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From Barcelona to Copenhagen: Is there any hope left? (Part-1)

Mizan R.Khan
THE last of the five rounds of negotiations on climate change since Cop-14 in December 2008 ended in November in Barcelona. The outcome differs in no substantive manner from the previous rounds. Perhaps Barcelona witnessed the highest number of non-papers, which are in-session documents issued informally. The decision to carry some of these non-papers to Copenhagen for consideration, without adopting any substantive decision is symptomatic of lack of any progress. The expectation is a new deal, particularly on mitigating climate change. Judging by the outcomes of the eight negotiations since adoption of the Bali Action Plan in December 2007, the prospect looks bleak.
What are the issues that still hold us back? Why is there no substantive progress? What is the likely outcome at Copenhagen? What should Bangladesh's strategy be?
As the deadlock continues, the impacts of climate change continue. New scientific studies go even beyond the IPCC AR4 estimates on temperature rise and the consequent impacts on the most vulnerable countries (MVCs). A map released by the UK Met Office Hadley Centre shows significant temperature rises on land, with the hottest days of the year in many highly populated areas being between 6 and 12 degrees C higher than they are now. It also shows that, by 2050, 70 million people in Bangladesh could be affected by floods and 8 million by drought, with increasingly intense cyclones. Against this disquieting future, the trends in emissions by the industrial countries present a contrasting picture: only few countries have reduced their emissions compared to 1990 level.
A new but important trend in climate diplomacy has been evident for the last few months. True to Morgantheau's
"power politics," emission power tends to rule the game, where the impacting countries call the shots and the impacted ones are ignored. This is evident from the flurry of negotiations held beyond the UNFCCC process. The bilateral 5-year cooperation agreement on climate change between China and India is a notable event. There is nothing wrong in these multi-level negotiations, but when they tend to undermine the main global forum, there is a real problem. Where do the MVCs fit in the equation?
The main issues are:
• The most intractable issue is a clear emission reduction target from industrial countries. The EU is committed to keep the rise in temperature within 20C and reduce emission by at least 20% compared to the 1990 level. The Boxer-Kerry Bill at the US Senate proposes to reduce US GHG emissions by 20% by 2020 compared to the 2005 level. This is higher than the proposed reduction in the Waxman-Markey Bill that was passed in the House of Representatives few months ago. Though the US continues to remain the lone holdout of the Kyoto Protocol. President Obama expressed intention to lead climate diplomacy by example, but his superb oratory may not have an easy pass over the Senate far beyond Copenhagen!
• What will the major developing countries do to limit the growth of their emissions compared to the business-as-usual scenario (BAU)? The pressure from industrial countries would have moral strength had they reduced their emissions as promised under the Protocol. There are lots of differences even within the G77. China promised to reduce carbon intensity of its economy by a "notable margin" by 2020. Brazil is considering a freeze of its emissions to 2005 level by 2020. Indonesia pledged to cut emissions by 20% by 2020 from the BAU levels.
India’s position is not yet clear. A confidential letter from the environment minister to the prime minister contains hints of a shift in India's position. The environment minister reportedly advocates for assuming a legally binding target in emission reduction, arguing that India does not want to be seen as a "deal breaker" and as acquiescing with the industrial countries. A Chinese delegate at the AWG-KP session in Bonnll in June this year refused to accept the polluter-pays-principle (PPP). However, the meaning of Article 3.1 of the Convention -- the principle of "equity and common but differentiated responsibility based on respective capabilities" -- is the PPP. How come China negates this? It seems that the shift away from the Convention process was engendered by mutual understanding between major polluters of both the industrial and the developing countries.So, despite the walk out of the 51 African countries in Barcelona, the positions of the key players did not change because the G77 is being undercut from within.
• Will the mitigation regime continue to be an extension of the Kyoto Protocol, with new emission reduction commitments by the industrial countries, or should it be packaged under a new framework covering both the developed and developing countries? This
framework, proposed by Australia in Bangkok, is supported by the US, Japan and the EU, while the G77, led by Africa, opposes such an approach as it blurs the differentiation of the responsibilities of addressing climate change between the developed and developing countries.
• The time frame, particularly of a midterm target, for emission reduction commitment is another unresolved issue. The EU and the G77 countries are strong supporters of such a commitment by 2020, while the umbrella group led by the US tends to shelve such mid-term commitments and focuses on targets of 50% by 2050. But the just-adopted APEC Declaration shows a backing away even from this long-term commitment. The politics behind pushing binding commitments far into the future seems to be the fact that the share of G77 countries' emissions, already half of the global total, by that time will exceed that of the developed countries. So the underlying rationale is that the burden will then fall more on the G77 group. Another implicit idea behind shelving of the commitment date to 2050 is that low carbon technology will be available on a massive and affordable scale in developing countries, where emission reduction is and will remain lot cheaper.
• Financing of the mitigation and adap-
tation measures is another most debated issue. This agenda includes at least 4 sub-issues: i) the size of the pot, ii) the source of the funds, iii) the mechanism of fund management, and iv) distribution of the available money. Till date, the money disbursed for addressing climate change amounts to less than $lbilllon, against a pledge of about $18 billion during the last seven years. From that amount, $70 million has been diverted to the LDCs. So, the amount pledged falls far short of the UNFCCC estimated need of $200 billion. The EU has come up with a figure of *100 billion ($150 billion) as the yearly need from 2020, in which public financing is likely to be *22-50 billion. The other sources proposed are emissions trading, auctioning off AAUs, levy from joint implementation and emissions trading, aviation and shipping, and co-financing by developing countries. How much the EU will contribute or how its share will be distributed among its members has not yet been decided. The Mexican proposal of creating a multilateral climate change fund based on population, emission level and capability is being widely discussed. There are disagreements regarding the management of available funds. The industrial countries want to continue with the GEF model, where voting is weighted against contribution. But the developing countries want a management frame under the control of the COP. However, for an interim period, it may be along the lines of the Adaptation Fund management, where the majority of board members come from their side. Next, how to distribute the funds available among the more than 130 G77 countries? EU proposed a high-level body to review the process. For the last few years, the Bangladesh delegation has been insisting on developing a vulnerability index, with criteria agreed by a COP-designated panel of scientists. This index could guide the distribution of funds. The Germans have developed such an index, where Bangladesh figures among the world's 10 MVCs. During the Bonn negotiations, which this author attended, the GEF expressed its willingness to develop such an index.
• Another interesting development relates to the proposal of establishing
new funds. There arc already 2 funds - LDC Fund and a Special Climate Change Fund -- under the Convention and the Adaptation Fund under the Protocol. The prime minister of Bangladesh, a very active spokesperson of the MVCs, proposed establishment of a new fund for this group. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, at the APEC meeting, proposed establishment of a global climate fund for mitigation and adaptation. In Barcelona, Japan proposed establishment of 3 funds: i) a climate change fund for implementing mitigation and adaptation measures, ii) an adaptation fund for the MVCs, and iii) a green fund for facilitating an enabling environment and capacity building.
Conclusion: There may not be any ground for hope of a substantive deal at Copenhagen. There might be some decisions on commitment of funding, REDD agenda, adaptation measures including insurance and capacity building, etc. A pessimistic note has already been sounded by the UN secretary general, and even by the most vocal leader of climate diplomacy, the British PM. Though Mr. Brown says that "failure would be unforgivable," the key player --the US -- is not likely to come up with any reduction commitment at Copenhagen, as the passage of the Senate Bill will take at least few months.
The last nail in the coffin was added by the just-concluded APEC summit. Without the US, the reduction commitment covers only about 30% of global GHG emissions. Mr. Obama has committed to go to Copenhagen, along with more than 50 leaders. Looking at the latest developments, particularly of the discussions beyond the Convention process, it seems that there is likely to be just a "political deal," a framework understanding, and not a "legally-binding treaty" at ail, in Copenhagen.
What the content of this political deal will be depends on the intense diplomacy and on-the-spot bargaining among the assembled leaders. In this situation, even a substantive political deal could have been a step forward, since it could be fleshed out in COP15 or at the next COP. In ■ the meantime, the Bangladesh delegation must do its home-work before boarding the flight to Copenhagen.
Mizan R. Khan. Ph D, is Professor. Department of Environmental Science & Management North South University
E-mail: mizanrk@northsouth edu