit of parliamentary democracy? Vesting executive power with the president is conceptually untenable in Westminster type of government. Existence of 2 houses in parliament, strong local government, proportional representation in parliament, and effective bipartisan House Committees often hold back emergence of authoritarianism or one-man show. But we have none. Against this backdrop, two aspects of the constitution may be revisited. First, widening operational space for the president in following ways:
Limited authority may be vested with the president without restricting executive authority of PM. The president may have the leverage to return a file once or twice to give a semblance of check and balance which may put a lid on the omni-potential mindset of the PM secretariat.
In the annual address of the president in parliament he may not be allowed to subtract anything from what has been approved by the cabinet but he should be allowed to add something should his conscience so dictates.
Civil Service in the country suffers from a sense of insecurity and has to work under the cloud of intimidation from political power. As an institutional safeguard the president may be the final appellate authority for civil servants of the republic facing discriminatory treatment or politically motivated unjust punishment. This
will be a safeguard for them, prop up their morale and lend them courage to stand for rules against undue political pressure and intimidation.
Since parliament elects and can remove the president, he becomes a stooge at the hands of few scores of members of parliament. If the president's electoral-college could be further expanded to include elected representatives of the local government bodies, this might make primacy of PM less pronounced.
Had there been a wider electoral college, perhaps president B.Choudhury would not have to face such an ignominious exit which took place within matters of hours and with the winking of few eyes. Inclusion of local government functionaries in electoral college for president will not resemble the Basic Democracy system of Ayub Khan because in the latter case they had elected country's chief executive. But here a titular head is being elected.
This arrangement envisages at diluting primacy of the PM by offering symbolic authority to the president without making him "deputy chief executive."
Secondly, we have seen how appointments of judges of the supreme court and other constitutional/ statutory positions of commanding heights were made purely on blatant political considerations completely ignoring their professional capabilities, integrity and image (Remember the past EC!).
However, the PM should have the exclusive privilege to select her cabinet. But for other statutory positions of commanding heights, PM's recommendation may go for confirmation to a parliamentary committee; consisting members from all parties in parliament.
Although at the end, the nomination of the PM is likely to be confirmed by virtue of the ruling party's majority in the committee but this will hinder the wholesale appointments of the undeserving or eye-catching controversial figures and thus save the iconic institutions from getting ruined.
Appointments to those exalted positions through a search committee might be another option. But given the legacy of arch rivalry between the two major political camps, it is difficult to presume that the belligerent parties will ever agree to the composition of the committee.
The defining feature of democracy is that it gives people freedom to hire and fire a government. But only every five years, not before it.
The writer is a former Civil Servant. E- mail: rcmahmud@yahoo.com