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Copenhagen: What could be the Bangladesh strategy?

Mizan R. Khan
THE previous piece tried for a dissection of die hard reality of climate diplomacy, which now hovers around the few major emitters, both from the developed and the developing countries. The UNFCCC-led universal multilateralism has been relegated to some non-voting observer status in the whole drama. The walkout of the 51 African countries for a day on November 4 in Barcelona, led by the Ethiopian leader, is a loud protest, but it seems to have no significant impact on the remaining two days of deliberations.
At the New York Climate Summit in September last, the protest statement of the exasperated Maldives President Mr. Nasheed of his unwillingness to come any more to the charade of climate talks can be cited as another case of extreme frustration. The outcomes of 8 round of negotiations since COP-13 in Bali can be compared to the Doha Round of trade talks -launched 8 years ago and still struggling to overcome the rich-poor rift — to scale back subsidies in the North in return for market access to the South.
Despite the unwelcome procrastination, what could be the strategy of the MVCs like Bangladesh? What should be the framework argument? One statement of the Ethiopian leader Meles Zenawi is pertinent here. In an interview on September 16 he said: 'The justice of our cause is so patent that we do not expect anybody in the international community to reject the minimum conditions that we set." What justice does he refer to? What is the foundation of seeking such justice?
To begin with, a bare fact needs to be laid out. Everybody will agree that use of atmospheric sink as a Global Commons is non-excludable but contradictory, in the sense that nobody can be excluded from the right to use it, but contradictory in that one's use of the sink reduces space for others. So climate change is regarded as a global public peril and, therefore, carbon reduction aimed at halting it is a
global public good.
This reduction as a public good suffers from problems of undersupply, freeriding and non-participation because some countries are guided by short-term cost-benefit analysis and consider cost to be higher than the expected benefit. But contribution in solving the problem is unequal, and the MVCs contribute least to generate this public bad. HoWever.'the climate regime already has a mechanism in the form of a principle in the Convention, which is the common but differentiated responsibility based on respective capability.
The corollary of the CBDR is the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) for internalisation of a negative externality like carbon emission. This PPP is applied within the OECD for solution of their trans-border environmental problems. The Rio Declaration or the Stockholm Declaration have provisions for payment or compensation (though the modalities are not spelt out) for extra- territorial damage by a country beyond its border, but they are not being applied globally yet. perhaps because the other side has been rendered weaker through a "divide and rule "policy.
The accepted principle of the CBDR (Article 3.1) is ostensibly the core value of the market economy. The contradiction is that the industrial market economies, led by the US (the Ione holdout of the Kyoto Protocol and a likely dealbreaker at Copenhagen), constantly advocate the application of market instruments in managing economic affairs of the developing world, but they themselves don't accept this basic market instrument of internalisation of externality (factoring the impact cost of accumulated GHG emissions) for meeting the challenge of climate change.
The amount of money needed for the purpose is not astronomical. The authoritative Stern Review estimates that action now will cost only about 1 % of global economic product. This equals an average cost of about $0.02 per kilowatt-
hour of electricity, or $0.25 per gallon of gasoline. The UNFCCC estimates expenditure of about $200 billion to return GHG emissions to current levels in 2030. This Is even less titan 0.5% of global GDP or about 0.7% of the "crisis money" mobilised at such short notice to bankroll the greed of western money-lenders.
Against this backdrop, Bangladesh is globally recognised as a front-ranking MVC. However, this global sympathy is yet to turn into an effective outcome that could support major adaptation initiatives. On the other hand, the government, from its own resources, has committed about $100 million for climate change projects. Together with some major policy initiatives, this commitment is unique in the developing world.
During the last few years, our delegation, that often included this author, has earned a reputation as good negotiators. This time our prime minister, who has already become an effective spokesperson of the MVCs, is expected to attend the high-level segment, which will be attended by more than 50 leaders. Therefore, the responsibility of our delegation is multiplied manifold. In such a challenging situation, it is proposed that the Bangladesh delegation focuses, among others, on the following issues: • Climate change-induced displacements: Our prime minister has taken a very unequivocal and strong position on this issue. She stated in her New York speech: "The affected communities would not only lose their homes, they would also stand to lose their identity, nationality, and their very existence, and in some cases their countries." So the PM said that Bangladesh would "make a strong call" for the development of a new legal regime under the UNFCCC process to ensure the social, cultural and economic rehabilitation of climate-induced migrants. The number of such displaced people from our coastal belt may exceed 20 million. At the moment, there is no global instrument that can deal with climate change-induced displacements. The Geneva Convention on Refugees lacks an explicit clause acknowledging the plight of people displaced due to environmental degradation. Many voices are calling for a re-drafting of the Refugee Convention so that it recognises climate refugees. But Article 4.4 of
tire Convention stipulates that developed country parties "shall also assist the developing country parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting the costs of adaptation." Therefore, in order to give full meaning to "adaptation," the cost of migration due to climate change should be acknowledged as a "cost of adaptation" and hence, a global responsibility. The new Nonpaper 53 (combined with Non-Papers 31 and 41) contains text for both national and international aspects of climate change-induced migration (paras 12c and 13b). So the Bangladesh delegation may contribute to the fine-tuning of the text likely to be adopted at Copenhagen.
Insurance: This is coming up as a major instrument of adaptation in a post-Kyoto deal in Copenhagen. There are two full-blown proposals -- one by the island states group, AOSIS, and the other by the Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII). The AOSIS proposal's expression of "compensation" is vehemently opposed by the industrial countries. However, there are positive elements in both these proposals, such as international responsibility, risk reduction incentives and insurance provisions for losses due to climate impacts. It may be recalled that this author, on behalf
of the LDCs, made a presentation on micro-insurance at the Plenary of COP-13 at Bali, where some mechanisms for auto-generation of funding for adaptation in general and for insurance in particular were proposed. The proposal also included piloting of weather index-based crop insurance for poor farmers and a regional model of insurance in South Asia, along the lines of the Caribbean Climate Risk Insurance Fund (CCRIF) supported by the World Bank. Under this model, the Caribbean governments are entitled to get liquidity in the immediate aftermath of a climate disaster. There are good suggestions in Non-paper 41 (paras 4b, 9a & 9b). It is expected that parties will find a compromise at COP-15 in integrating disaster risk reduction and insurance. There is likelihood that COP-15 will give mandate to explore catalytic activities in the form of a 3-year work program. So, the Bangladesh delegation may closely follow this vital agenda and forcefully revive the proposal of hosting a global workshop on micro-insurance before COP-16.
Economic diversification of the LDC economies: In the section on the Means of Implementation in the Adaptation Text, the delegation of Bangladesh may flag the issue of diversification of LDC economies as a means of adaptation. For the purpose, together with
demanding financial and technical support, we may press for, as our State Minister for Environment and Forests Dr. Mahmud argues, quota-free access of LDC exports to industrial country markets. The rationale is that the base sectors of the LDC economies are likely to be hardest hit due to climate change impacts. This has the potential of being a very effective non-pecuniary support mechanism to the LDCs.
• Developing a vulnerability index: The Bangladesh delegation may insist on development of a vulnerability index by a COP-designated panel of scientists. Such an index could guide the distribu tion of funds among competing claims. In developing such an index, a life and livelihood, rather than sectoral, vulnerability approach is more realistic from the human security point of view. The Napa guidelines set the level or degree of adverse effects of climate change and reduction of poverty as two of the four broad sets of criteria for prioritising activities for developing the adaptation program. For the purpose, Bangladesh may lobby with the major MVCs to push this agenda forward. Bangladesh can also hold a meeting with GEF, which has expressed its intention for developing such an index.
• Meetings for promoting bilateral cooperation: On the sidelines of multilateral negotiations, Bangladesh may be more active in negotiating bilateral environmental cooperation, particularly with Canada, Japan, the UK, EU and the US. It may be mentioned that President Obama has set aside $80 billion as clean energy fund under the recovery plan. Bangladesh may seek cooperation in areas like transfer of clean energy technology, technical assistance for energy efficiency and reducing system loss, forest conservation and capacity building. It is to be reiterated that, nowadays, environmental diplomacy subsumes economic diplomacy and resource mobilisation for poverty alleviation to ensure sustainable development. We only hope that our diplomacy will now focus more on issues of "low" rather than "high" politics.
Mizan R. Khan, Ph.D is Professor, Department of Environmental Science & Management, North South University. E-mail: mizanrk@northsouth.edu