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Has coalition path meandered?

RlICHIRO MAEKI
The lessons learned from that failure must be used to ensure the successful operation of the coalition government on this occasion. But the path the negotiations took in reaching the agreement was somewhat less than reassuring.
THE Democratic Party of Japan, which is set to become the ruling party after its overwhelming victory in the recent House of Representatives election, finally reached agreement with the Social Democratic Party and the People's New Party on the formation of a new coalition government to be led by the DPJ's Yukio Hatoyama as prime minister.
The negotiations that led up to that agreement focused on what kind of forum to create for coordinating policies among the three coalition parties.
The SDP was very keen to form a standing consultative panel involving the three parties. SDP Secretary General Yasumasa Shigeno expressed concern about the mechanism of his party's involvement in the coalition government, saying: "If a national strategy bureau and an administrative reform council are to be established (as proposed by the DPJ) within the govern-ment.rthen how will the SDP and the PNP be Involved in the policymaking process?"
The DPJ, on the other hand, attached importance to unifying the policymaking process under the leadership of the cabinet
and is against granting parties strong policymaking powers. In its August 30 general election manifesto, the DPJ called for switching from the current "two-track system in which policymaking proceeds in parallel in government and in the ruling party to a unitary' system of cabinetcentered policymaking."
As a compromise in the coalition negotiations, the DPJ said it would establish a "cabinet committee" as a consultative body of the three coalition party leaders after having the leaders of the SDP and the PNP join the cabinet. Earlier, SDP President Mizuho Fukushima telephoned DP) President Hatoyama and directly asked him to establish this kind of consultative panel made up of the top leaders of the three parties.
If the coalition's consultative body comprises cabinet ministers, the DP) can explain that it does not represent a contradiction of its policy of unifying the decision-making process under cabinet leadership. The SDP, for its part, considers the establishment of a standing decisionmaking consultative council of party leaders a significant move.
But the DPJ's original manifesto pro-
posal called for the establishment of a cabinet committee involving all cabinet members. In the manifesto, the party says: "Politicians themselves will coordinate difficult issues under cabinet leadership. We will abolish administrative vice-ministers' meetings and put politicians in charge of decision-making."
When the DPJ compiled the policy’ platform, it is believed to have envisaged cabinet committees comprising the prime minister and the 17 other cabinet ministers.
It remains to be seen how the new administration's cabinet committees will function. There will be two types of committee, one to be established on each policy and consisting of cabinet ministers and the other to involve party leaders.
If the second type of committee is limited to lawmakers at the very top of their respective parties, it will consist of a mere three members. In this case, the SDP and the PNP would each presumably have a one-third share of the policymaking say of the new government, six times the influence they each would have as one voice out of 18. as originally envisioned by the DPJ in its manifesto.
In the aftermath of the general election, the DPJ has 308 lower house members, compared with the SDP's seven members and the PNP's three. At the start of the negotiations there were differences among the three parties on policy, especially when it came to diplomatic and national security policies. But if the new government fails to carry out policies envisaged by the DPJ due
to opposition from the SDP. this will represent a betrayal of the faith people placed in the party as reflected by the election results.
If the DPJ considers it more important to secure a majority vote in the House of Councillors by wooing the SDP to stabilise the management of the coalition government than to carry out its policy pledges to voters, it would be getting its priorities wrong way round.
When the then prime minister Morihiro Hosokawa formed a coalition government that excluded the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japanese Communist Party in August 1993. Ichiro Ozawa, then secretary general of the Japan Renewal Party, did not, join the Hosokawa cabinet. Instead. Ozawa flexed his political muscle within a panel of coalition party leaders.
But communication between the cabinet and the Ozawa-led panel was not just insufficient; the panel also intentionally distanced itself from the cabinet in the policymaking process. This caused a rift between the two sides and, eventually, the breakup of the Hosokawa administration after just eight months in power.
Both Hatoyama and Ozawa must know ail the minute details of this political drama. The lessons learned from that failure must be used to ensure the successful operation of the coalition government on this occasion. But the path the negotiations took in reaching the agreement was somewhat less than reassuring.
C The Yomiun Shtmbun. All nghts reserved Repented by arranoemenl with Asia News Network