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Withdrawal of the security forces from CHT

Shahedui. Anam Khan
***A dispassionate look is in order since, while some may be trying to overplay the security issue, it would be advisable not to overlook the apprehensions altogether. At the same time, delay in the implementation of the accord might provide the excuse to certain groups in the hills to create unrest in the area.***
The current army withdrawal is perhaps a tangible manifestation of implementation of certain aspects of (he 1997 Accord, although the suddenness of die announcement has surprised many. As per die accord, die government is required to pull out such camps as were deployed during the security force's anti-insurgency campaign, after tlie surrender of the insurgents along with their arms and weapons.
When the government is asserting dial die "wididrawal” is in conformity with die terms of die accord, why Ls opinion divided regarding the prudence of the move? While some feel that the move would adversely impact the security situation in the hills, the government is confident that no such thing is likely, and that it is quite capable of addressing the situation as is obtaining there at the moment or dial is likely to in die future.
One would like to take comfort from the assurance of die government; it is for the state to ensure the securi ty of its citizens; and one would hope dial it has alternatives in place to address any emerging situation. I lowever, going by the reactions of the non-tribal population in some * parts of the CH I. one would not be wrong in suggesting dial there are serious misgivings in their minds about the likely outcome of the armywithdrawal.
A dispassionate look is in order since, while some may be trying to overplay die security issue, it would be advisable not to overlook die apprehensions altogether. At the same time.
delay In the implementation of the accord might provide the excuse to certain groups in die hills to create unrest in the area.
But let us first clear some misperceptions regarding certain aspects of die issue.
First, it would be wrong to consider law and order and security matters as synonymous. It has to be stressed, at the risk of sounding pedan -tic, that the issue of security has a wider scope and has both trans-frontier and cis frontier connotations; and while law and order can be a relatively more straightforward matter to handle, the security issue is not
Secondly, one gets to hear that the with drawal will help end "army rule" and "military occupation" of die region. The fact is that die law enforcing agencies were inducted, not as a political solution but as a holding force, to reduce die insurgents' capacity to launch destructive operations; and although, to handle the security situation, certain regulations were introduced to help tide over the prevailing circumstances, it was the civil writ that ran.
Hardly, there can be nothing more ridiculous than to suggest that the area was, or is, under occupation." While one can dismiss such remarks emanating from the uninformed, those words coming from none other than sitting members of the parliament is distressing One fails to understand how one's own territory can be under "occupation" ofone'sown army. Arewe to understand that the protagonists of such ideas think that the army is not in its own sovereign territory?
And what is the ramification of "with-drawal?" I suggest that there are certain ground realities that must be kept in mind, and which, one would like to think, the government has kept in view before deciding on the move.
The situation in the CHT is not like what it was pre-December 2, 1997. With the termination of military operations and end of active insurgency it had become easier for gunrunners and dnig peddlers to use this area with impunity. Given the nature of the terrain and absence of area domination, it was being used by them as a safe conduit for movement of illegal weapons and drugs.
Physical withdrawal from certain sensitive areas, more so after the current flux in the BDR, may be of help to these elements. And, as with movement of weapons, the various insurgent elements in our neighbouring countries would find it easier to seek sanctuary in our territory when under pressure in their own. And one cannot discount the possibility of their security forces extending the pursuit into our territory unbeknownst to us. Add to this the fact that a
segment of the insurgents in the CHT has not conceded to the accord, and continues to remain armed as before.
As for the CHT Accord, we are into the twelfth year of its signing and in the more than three years of the AL rule, and the five years of the BNP's, except for some cosmetic actions, very little worth the mention has been done in this regard. What begs the question is why has the compart been not fully implemented?
We all have a stake in permanent peace in the CHT. The BNP and the JP led by Ershad had made attempts in this regard during their tenures. If there be provisos in the accord that need a rethink, in particular those that deal with the devolution of power which seems to have hit a snag then all concerned must sit together and devise ways to circumvent those and determine the means to implement the accord without either violating the constitution or the spirit of the deal itself. The author is Editor Defence & Strategic Affairs, The Daily
Star