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Rampant extortion by transport associations

Road transport, as a vital pillar of public mobility, is an integral component of the country's socio-economic structure. Strong political will at the highest level is required to ensure coordinated efforts by the home, communication and labour ministries to establish discipline in this vital sector by addressing the root causes of this malaise.

Md. Rezaul Karim
FOR decades, the road transport sector in Bangladesh has been plagued by rampant extortion and bribery. Due to the domino effect, the cost of extortion is passed on from vehicle owners to transport users to wholesalers to retailers and finally to the hapless consumers who are the ultimate victims. This issue has been recently highlighted by the food and disaster management minister, who went on record in the electronic media citing precise figures to emphasise how extortion results in manifold increases in transport costs.
It is, thus, clear that commodity prices can never be brought down to tolerable levels without controlling this menace. Unfortunately, successive governments have failed to undertake any effective remedial measures in this regard. Road transport, as a vital pillar of public mobility, is an integral component of the country's socio-economic structure.
Strong political will at the highest level is required to ensure coordinated efforts by the home, communication and labour ministries to establish discipline in this vital sector by addressing the root causes of this malaise.
Analysis of root causes
I.ack of accountability: There is no agency or clear-cut government policy for the regulation of the activities of the transport associations. In the absence of a precise set of rules delineating the nature and scope of their activities, they are free to operate as they wish. Furthermore, there is no auditing system to monitor how the collected subscriptions are utilised.
Numerous transport associations: Readers will be surprised to know that there are more than 53 associations operating in the routes of the southern and western parts of Bangladesh. In the absence of updated official records, the actual number could not be ascertained. Under existing provisions, it is easy to establish transport trade unions.
They come into existence with the professed manifesto of protecting the rights of the transport workers and owners and with the promise of providing various facilities to the stakeholders of this sector.
In reality, however, their main objective Is to achieve dominance over transport routes for the purpose of extortion. It is relatively easy for persons with political backing to take advantage of the flexibility of existing trade union and labour Acts to set up transport associations.
Absence of eligibility criteria: Due to weaknesses in the trade union and labour Acts, persons who are neither vehicle owners nor transport staff become office-bearers of transport associations by using their political connections. At the risk of losing their lives or facing other forms of intimidation, the general transport owners and workers rarely dare to protest such practices. 1 hey are even reluctant to unite under a common banner for the realisation of their legitimate rights.
Non-emergence of new leadership: In the absence of mandatory legal provisions for holding free and transparent elections at regular intervals, a few known faces always manage to remain at the helm with the help of political (and hence administrative) backing and muscle power. Change in government is usually accompanied by change in leadership of the associations,
but the new leaders are again from among the same circle of known faces (albeit from a different party) with the same agenda. It is the classic case of "old wine in a new bottle."
According to some vehicle owners: "We have no power to overthrow them democratically as they can manage the influential leaders of the ruling party and keep their position in the association indefinitely. If there is clear and enforceable government regulation for selecting association leaders only through ballot, we could throw them out."
Tacit patronage by political leaders and administration: This is indeed the crux of the problem. If the very persons who. as public representatives and government functionaries, are empowered to curb this menace are themselves partners in crime, this problem will never be solved. It is no secret that a substantial portion of the proceeds of extortion finds its way into the pockets of these patrons.
X Nature and extent of extortion | and other irregularities
| Monthly subscriptions: By setting up 5 counters at district towns, major intersec-= tions and entry points to district and divi-§ sional towns, the associations collect 2 Tk.500-1,000 as mandatory subscriptions
from each bus (www.ti-bangladesh.org) on a monthly basis.
Trip-wise subscriptions on long routes: Almost all commercial vehicles carrying passengers and goods have to pay Tk.500-1,000 as subscription for each trip. This is collected at five to twenty places along the routes, like entry points of district headquarters, major intersections and at places adjacent to police boxes and stations.
Overcharging passengers: Neither the traffic police nor the mobile courts operated by the BRTA and the RTC have succeeded in ensuring that passengers are not overcharged by bus operators. A TIB study (www.ti-bangladesh.org) reveals that 23%-76% extra fare is charged in 15 routes under DMP area. The situation is not very different in other areas. On-duty traffic personnel are not very effective in solving this problem because of political influence, absence of sufficiently punitive regulations or simply because of corruption.
Misuse of power: Influential transport owners care little about laws and regulations. They often use their connections to free bus/truck drivers arrested for causing fatal accidents. They use their influence to obtain recommendations for route permits from the RTC and registration of unfit vehicles and driving licenses for unqualified and inexpert drivers.
Total disregard for workers' rights: A study conducted by the TIB (2009) reveals that 96% of the professional drivers do not get any formal appointment letters from their employers. There are no laws specifying their salaries, benefits and terms of employment and, thus, no way of ensuring their job security. Transport associations are professedly established to ensure the rights, privileges and welfare of the workers as stipulated in the Labour Act Ironically, it is they who are responsible for the exploitation of general workers and owners.
No monitoring authority: Concerned ministries and BRTA have no regulatory jurisdiction over transport associations or terminal committees. As a result, they can do pretty much as they wish.
Recommendations
Abolition of political patronage: Initiative should be taken at the highest levels of government to form high-powered cells to identify’ the culprits within the ruling party who are engaged in patronage of the extortionists. It should be made clear that such acts would be punishable by expulsion or suspension from the party. Prompt and exemplary action should be taken if such warnings are not heeded.
Ensuring accountability: Policies should be formulated specifying the criteria for formation of transport associations, incorporating mechanisms for regulating their activities and ensuring transparency and accountability through formulation of strict rules and regulations in this respect Eligibility for leadership: The labor ministry’ should fix some basic criteria, which must be fulfilled in order to become officebearers of transport associations. The tenure and scope of work of the associations should be clearly spelled out. Provision for election of leaders through secret ballot should be there.
Empowerment of BRTA: BRTA should be institutionally strengthened so that it can strongly and effectively monitor the activities of the associations.
Controlling bus fares: Strict penalties (fines and/or imprisonment) should be instituted for charging fares in excess of those determined by the RTC. If necessary, the RTC should be overhauled with com-
petent and honest persons at the helm to implement these measures.
Abolition of recommendation system: The system of obtaining approval from the associations for new operators or even for additions to existing fleets should be done away with.
Ensuring rights of transport workers: The labour ministry should formulate and enforce a comprehensive code of conduct specifying w-ages and benefits of transport workers and their right to formal appointment letters detailing their terms of employment.
Cancellation of registration: There should be provision for cancellation of registration of transport associations for violation of regulations.
In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that mere formulation of rules and regulations cannot stop extortion or bring about desired reforms in this sector. As I have
mentioned before, only sincerity and determination at the highest political levels can bring this about.
This article reflects the writer's own views . Md Rezaul Kanm is a Road Transport Researcher and a Fellow in Transparency International Bangladesh