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Demystifying the 7th WTO Ministerial

Toufiq Ali
THE Marrakesh Agreement that Established the World Trade Organization (WTO), in Article IV Section 1, provided for " .... a Ministerial Conference composed of representatives of all members, which shall meet every two years." The Ministerial Conference is the highest decision-making body of the WTO and the multilateral trade agreements under it. Having actively participated in the last four Ministerial Conferences, I thought it would be useful to share my perspectives.
The 1st Ministerial was held in Singapore in December 1996. It took momentous decisions with far- reaching consequences. For instance, it decided on the debatable "Integrated Framework for LDCs" as a means of helping the LDCs expand their trading opportunities. The 2nd Ministerial was held in Geneva in May 1998: this was a procedural meeting mainly to coincide with the observance of the 50th founding anniversary of the UN, and allowed thenPresident Clinton to address it.
The next Ministerial in November 1999 in Seattle took on a different significance. It was time for decisions regarding review of some elements of the Uruguay Round Agreements, the so-called built-in agenda. Preparations for the Ministerial left much to be desired, and different groups approached the
Ministerial with varying ambitions. The events surrounding the Ministerial, particularly the rioting, drew more attention than the substance. There was no option but to allow the Ministerial to "fail.”
The 4th Ministerial was held in Doha in November 2001. The mood was somber, coming after the shock of 9/11. The US and the EC, for their own interests, wanted to launch a new round of trade negotiations. The developing countries were opposed to it, but were prepared to bend over backwards to accommodate the US. So, the Doha Round was launched -- an overly ambitious agenda and too little time in which to complete it. Incidentally, this meeting took the decision on China's membership.
The 5th Ministerial in Cancun in September 2003 was supposed to be the mid-point of the Doha Round: by then, the modalities in agriculture and NAMA were to be agreed. The negotiations were far from that position; in fact, the modalities have not been agreed to even now. At the same time, the G20. a group advancing developing country interests in agriculture had been formed. This changed forever the dynamics of multilateral trade negotiations: no longer were the industrialised countries able to submit drafts that would become the only basis for negotiations. The "collapse" of the Cancun Ministerial was very sudden, leaving the Doha Round in
total disarray.
As the 6th WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong in December 2005 approached, everyone was careful to downplay expectations. No one wanted a repeat of the past failure; at the same time, everyone was aware that the progress in the Doha Round negotiations was not enough to expect major achievements.
For some time prior to the Hong Kong Ministerial, the general trend was to label the Ministerial as concentrating on "development” issues. The WTO is not a "development organisation" in the traditional sense, though its rules can have profound consequences on the prospects for economic growth. We took full advantage of this emphasis on development issues to highlight LDC concerns. For the first time, we were able to "multilateralise" the issue of duty-free and quota-free market access, which hitherto was totally dependent on the desires of the concessiongranting country. There were some crisis points, but we were able to successfully overcome them.
The 7th WTO Ministerial was to have been held in 2007, but the mood in the WTO was not conducive to it; the General Council - the second highest decision-making body -- agreed to waive the requirement for a Ministerial that year. In May 2009, it was’decided to hold the Ministerial in Geneva in 2009. Outlining the program for the Ministerial, the chair of the General Council on October 20th made it clear that it would " ... not be structured around negotiating processes, but instead provide an opportunity for discussion and direction at ministerial level across all WTO's activities."
The Ministerial Meeting will commence in the afternoon of November
30th, with the heads of delegations each being given a 3-minute intervention opportunity. There will be two working sessions (simultaneous with the Plenary), on the themes: (1) Review of WTO activities, including the Doha Work Program - on December 1st; and, (2) The WTO's contribution to recovery, growth and development -- on December 2nd. At each of these sessions, the delegations will get 3-minute intervention opportunities. The Ministerial Meeting will conclude on the evening of December 2nd. There will not be any Ministerial declaration; instead, there will be a non-binding chair's summary.
This structure is not one for negotiations or for any significant outcome. This is only a procedural meeting -- the 3-minute statements of delegations will not provide significant indication of country positions.
What, then, is the interest in this meeting? The answer lies in the very presence of the senior officials who are expected to be present in Geneva. Taking advantage ■ of this, the Trade Negotiating Committee for the Doha Round (which oversees the negotiations) has scheduled informal meetings on the 23rd and on the 27th. In fact, throughout the whole week (November 23-27), there will be numerous informal gatherings. It is at these gatherings that respective country-positions, and subtle changes in negotiating stances, will be visible.
Who participates in these meetings? There are open-ended meeting.s and limited-participation meetings, the most exclusive of the latter category is the Green Room meeting (to be held on November 2^th). Any delegation can attend the open-ended meetings; the
exclusive meetings arc by invitation only. Bangladesh's contribution to world exports is roughly about 0.1% --too low to guarantee an invitation. The coordinator of the LDC Group (this rotates among all the LDCs) will be invited. (When I was ambassador in Geneva, 1 was always invited, in my capacity as chair of the Trade & Environment Negotiating Group, and could safeguard our interests.) For smaller countries, it is quite a privilege to be able to enter such restricted gatherings.
Entering these rooms does not necessarily mean that you can advance your country's interests. It depends on the preparations you have made. For instance, have you discussed your issue with the key players to get their support when you raise the issue? There are numerous other techniques that are vital. Finally, it takes considerable skills to project your interests in a suitable manner.
What can a country achieve at the Ministerial? The 7th WTO Ministerial is not designed to produce any outcome that would influence the Doha Round negotiations. The 3-minute speeches will be interesting; and that is about all.
Can anything be achieved on the sidelines? This is what the key delegations will be targeting. The senior officials' meetings this week will be important. For instance, in the Services meeting on November 24th, it was agreed that a "waiver" for LDCs in services would be granted. This "waiver" allows countries to accord special facilities to LDCs that they need not extend to other countries (derogation from the most-favoured nation principle). We have a waiver for "goods," but not one for "services." For years we have been
demanding this; of late, some countries, including India, have given support to this -- we hope it will be formalised sometime next year. What else we can achieve depends on the level of our preparations in Geneva; perhaps we should not have high expectations. I do not expect that we will be Invited to the vital informal meetings that are currently being held outside of the WTO.
The LDC Group has been a significant player, however its current dynamics is not very favourable for Bangladesh's interests. The Dar-es-Salaam LDC Ministerial produced a declaration and a work program. Not much has been achieved since then to advance Bangladesh's interests, particularly in duty-free market access. The LDC Ministerial scheduled for November 29th is too late to influence the LDC positions at the senior officials' meetings or in the Green Room. Much more work is required to develop support in the LDC Group on areas ol interest to Bangladesh.
We recognise the vital role that exports can play in economic growth. Increasingly, the multilateral trade rules are constraining the prospects of new entrants to this field. Our approach has been to carve out a favourable niche in the multilateral rules for the LDCs, and take full advantage of that. This requires a sound understanding of the multilateral and domestic policy framework, and superb negotiating skills. The WTO is here to stay; it is up to us to build on past successes and to play the game to our advantage.
Dr. Toufiq All was Ambassador in Geneva (2001-2007).
E-mail: toufiqali@hotmail.com
***This structure is not one for negotiations or for any significant outcome. This is only a procedural meeting -- the 3-minute statements of delegations will not provide significant indication of country positions.****