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Myanmar’s motivations

These high stakes explain the junta's motivation to settle the boundary quickly so that they, not their successors, can enjoy the spoils. The junta's urgency to settle the maritime boundary dispute should be recognised by Bangladesh as a result of the country's domestic political pressures.

Jared Bissinger
CORRUPTION and political uncertainties have created incentives for Myanmar's junta to quickly settle the maritime boundary dispute with Bangladesh so that they, not their successors, can enjoy the spoils of offshore natural gas exploitation that the unresolved maritime boundary is blocking. These internal political
pressures could lead to a settlement that is both quick and more favourable for Dhaka.
Myanmar's push to settle the maritime boundary comes from the small group of junta members who control the country's notoriously corrupt gas exports and stand to benefit from exports from the disputed area. In 2009, gas exports brought in about US $2.5 billion; however, little of this money found its way into the govern-
ment's official budget. That is because proceeds from natural gas sales are converted to kyat, Myanmar's local currency, at a market exchange rate of around 1,000/USD. But the transactions are recorded in the country's budget at the much lower official rate, currently 6.51 kyat/USD. This multi-tiered exchange rate helps the junta omit over 99% of the country's actual gas revenues from the official budget, and would likely be used for gas exports from the disputed area.
The fruits of Myanmar's creative accounting are spent by the junta and its cronies for personal and political purposes. Personal uses include mansions for top generals in the new capital Naypyidaw, special events such as the wedding ofThan Shwe's daughter (which included wedding gifts worth an estimated US $50 million), and frequent travel to Singapore for,
among other things, doctors visits or shopping excursions. Political projects funded by gas revenues include the construction of Naypyidaw in rural Myanmar, far from the dissent-prone former capital ofYangon, as well as the pursuit of nuclear technologies and a tunnel network Gas revenues have also funded weapons purchases and allowed the junta to exert greater control over the country's military, the Tatmadaw. Gas revenues have given Myanmar's junta significandy more comfort and security, and additional revenues from the disputed area would likely only further enrich the junta.
Yet, the future for the junta and its cronies is rife with uncertainties about access to the corrupt stream of gas revenues. There is strong internal competition among the junta, other current and retired military officers, bureaucrats and the
business class. The major uncertainty is not whether the junta will retain power, but who within the junta will retain power. These unknowns have intensified recentiy because of upcoming elections and the possible retirement of senior junta members. This instability gives the current junta a sense of urgency in its undertakings, especially those that could secure revenue. Few projects in Myanmar hold as great a promise of potential revenues as developing natural gas resources subsequent to settling the maritime boundary.
These high stakes explain the junta's motivation to settle the boundary quickly so that they, not their successors, can enjoy the spoils. The junta's urgency to settle the maritime boundary dispute should be recognised by Bangladesh as a result of the country's domestic political pressures. Myanmar, a natural gas
exporter, should have the leverage to secure a more favourable settlement than Bangladesh, which is in the throes of a worsening electricity crisis caused by gas shortfalls. However, corruption and political uncertainty have mitigated this leverage and made it difficult for Myanmar to prolong the dispute settlement process. This should help Bangladesh secure both a quick and more favourable settlement to the maritime boundary dispute. However, for Dhaka would be wise not to wait for legal proceedings to run their course, but instead should be proactive in pushing for a faster settlement.
Jared Bissinger, is Research Fellow, National Bureau of Asian Research, in Seattle, USA. He can be reached at jaredbissinger@gmail.com.