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Are allied efforts succeeding in Afghanistan?

Muhammad Zamir
Obama's decision to have a troop surge has perhaps been politically motivated but any chance of salvaging an acceptable outcome will definitely hinge not on what American and allied soldiers can do on the battlefield, but on putting together a coherent political strategy.
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Afghanistan, one of my friends recently presented me with a copy of The Kite Runner by Khaled Hosseini, an author of Afghan origin currently living in the United States. A bestseller (has sold more than two million copies), the book vividly portrays the social background of that war-torn country and the societal effects that has taken place over the last thirty years in Kabul and the adjoining regions, as a result of insurgency and terrorism. I hope President Obama has read it. It provides a rare insight into what is happening in Afghanistan and why.
Like other analysts, I have also reflected carefully on President Barack Obama's speech of December 1,2009, delivered at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He highlighted three core elements of US strategy in Afghanistan: the military effort to create the conditions for a transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and how a more effective partnership can be put in place with Pakistan. In this context, he also pointed out that the Iraq war was coming to a responsible end and that all US troops will be out of Iraq by the end of 2011.
He then went on to point out that his aim now was to better coordinate the military and civilian efforts of US and the NATO forces. He also recognised that "huge challenges remain" and that "Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has moved backwards." He also added that "there is no imminent threat of the government being overthrown, but the Taliban has gained momentum." Such candor, instead of spin, was refreshing.
It appears that pursuant to Obama's orders, the first U.S. forces in the surge will be deplqyffd^i^p^;^,^^. r an infantry battalion task force at Camp . Lejeune in North Carolina will head to Afghanistan later this month, and will be followed by the further deployment of another 13,500 by the end of spring, including an additional 6,200 Marines from Regimental Combat Team-2 at Camp Lejeune; 800 from I Marine Expeditionary Force at Camp Pendleton, California; 3,400 troops from a brigade combat team of the 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum, New York; and 4,100 support forces. The rest, out of the total additional pledged 30,000, will follow subsequently. It is being hoped by the Obama Administration that this extra presence will increase the Allied ability to train the Afghan security forces so that more Afghans can get into the fight, thus helping to create conditions that would enable the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans sooner than later.
This indicates the seriousness of the US strategy. However, not much has been heard from the other countries that have an armed presence in Afghanistan, about sending further reinforcements. Some observers have hinted that they have not been so forthcoming as they are not sure that such a surge will work in a war, where the Afghan partner is corrupt and has become controversial after the recently concluded presidential election. France and Germany have been particularly silent.
A few analysts, including retired Russian generals involved in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have already started drawing parallels of the US presence in Afghanistan
with what happened in Vietnam. They, in this regard, are also highlighting that future operations through additional troops will be meaningless unless it is in support of a sustainable political system. They are also stressing that the Indochina parallel seems valid given that, as in Vietnam, America's Afghan allies are unviable.
No one in his right senses should seek a precipitate withdrawal of the US and NATO presence from Afghanistan. However, it is equally true that the whole scenario has to be viewed within the multifaceted paradigm "(vhere politics Anti cfipIdHiacy"art thetunfla1-* mentals, and where progress cannot be achieved unless security improves. In addition, there has to be recognition that even the most limited stabilisation program will flounder, unless all the regional powers, including Iran, become parties to it. This is vital because of the complexities created through the presence of tribalism and the sectarian divide within Afghanistan. The situation also becomes more intricate because a large section of the population, the Pashtuns, an important component for stability, dislikes both the Western "occupiers" and also the present Kabul regime. Progress will depend, as General McChrystal has correctly diagnosed, on reaching accommodations with the tribes from the bottom up, not the top down.
Obama's decision to have a troop surge has perhaps been politically motivated but any chance of salvaging an acceptable outcome will definitely hinge not on what American and allied soldiers can do on the battlefield, but on putting together a coherent political strategy'.
I also tend to agree with the general view that the Taleban commander Mullah Omar might have got the wrong message from Obama's speech and might now focus more on the premise that the US will start their withdrawal in 18 months. It would be appropriate here to recall Mullah Omar's earlier comment that "they may have the watches, but we have the time." I hope Obama has not inadvertently given volume to that message. I can understand the temptation of setting timelines and exit strategies to reassure the domestic audience, but one must remem-
ber that it also tells the opposite party how long they have to wait before the US and her Allies give up.
Instead, it might have been better to set milestones and targets for the growth and professionalisation of the Afghan Army and police, and the handing over of functions to Afghan structures before any pull-out would commence. One hopes that such a transparent public document can still be prepared for Afghanistan. From that point of view, it could be similar to the Mission Implementation Plan that set forth a visible 'rfialTrii^j^fJfbgreftlbr Bosnia durih^lhe' height of instability.
One need hardly reiterate that for any plan to succeed in Afghanistan, one has to take into cognisance that its demography is not only tribal in character, but that a Western-style centralised constitution might be perceived as being against the grain of Afghan society. From that point of view. Obama's suggestion that the US "will suppon efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taleban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens’ has been a good step. However, it can only work if America is able to persuade the restive rural Afghanistan that Karzai has a credible and attainable Afghan domestic and regional strategy.
At this point, one needs to also underline that little progress can be made toward regional stability without reducing tensions between Pakistan and India. India's dalliance with the Afghan government, which has been given hundreds of millions of dollars in Indian aid. has increased the deep paranoia of the Pakistani army and intelligence service. Such a status quo, in all likelihood, can only lead powerful elements of Pakistan’s security forces to continue to support Islamic militants as proxies against India. The US and its Allies, within this framework, will also have to agree on a wider regional strategy that would include Russia and China. Without this, success will be much more difficult.
Muhammad Zamir s a former Secretary and Ambassador and can be reached at mazam.r@dhaKa.net