Every now and then we come across reports that reinforce the fact that it is difficult to root out terrorism entirely. While

the present government can take due credit for the success in preventing serious acts of terrorism in its two

years in office, one cannot say with equal conviction that the agencies have been able to stop the organisational activities of the terrorists completely.

To put a cap on clandestine activities, given our limitations of human intelligence capacity, is not possible in Bangladesh, and other countries with the most sophisticatedly equipped anti-terrorist forces would find it very hard to end it. In fact, it will do us well to keep in mind the axiom that absence of evidence (of their activity) is not evidence of absence (of the phenomenon), [an argument of logic that was embezzled by Donald Rumsfeld to establish the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq], to be able to preempt the terrorists from doing damage to people, property and life.

We are seized with the issue, once again, being prompted by several reports that have appeared in the media recently related to terrorists and terror financing in Bangladesh. A report in the leading Bangla daily has revealed that al-Qaeda has established links in Bangladesh. This has been established from the statement of JMB leader Sayedur Rahman, now in custody, and deduced from statements of Rajib Karim, an expatriate Bangladeshi found guilty recently of terror plot in Britain. The revelation was a foregone reality, but had not been supported by hard evidence so far.

It is not difficult to infer the existence of psychological and ideological linkages between the Islamic extremists groups in Bangladesh and the al-Qaeda. It is well established that the senior leaders of the JMB and Huji (B) were so-called Afghan veterans, and one of them

even "rose" to the position of bin-Laden's bodyguard, and these people, as well as those from the dozen Muslim countries who had participated in the war against the Russians, were told after the withdrawal of the Russians to go back home and establish Sharia rule in their respective countries.

What had eluded us so far is specific intelligence about the organic link. But there are a few other things that the agencies need to find out, besides, to help devise a comprehensive strategy to counter these groups. For example, it imperative for the agencies to find out what the al-Qaeda plans are in respect of Bangladesh. As it is, there are

perhaps several options open to it.

Given the relatively quiet environment in Bangladesh, al-Qaeda would not be willing to risk going for aggressive action, but would much rather use our territory as a safe haven in the event they needed to escape the any heightened pressure in other areas of

the region. Thus destabilising, or creating conditions that would force the law enforcing agencies to go on overdrive on the anti-terror front, is not an option for them. However, to have sleeper cells in Bangladesh with the task of developing tentacles clandestinely and wait for the right moment to react is a choice open to al-Qaeda and

on which we must remain constantly focused.

It will also not be wrong to suggest that al-Qaeda's reactions would be influenced by the nature of our participation in the future in the so-called war on terror. And to that end the government must be complimented for having resisted US pressure on Bangladesh to actively involve its troops against the Islamic extremists in Afghanistan.

While Laden's directive might have been the fountainhead of the ideological inspiration of the indigenous extremist groups, and we can work out plans to "de-inspire" these groups, what should worry us more, and towards which our energy should be directed, is uncovering the organisational link and their local sponsors in the country, and pinpoint the source of their money supply. And in this regard we need to have specific action plan than merely having a money laundering act, which too has several contradictions that must be reconciled.

And that brings us to the more pressing question of terror funding. In this regard the statement of the state minister for home is as revealing as it is distressing. According to him, Islami Bank Bangladesh is spending 8% of its profit to fund militants in the country, which it does through the Islami Bank Foundation; that amounts to more than Tk.25 crore. This is for the first time that a source of terror fund in Bangladesh has been identified by the government. The bank has refuted the allegation.

We are sure that the information is based on hard evidence. We cannot countenance a bank funding militancy; we wonder why the government has not initiated necessary action against it. If the minister has been so specific as to put his finger on the exact percent of its profit being used to fund militancy there is no reason to dither. Or has the minister spoken out of turn. It is on the government and the Islami Bank to prove their respective points.

The writer is Editor, Defence & Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.