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Can US withdraw troops next year?

Harun ur Rashid
PRESIDENT Obama, while sending 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, believed that the surge would turn around the war and allow pulling out of troops from Afghanistan by July 2011. By summer, it is estimated the number of US troops will increase to 105,000.
The question raised in Washington is whether the time-table of withdrawal can be maintained given the situation in Afghanistan?
For now, it is reported that the White House has decided to wait until a review, scheduled for December, to assess whether the target date could still work. Meanwhile, officials are underscoring the fact that the July 201 Iwithdrawal start will be based on conditions in Afghanistan, and the president will decide how quickly troops will be pulled out.
The Nato-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan government are set to extend "Operation Moshtarak" (meaning "together" in Dari language of Afghanistan) from Helmand into the adjacent province of Kandahar.
Kandhahar is the seat of the insurgency, and winning it depends on the success of
operations in adjoining provinces. In the provincial capital, Kandahar city, very few NGOs and multilateral institutions operate because of the extreme danger posed by insurgency.
Kandahar is of the utmost strategic significance to ISAF due to its critical position on Afghanistan's ring road. The ISAF plans to create a ring of stability in the populous districts that surround Kandahar city by putting troops to restrict Taliban's mobility. These forces, according to a report, will be in place by August, and the additional 30,000 US troops will be placed in the surrounding districts.
Some concerns about the operations of Kandahar are described below:
• The inability of Afghan officials -- both civil and security — to keep law and order after the insurgents are beaten. The local people get frustrated when they do not obtain amenities from the government officials, and insurgents eventually return to the area;
• After the defeat of the Taliban in Marja in Helmand province in February, Afghans and American struggled to establish a local government that can win the loyalty of the people to fend off the Taliban. However, Afghan officials rarely show up at work and do little to help local people.
Corruption, big and small, remains an overwhelming complaint. Under the circumstances, it is very difficult to depend on the loyalty of local people in fighting against the Taliban;
• In multiple firefights, journalists who accompanied the operations say that many Afghan soldiers did not aim — they pointed their American-issued M-16 rifles in the direction of the incoming small-arms fire and pulled their triggers without putting rifle sights to their eyes;
• The real failing is the inability of Nato partners and allies to travel through the dangerous areas in the south and the east of Afghanistan, where the real centre of the fighting exists;
• President Karzai's abrupt dismissal of two senior security officials who were widely trusted by the US security officials;
• Afghans know that American and European troops will probably pack their bags and leave the country within 18 months and, given this scenario, it is doubtful whether the Afghan governmentcanbuild trust in the Afghan people within that time.
General McChrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, reportedly said in early June that operations in the Taliban heartland of Kandahar "will happen more slowly than we originally anticipated."
On June 16, General David Petraeus, the commander of US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, told the Senate Armed Services Committee: "It is important that July 2011 be seen for what it is; the date when a process begins, based on condi-
tions, not the date when the US heads for the exits." He said "rigorous assessments" would be made as the date approached.
Administration officials argue that there is mixed progress in Afghanistan and that it is too early to draw firm conclusions on the target date. While acknowledging setbacks officials point to positive signs, including the recent jirga peace conference called by Karzai intended to lure moderate Taliban out of the war, and his trip to the insurgency-infested south of the country.
Karzai believes there are thousands of Taliban members with no ideological basis for fighting his government. He called them "country boys," driven to the insurgency either by Taliban intimidation or by disillusionment with past government failures.
Riedel, the regional specialist, said that the administration had few attractive alternatives to its current course. Pouring in more Nato troops is politicially infeasible (the new British prime minister has ruled out any increase of troops), while pulling out altogether would make Afghanistan vulnerable to Al-Qaeda in a Taliban-dominated Afghanistan.
It seems that President Obama inherited a disaster in Afghanistan and could easily end his first term with more troops in Afghanistan than when he began it. His determination to end the nine-year old war remains uncertain. Meanwhile, Nato soldiers are being killed in the south and east of Afghanistan (during the last fortnight of this month, 44 international service members have been killed, 27 of them Americans and 9 Britons).
Barrister Harun ur Rashid is a former Bangladesh Ambassador to the UN, Geneva.