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The coming "jaw-jaw"

Naqvi
Indo-Pakistan talks are sure to be resumed. But it is hard to find a basis for expecting success - unless the Indians accept the ideas that Pervez Musharraf floated in recent years.
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J "X R. Manmohan Singh has -f fTormed another~government, JL-X and his party looks like lasting the next five years with little real challenge. There are expectations in both India and Pakistan that talks between the two estranged neighbours will resume soon. What is to be expected?
The Indians and Pakistanis have been
talking with each other for long. They have also fought three wars and two major skirmishes. Indo-Pakistan negotiations "begafrfrortt’ the' Of" Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan.
These were meaningful and resulted in concrete agreements that held for long. After that, the Kashmir dispute has made the relationship complicated. Even so, the various Pakistan rulers kept saying to Indian government leaders:
"Let's settle this issue in our lifetime; otherwise it will be very hard to find a solution."
Prime Minister Mohammad Ali of Bogra, for instance, carried a message of good wishes of Governor General Ghulam Mohammad with him. Nehru listened and listened some more, but the effort failed. Other emissaries from Ghulam Mohammad also went to Delhi butfflp5WogSusMe^,u to amaana woi
When Ayub Khan came to power, the impulse to suggest agreements to India had not subsided. Ayub Khan briefly met Jawaharlal Nehru at Karachi Airport and proposed joint defence between Pakistan and India, apparently off the cuff. Nehru's reply was sharp and crisp: "Joint defence against whom?"
Thereafter, there was little communication between India and Pakistan until 1964, when marathon talks between Sardar Swaran Singh and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto went through six rounds.
Although a more or less authentic rumour said that a format for final agreement had been arrived at in the last round, no agreement emerged. The 1954 volte faced by Nehru on the question of agreed plebiscite in Kashmir was decisive. Thereafter, India has kept declaring that Kashmir is an integral part of India.
Nehru's statement of 1954 virtually killed all prospects of a peaceful Kashmir settlement, though, for Pakistanis, Kashmir was the main dispute. If talks did not succeed, war between the two countries was likely. And it did come soon enough - inl965 -- and was fairly decisive. Foreign diplomats said: "After this there will be no war over Kashmir, though wars might take place on other
issues."
The East Pakistan crisis brought on the second India-Pakistan war, which Pakistan lost even more decisively. East Pakistan became Bangladesh as a result. Pakistan lost some land in West Pakistan and gave too many POWs to India.
Pakistan had to agree to all the terms India dictated. A year and a half after this war, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Mrs. Indira ifi^ndhi signed, the Shwla Agreement jp. July 1972. That ensured stable peace for 18 long years.
One of the byproducts of the 1971 war was Islamabad's renewed determination to get even with India. The thinking was simple. The only way to equalise was to go nuclear. The whole world at the time thought that possession of nuclear weapons meant acquiring a deterrent.
Bhutto started, or rather intensified, an old atomic plan, and he made two agreements. The first was with France to buy a reprocessing plant so as to obtain plutonium, the raw material for the Bomb. The second was to make Canada help build Karachi's nuclear power plant.
But Pakistan’s atomic program was greatly helped later by finding anew route to the Bomb; by enriching uranium. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan set up an enrichment plant and succeeded in producing highly enriched uranium that could and did make the Bomb. Bomb-making itself is no great deal, but one has to have enriched uranium or plutonium, which are hard to obtain.
In 1984, Dr. Qadeer Khan disclosed that Pakistan had mastered the technology of enriching uranium. Later reports said that, in fact, Pakistan had made the first Bomb in 1984. In any case, Pakistan was
able by November 1986 to threaten India with a nuclear riposte if it did go ahead with the rumoured invasion of Pakistan under cover of the Brasstacks Exercise. The deterrence associated with the still-unacknowledged Bomb worked.
Both India and Pakistan implicitly believed that nuclear weapons were the ultimate weapons, and possessing them made one immune from any serious , 4q$at. This illusion of nuclear bombs providing reliable deterrehcelasfed urfaT 2002 when Indian ideas changed, though not before India had suffered a whole decade of jihad in Kashmir, which inflicted heavy casualties on Indians and Kashmiris.
Pakistan's strategy was to inflict a thousand cuts on India in the assurance that it would not employ either its superior conventional forces or its own nuclear weapons against it.
Pakistan had also teamed up in the 1970s with the west in overthrowing a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul -- a regime which the west saw as having violated the hoary understanding between Britain and Czarist Russia in which Afghanistan was to remain a neutral buffer state permanently. Those rules of the famous Great Game had survived 1917 Russian Revolution and the passing of the sceptre of western imperialism from UK to the US in 1946.
The US and UK refused to allow it and went to war to detach Afghanistan from the Soviet sphere, in which highly anti-Soviet (Islamic) manpower was provided by Pakistan while the west provided money, equipment, logistics and guidance.
Pakistan helped win this war. In the
process, Islamabad learnt the technique of asymmetrical warfare and acquired 200,000 to 300,000 trained holy warriors -the mujahideen -- whom it later employed in Kashmir in the 1990s. Now these men are a great nuisance because they have become allies of a later version
of the mujahideen - the Taliban. Pakistan was hoisted on its own petard.
But after 1989, the mujahideen had nothing to do and could be employed in ' KasKifiir, so thought the adventurous Pakistani generals. For the warriors it was a jihad and Pakistan served its own purposes of trying to oust India from Kashmir. Holy warriors were sent into Kashmir after the Afghan jihad. This jihad, jointly with Pakistani volunteers, kept India engaged in irregular warfare for over a decade, and ended in mid-2002. But this design failed.
The point to note here is that the Indian leadership did overcome both its fears and restraint Indian PM A. B. Vajpayee ordered the Indian army to invade Pakistan despite its Bomb. How did the Indians get rid of their fear of Pakistan's nuke deterrence?
The Indians claimed that Pakistan did not pose any threat to India because India had a larger stock of nuclear weapons. These two deterrents cancel each other out. The only effective instrument in a war would be the conventional forces, in which India had the undoubted superiority.
Indo-Pakistan talks are sure to be resumed. But it is hard to find a basis for expecting success — unless the Indians accept the ideas that Pervez Musharraf floated in recent years.
M B. Naqvi is a leading Pakistani columnist