The jubilation in the US following the death of Osama bin-Laden is understandable.

Never, perhaps, in the history of the US had one man been so dreaded by a nation, certainly never one more reviled than the al-Qaeda leader, and surely never one whose end brought so much relief. His end has avenged the death of 3,000 US citizens but at the expense of thousands of Iraqi and Afghan lives.

The man who had broken the myth of US invincibility, and one who had succeeded in eluding the dragnet of the world's mightiest military machine for nearly ten years (as it turns out, with the help of some of those that were a part of a coalition in the GWOT) died in the hands of the very people that had helped him rise to prominence as a "freedom fighter" nay a Jihadist.

It is not surprising that Laden, and the Mujahideen of which he was an integral part during the anti-Soviet war, was venerated by the US. "These gentiemen are the moral equivalents of America's founding fathers," was how Ronald Reagan described the Mujahideen leaders while introducing them to the media on the White House lawns in 1985. Not only did the US government glorify them, it gave them billions of dollars in military aid, which eventually toppled the PDPA, a pro-woman secular government.

That he was a CIA creation there is no doubt. Former British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook's comments "bin Laden was a product of a monumental miscalculation by western security agencies. Throughout the '80s he was armed by the CIA and funded by the Saudis to wage jihad against the Russian occupation of Afghanistan," add credence to Laden's being "their man." And he was one of the many that became Frankenstein for the US.

In view of the contradictory statements from Pakistan and the US about the operation, there can be many theories, and delving on these will be a waste of time. But one cannot help ponder on some of the questions that the military action and

killing of Laden has thrown up, particularly those relating to the future conduct of operation against the war on terror and Pakistan's role therein, future US-Pak relations and the question of Pakistan's national sovereignty, and above all, will the end of Laden see the end of religious terrorism.

If anything it has confirmed the severe deficit of trust between the US and Pakistan, an issue that had beset the operational relationship between the military forces of the two countries for some time. And this is bound to shape their future bilateral relationship. On the other hand, it will be difficult for Pakistan to explain how bin Laden got to be ensconced in Abbottabad. All the explanations from Pakistan, some of them selfcontradictory, appear tardy and facile.

It is difficult to accept that the ISI was not in the knowledge of the presence of the world's most wanted terrorist in Abbottabad, a garrison

town in a border district close to the Kashmir frontier, hundreds of miles from the Afghan border, whose access to it from Islamabad is extremely limited. The question is whether the Pakistan government was in the knowledge of it.

It is an equally plausible explanation that the establishment in Pakistan was fully aware of the presence of Laden but did not to go for him because Pakistan did not want to be seen as having pulled the trigger on him, to escape the wrath of the al-Qaeda.

But moving away from the world of speculations to the realm of reality, the question is what next? It is true that al-Qaeda's capability and his hold over the Muslim world had been overestimated. He was credited by the West with more than Laden or al-Qaeda was capable of. Certainly he pulled many Muslims towards his cause by exploiting the double standards of the West and the US on the issues of Palestine, the occupied areas, and generally the Middle East. But his method was abhorred by a great majority of his ideological adherents and the Muslims in general. In fact the al-Qaeda's influence and trans-frontier capability had been on the decline. And it is not a well-structured political entity either whose writ had been becoming narrower.

However, to elate at Laden's death as being the death knell of al-Qaeda, or indeed religious terrorism, may perhaps be a bit premature. There are objective conditions which, if not addressed with sincerity, may find more stepping into his shoes. And that is what the world must concentrate on and ensure that the causes which help foster such forces are eliminated altogether.

President Obama has delivered on the commitment he made during his election campaign that the US would not hesitate to pursue Laden even inside Pakistan territory should it have credible and actionable intelligence. Justice has been done, but only partly. The death of bin Laden has put a greater burden on Obama to see that justice is fully done. The end of Laden has given Obama a political windfall. The world is waiting to see whether he will use it to deliver on his commitment to ensure a just world.

The writer is Editor, Defence & Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.