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Preventing radicalisation

Muhammad Nurul Huda
Our preparation to combat the extremists cannot wait for evidence of the likelihood of further hostile acts against us. We should, therefore, be forewarned and forearmed. The act of forewarning could itself constitute one of the most effective deterrents to the bigot's appetite for attack.
Bangladesh polity is now challenged by hostile groups that profes.s a philosophy of life and of government that is inimical to opr own. In fact, we are now facing an adversary who is armed enough to commit widespread violence. In our free society, while our defenses and deterrents are largely prepared in open fashion, our new antagonists have succeeded in building a formidable wall of secrecy and security, So, to bridge the gap and warn ourselves in time, we have to rely more and more upon our intelligence operations. There is a need to break through the shield of secrecy of the bigots. Special techniques, which are unique to secret intelligence operations, are needed to penetrate the security barriers of the extremist outfits.
Our preparation to combat the extremists cannot wait for evidence of the likelihood of further hostile acts against us. We should, therefore, be forewarned and forearmed. The act of forewarning could itself constitute one of the most effective deterrents to the bigot's appetite for attack. Intelligence should not be a tabooed subject. What we are striving to achieve should be an advertised fact.
The most serious occupational hazard in the intelligence field is prejudice. While we are all creatures of prejudice, we must be able to avoid bending of facts obtained through intelligence to suit or defeat a particular political viewpoint.
We have to admit that we are not really at peace with the so-called religious extremists because they have declared war on our system of government and life. The reality is that we are faced with a closed, conspiratorial and scheming enemy. We cannot hope to maintain our position securely if our opponents are confident that they can attack us at the time and place of their choosing and without any forewarning.
The only silver lining in an otherwise ominous scenario is that the denial mode, insofar as the existence of the extremists is concerned, has perhaps disappeared. The unfortunate part, however, is that, as in other sectors, we have been disappointingly reactive in responding to the threats to internal security. The whole approach appears to be ad hoc and on a case-to-case basis. Somehow, we want to assure ourselves by imagining that a hydra-headed monster has surfaced all on a sudden and will wither soon to the relief of a concerned population. No wonder, therefore, that some of our incorrigibly garrulous politicians have in the past set a time limit of two to three months, after which the specter of
the so-called religious extremism and the bomb-scare would be gone for good.
Under these circumstances, authorities in Bangladesh need to:
• Designate a lead anti-terrorism police and intelligence agency;
• Develop a comprehensive strategy, which encompasses legislation, international cooperation, intelligence and lawenforcement personnel and strong public Involvement, to tackle terrorism;
• Allocate sufficient resources to establish and subsequently make fully operational a counter - terrorism unit within the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Bangladesh Police.
Bangladeshi intelligence and police agencies do not possess an overarching operational coordination structure. High-level coordination is accomplished through the "Core Committee,” which functions as a crisis-response body bringing together senior officials to share information and devise overall strategy. However, the Core Committee is too senior a body to deal effectively and efficiently with breaking investigations. District-level core committees apparently exist, but appear to be hampered by the policy of centralising all decisionmaking on terrorism issues in the capital city. A permanent working-level body would ensure implementation of the strategy and better coordination of the measures decided at a higher level.
Under the above circumstances, the authorities need to:
• Pursue consolidation and further specialisation to improve effectiveness among the agencies dealing with counter-terrorism;
• Establish a permanent working-level body with personnel from the intelligence as well as police agencies;
• Expand access to existing databases initially and work towards setting up uniform databases that can be populated and searched by vetted employees from all agencies with a terrorism portfolio.
We may consider deterring those who facilitate terroriini anrf those who entourage others to becometerrorists.
The Terrorism Act 2006 of UK makes it a criminal offence to directly or indirectly encourage the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism, or to disseminate terrorist publications. This offence includes statements or publications that glorify terrorism.
The Terrorism Act 2000 of UK makes it illegal for certain groups to operate in the UK and extends proscription to include international terrorist groups like Al Qaida. The Terrorism Act 2000 of UK broadened the
basis for proscribing organisations to include those that promote or encourage terrorism.
Like UK. we should agree that the area of action to counter radicalisation is a battle of ideas, challenging the ideological motivations that extremists believe justify the use of violence. In particular, we should work with communities to help them discourage susceptible individuals from turning towards extremist activity.
Operational decisions on whether and how to conduct counter-terrorist operations are a matter for the police. There may be situations where the police believe they have no choice but to take action on the basis of the specific intelligence they have received.
Successful prosecution in the courts, based on gathering the necessary evidence and apprehending those involved in planning acts of terrorism before they can carry out their intentions, should be our preferred way of disrupting terrorist activity.
To maximise the impact of financial intelligence, and make it harder for terrorists to operate, our money laundering and terrorist finance measures require finan-
cial institutions to “know their customer," keep proper records, and report suspicious activity. Irrespective of any final charges, every terrorist suspect should be subject to financial investigation.
Most terrorist activities are encouraged and sustained by an ideological inspiration. In other words, terrorism is not divorced from ideology. One has to look for the said ideological moorings. In this quest, in Bangladesh, it is strongly likely that there will be some accusatory finger-pointing towards some political party In the event of such a possibility turning into reality, the government of the day has to take tough actions without bothering about the political fallout.
That would demand political sagacity of a very high order and may be a tall ask in our perilously polarised polity.
There is no doubt that the battle against extremism will be long. However, since the violence of the so-called religious extremists in the recent past is a manifest attack on the long cherished values of the mainstream, our strategy and thought process should undergo substantial change.
Muhammad Nurul Huda is a columnist fy The Darty Star