PAKISTAN'S campaign to rid the scenic Swat valley, Buner and the surrounding areas of Islamist fighters has added another chapter to the continuing saga of their commitment to tackle the crisis of fundamentalism. Now the engagement has been more intense, and has achieved a bit of success. The brutal insurgency aimed at imposing Shariah law and expanding militant control appears to have lost some steam but doesn't appear to have lost its momentum.
In the meantime, the local civilian administration in that mountainous area is facing the daunting task of providing relief to over one million internally displaced persons who have left the area of conflict. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as a calamity has described this situation. We have watched reports with concern that have suggested that hundreds of civilians and militants have died and that more than one million are living in precarious conditions in and around Swat's main city of Mingora.
The latest assaults by Pakistani armed forces appear to have been initiated in response to questions raised by certain skeptics about the Pakistani administration's anti-Taliban resolve. It was also obviously aimed at demonstrating to the new US Administration (during the Pakistani President's recent visit to that country) that Pakistan does not believe in compromises with militants associated with Al-Qaida. This latest Pakistani action has however not convinced many of its western allies completely that the Pakistan government has overcome its past history of flip-flop with regard to militants and terrorists.
As expected, Washington has cautiously welcomed the latest Pakistan offensive as the correct measure towards the reduction of the mounting alarm that has arisen over the spread of Taliban influence across the northwest of Pakistan and militant bombings in the Punjab. On more than one occasion, the US leadership has reiterated that containing militancy in that region is vital to US and Nato interests aimed at hitting Al-Qaida and ending insurgency In Afghanistan.
Pakistan's latest campaign, according to media reports, has been intensive. There has been some progress on the surface. Mingora has been regained. However, questions have also emerged after one month whether its politicized army has the stomach to sustain an effort that has already caused heavy civilian casualties, increased the refugee burden and alienated public opinion in several areas in the sensitive north east and southwest.
Analysts, quite understandably, have also started wondering whether a brake on this offensive will take place due to the indirect pressure of Pakistan's powerful Inter Services Intelligence Agency, known for its alleged links with some militant groups who sometimes figure as tools in Pakistan's confrontation with India.
This has made the scenario more complex. Professor Timothy Hoyt of the US Naval War College has interestingly pointed out that it is also not very clear right now whether the intelligence and Pakistan's militaryor elements within themstill view association with such groups as an asset, either for geopolitical or ideological reasons. Nevertheless one aspect is sure. Past shifts in strategy, inconclusive offensives and peace deals with militants have only emboldened them.
We have seen significant developments over the last two months in Pakistan's strategic planning approach with regard to the handling of the militant resurgence. It would however be worthwhile to note that this time, though the civilian and military authorities appear to have acted more closely in unison, it would still be important to keep a very close watch in view of the low threshold of the Pakistan army pertaining to political backlash and civilian damage
It is important to note here that most Pakistani Taliban fighters are ethnic Pashtuns from northwestern regions on the Afghan border. Perverse idealism and lack of suitable employment opportunities have possibly contributed to this scenario. They support the Afghan Taliban, most of whom are also Pashtun and many of whom fled to the Pakistani Pashtun villages after the US forces entered Afghanistan in late 2001. Thirteen factions are based in different parts of North West Pakistan and they have formed a loose umbrella group, the Tehrik e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) led by Baitullah Mehsud, an Al Qaida ally in South Waziristan on the Afghan border.
TTP and one of its commanders called Faizullah are leading the Taliban activity in Swat and its neighbouring districts. Their efforts towards increasing support have been based on existing frustration with the local administration in that area, prevalent poverty, an ineffective judiciary; anger against feudal landlords and widespread anti-US feelings.
The TTP according to Nato intelligence swears allegiance to Mullah Omar, chief of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan and acknowledges dispatching fighters across the border to that war-torn country; ostensibly, as an effort 'to expel western occupation forces.' It is also being claimed that the TTP has forged links with militant Sunni Punjabi groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LED who specialize in high profile artacks on Pakistani Shiah Muslim targets.
It is clear that today the Pakistan army and others involved in strategic planning have been forced to slightly change direction because of the recent sequence of events. Little more than a few weeks ago, General Ashfaq Kayani, the Pakistani army Chief of Staff, regarded the Swat valley peace deal as a 'model' for dealing with Pakistan's indigenous Taliban. The weak civilian government of President Zardari took the cue and also embraced such an approach as a 'home-grown' suitable for defusing insurgency.
International observers were however alarmed and not convinced with the approach. That included US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton There was also public outcry inside Pakistan and the Swat agreement was generally criticized as capitulation. All these factors eventually persuaded the Pakistani planners to undertake the armed measures.
President Zardari has watched his popularity diminish and has also noted that Nawaz Sharif, the former Prime Minister is reinventing himself as a democratic bul-wark. For obvious reasons this has not been a source of comfort to him.
I believe that it is unlikely that Islamic militants will be able to seize power in Pakistan, given the strength of its military. However, it is also true that recent successes by the Taliban in extending territorial gains could foreshadow the creation of 'mini-Afghanistans' around Pakistan’s restive bordering regions that would allow militants even more freedom to plot attacks.
Such a possibility, according to The New York Times, would be consistent with Al-Qaida's strategy of conducting decentralised operations under small but well-organized regional groups. Their efforts would then be directed to the creation of a feeling of insecurity within Pakistan and also embarrassing the government and its steps towards economic development.
Till now Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahri have been wary about claiming credit for the violence in Pakistan. They have probably refrained from doing so to avoid generating a popular backlash against the group and also painting the Pakistani Taliban movement as having an Arab face.
The uncertain situation as it exists today in Pakistan is chaotic to say the least. Only one equation is unambiguous. Ordinary civilians all over Pakistan are feeling more vulnerable and their sense of insecurity has been enhanced by the vague nature of Pakistani politics.
Pakistan today faces an existential challenge. On several occasions the Pakistan electorate have voted against radical Islamic parties but as Bret Stephens has pointed out 'rejecting clerical politics is not quite the same thing as accepting secular ideals.'
Muhammad Zamir is a former Secretary and Ambassador and can be reached al mazamr@dhak.anet