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The new US security strategy

Coming as it does, after two strategy papers of the Republican regime under Bush, this has evinced a good deal of interest and generated a mixed reaction. While some see major departures from the policies of the Bush regime, some see it as a "Bush redux," the president having retained the option of unilateral action.

Shahedul Anam Khan
IS it really a new strategy? Some prefer to see the new national Security Strategy paper, released recently by the White House, as a set of pointers rather than a strategy, articulation of intent rather than canonical imperatives. Some of the salient features of the paper are those dealing with terrorism, "soft power,” multilateralism, and the expanded meaning of the term "security."
It seems that President Obama has learned from his predecessor's shortsightedness; was it not an American humourist who had said that there is a lot for the wise man to thank the fool for?
The document is the first of its kind from the Obama administration, and is in keeping with the requirement of the Senate since 1986 obligating the president to layout his threat analysis in order to make rational budget appropriation for defence. And no wonder, in keeping with the traditions, it has come to be called the "Obama Doctrine."
Coming as it does, after two strategy
papers of the Republican regime under Bush, this has evinced a good deal of interest and generated a mixed reaction. While some see major departures horn the policies of the Bush regime, some see it as a "Bush redux," the president having retained the option of unilateral action.
The thrust of the new doctrine stems from the recognition of two very important realities.
One, that there is a limit to raw power, and modulating policies to conform to such a philosophy becomes counterproductive for a nation in the long run. The Bush administration had perhaps perceived the kernel truth during the terminal phase of its regime, but was either unwilling to acknowledge, or unable to implement, it, having put all its money on the policy of unilateralism and preemptive attack. By the time it realised that it could not go it alone, either in meeting its security objectives or its economic goals, it was too late for George W. Bush to redact his plans.
The second universal truth that Obama draws upon is that, because of the perva-
sive worldwide presence of, and absolute reliance on, military power as a tool of world domination, there is always a possibility of being entrapped in an "imperial overstretch" which, without a strong economy to prop it up, will cause the collapse of the state. And there are many historical instances of it, the latest being the collapse of the Soviet empire.
That is why, there is such an overwhelming emphasis on domestic policies particularly the economy, to the extent of stressing that "the key to America's future security will hinge on its ability to reinvent its rusting domestic economy." The billions of dollars being spent everyday to fight the War in Afghanistan and Iraq and the effect of world recession have added to the woes of the Americans.
The renunciation of force is very evident in the new approach, and we are hearing of "Smart Power," a new phrase being bandied about. One might call it "soft-power" too, a Kautilyan prescription of use of influence (as an alternative method of domination) that can prove to be more effective than raw power. And as Hilary Clinton admitted recently: "Even the US military has come to recognise the limits of the use of force examining its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan," and that it is, "Moving from mostly the direct exercise of power to a more sophisticated and difficult mix of indirect power and influence.” The only point that one would like to make here is that there are limits of US "influence" too, that is imposed by the double standards the US has exercised in
its foreign policy.
Some see the new approach to counter international terrorism as abandonment of the US global war on terror. But is it really a goodbye to GWOT? While the new approach, which emphasises the fact that it is, "Not a world war against a tactic — terrorism -- or a religion — Islam," may assuage the feelings of many, one wonders whether it is realpolitik that has motivated the position or compulsion stemming from innate beliefs.
To look at terrorism as a tactical measure is a narrow way of looking at an expedient that can be used as a strategic tool too. But more importantly, it is a legitimate question as to how the Obama administration will ever, "Seek to end the legitimacy of the use of terrorism and isolate those who use it," without stopping its biggest ally in the Middle East, Israel, using terrorism as a state policy. The latest instance is the killing of nine people on a relief mission to Gaza on board a ship in international waters.
Mr. Obama has come for a bit of stick for moving away from the traditional definition of security and including under the rubric a host of issues apart from the military and economy, which is at it should be.
One is waiting to see how the new policy will be implemented, because, according to the critics, the document is incomplete since it does not go far enough to spell out the ways to achieving the goals.
Brig. Gen. Shahedul Anam Khan ndc, psc (Retd) is Editor, Defence & Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.