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The crisis is not all that far

M.B. Naqvi
The US cannot easily take a decision to go to war with Iran. Losses will not be negligible, even if they can scarcely be decisive. The Iranians have been preparing to defend themselves effectively if a war comes, which is one reason why Mr. Ahmadinejad has been so aggressive.
THE presidential elections in Iran have caused a series of protests that threaten to go on. This is none too small a crisis, although Iran is already at the centre of a big international crisis. The Israeli government and the Israeli lobby in America wanted the Americans to start a war against Iran. The Americans, even under Bush, figured that befriending Iran would help them stabilise both Iraq and Afghanistan; it would also help normalise Syrian-Israeli relations and promote the chances of a stable peace in ME.
Iran's clerical establishment has noted that even Obama's government is not above causing pinpricks that,
under some circumstances, can become a prelude to serious tension and thus serve as an excuse for a possible war with Iran. Islamic extremists' attack on Iranian Balochistan, and what the US is doing diplomatically in the region, is not all that reassuring to Tehran. The Americans probably are going along with the hard- line Arab monarchs and dictators who are terrified of Iran.
The war and peace issue is a very large one and it cannot be decided light- heartedly. Iran is not without some support; it has worked hard to convince the Arab masses that it is not following an anti-Arab course. More than that, there is the steady strategic support from Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), particularly Russia, that goes on providing technological aid to Iran. For the same strategic reasons even China is inclined to oppose the US or Israeli designs of any possible war.
The US cannot easily take a decision to go to war with Iran. Losses will not be negligible, even if they can scarcely be decisive. The Iranians have been preparing to defend themselves effectively if a war comes, which is one reason why Mr. Ahmadinejad has been so aggressive.
The continued colour demonstrations — green in this case -- remain a dangerous provocation. They will invite harsh repression from the theocratic regime. The Iranian peasantry, bazaris and much of what is really urban lumpen proletariat, are supporting the mullahs. The more ardent followers of the clergy have now been organised into several militias, particularly Baseej and the Revolutionary Guards.
They would, more or less, extinguish the chances of repeating 1978's successful protests against the Shah. The protests were not be allowed to grow from one incident of repression to another, which is why the Iranian army gave up and refused to fire on Iranian masses. That was the Shah's end. Some such thing in the current situation does not seem to be likely. The lergy has sufficient support to ensure its survival in power.
And yet a huge amount of bloodletting can take place. That will be of advantage to no one. The protestors do not appear to have any chance of winning, and the end might be similar to what happened in Beijing after the students' protests. That will benefit no one and work to the disadvantage of both sides.
But a larger and longer-term threat to the 1979 Revolution by Ayatullah Roohullah Khomaini has emerged. It is not immediate or imminent. But a clear probability has now opened up that later, and not now, the regime might face a far bigger threat than it faces today.
The main reason is that its economic performance has not been as good as could be expected. The clergy as a whole has failed to resolve the main question of economic policies at the time: how much freedom to give to private enterprise and how much of the economic sphere the state should reserve for itself to put the country on a high growth trajectory.
Iran has plenty of advantages in the shape of general potential and in particular oil and gas reserves. Most Iranians think that commensurate progress has not been made due to absence of common ideas among the clergy on how the economy should be reformed.
Iran is the number two exporter of oil from the Gulf. Its foreign exchange income is considerable. And yet the unemployment rate is said to be around 40%. Above all else, the higher echelons of the clerical establishment are still not united; there are serious differences among the various groups. What goes on and what is reported in the media are two different things.
What really matter are the shifts in power groups at higher levels. The continuing absence of consensus on how to reshape the economy is a huge indicator that the situation can really turn nasty at some stage. But to repeat, this danger is not imminent.
Pakistan is directly involved. Time was in the 1980s when Iran and Saudi Arabia ran a cold war on Pakistani soil. The Shia-Sunni split became noticeable then; it has grown to bigger proportions. Right now, the Iranians have shut the border with Pakistan to prevent unauthorised entry of those seeking to enter illegally. An obscure obscurantist group, Jundullah, based in Pakistan, frequently attacks targets in Iranian Balochistan areas. Iran has closed its land border with Pakistan.
But the government has also signed the IPI deal, despite tough American opposition to it. The issue does not seem to have been closed with those final-seeming signatures. During the recent budget debate in Parliament, it came out in the open that Pakistan's bureaucracy and some political elements are against buying "expensive" Iranian gas. The Americans had made no secret of their opposition. As a
result, the Indians quietly withdrew.
But on the IPI hang various Chinese schemes of helping Pakistan to broaden the Karakoram Highway, optic fiber link and also probably a railway to connect China with Pakistan, after the Chinese join the IPI arrangement following India's withdrawal. There are wheels within wheels where ME politics in and around lran is concerned.
But one thing is clear. A war in the Gulf zone will be disastrous for all. That would shut all the oil supplies from the Gulf for God knows how long. International prices of oil will again rise sky-high. The world is already in a heavy recession, if not depression. This war will worsen the situation.
As for Iranian vulnerability to political earthquakes, it springs from basics. It had become fashionable in the Muslim World after the propaganda of Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaate Islami that Islam makes political and economic demands on Muslims. Yet, the fact is that there is no specific instruction regarding how an Islamic state and an Islamic economy should beformed.
It is not even sure that God and Prophet do actually want Muslims to conduct their political and economic matters in one particular way, other than being, honest, God- fearing and pious. There are precise instructions too where necessary.
There are different models, problems and issues over which there are no agreements, like what constitutes "Islamic Nizam" and "Islamic economy." At least the Iranian clergy has never been of one mind on these issues. Hence, an eventual vulnerability.
M.B. Naqvi is a leading Pakistani columnist