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Will peace prevail in Sri Lanka?

Harun ur Rashid
One can win a war but may not achieve peace. Peace is not merely the absence of war. It is much more than that. The Sri Lankan government has a daunting challenge to bring peace in the country.
THE Sri Lankan government has declared May 20 a holiday for the victory against the Tamil Tigers. The government has reported the deaths ofTamil Tiger's leader Prabhakaran and his lieutenants. During the 26 years of armed struggle, more than 80,000 people were killed.
The Tamil Tigers had fought since 1983 to create a Tamil State "Tamil Eelam." Tamils constitute about 12% of the total population in Sri Lanka and are mostly living in the north and east of the island. It is the British who brought Tamil labourers from South India for tea plantations.
During the Bandamaike governments in the '60s, a pro-Sinhalese policy was reportedly pursued, thereby alienating the Tamils. They had two selling points: first their grievances were that they were discriminated against by the majority Sinhalese population and they wanted a separate Tamil state for safeguarding their identity. Secondly, they were the "sole" representatives ofTamils in Sri Lanka. They crushed nearly all the Tamil groups.
Tamil Tigers were the first armed group to make suicide bombings their trademark Until 2004, they had carried out 76 suicide attacks in Sri Lanka, killing numerous political Sinhalese and Tamil leaders, including India's prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. TWo outstanding Tamil leaders, former foreign minister Kadirgamar and Harvard trained lawyer Neelan Tiruchelvam, were brutally killed.
Tamil Tigers engaged in cold-blooded slaughter, and their use of children soldiers generated disgust even among many Tamils within Sri Lanka and abroad.
The Tamils found a match in Rajapakse's government's determination to root out the Tamil Tigers with the same brutality and ruthless as the Tamil Tigers had.
The government's action had often been cold-blooded. It defied international pressure to halt the armed action, increased defence spending, bought arms and weapons primarily from Pakistan and China and nearly doubled the size of the armed forces to roughly 160,000.
The total strategy was laid out by the president and his two brothersGotabaya, the
influential defence secretary and Basil, MP, a special adviser to the president Starting in August 2006, the government forces staged intense ground, air and sea assaults against theTamil Tigers.
The government also adopted some guerrilla tactics from the Tamil Tigers, using small groups of troops to attackdeep into the jungle andkillTamilTigers' leaders.
As Nilan Fernando of the Asia Foundation puts it "Previous governments were always playing for a draw. This time they were play-ingforawin."
Since the intense fight in 2006, the government disclosed that 6,261 security forces and 15,000 to 22,000 Tamil Tigers were killed in action.
Finally, the government won decisively and crushed one of the world's most enduring guerilla armies on the battle field. The military strategy of the government paid off. Some have alleged that war crimes were committed by the government
There were several reasons for their defeat Every movement, whether armed or unarmed, has a time limit, and if the goals are not achieved by then it will fade away or lose its relevance. Furthermore, after 9/11, terrorists are being hunted globally and Tamil Tigers were no exception. They lost the sympathy of the international community.
Their funds from overseas gradually came under scrutiny of foreign governments and under tightened laws against terrorists.
They were imprudent enough to break ceasefire in 1995 and in 2002. They used every
ceasefire to rest, recruit and rearm.
Colonel Kanina, a battle-seasoned commander of UTE, broke away from the rebel group in 2004 due to internal disagreements, and led well-trained dissident cadres against the Tigers. The split weakened the Tamil Tigers as they lost the moral right to speak onlyforTamils.
Tha Tamil leadership did not take into account that the environment under which they started armed struggle had changed dramatically over 25 years, and they failed to realise that the autonomy for them was the best option because an independent Tamil state in a small island did not make any sense.
One can win a war but may not achieve peace. Peace is not merely the absence of war It is much more than that. The Sri Lankan government has a daunting challenge to bring peace in the country.
The government must look after the affected Tamil civilians caught in the battlefield. The Sinhalese majority must show compassion for them. Within a short period, the government might sit to negotiate with all Tamil stakeholders and minority communities for a new dispensation. It would be reasonable to grant a measure of autonomy to Tamil majority areas of the north and east
If the government can heal its ethnic wounds, Sri Lanka, with a relatively literate population, an innovative business class and three deep-water ports, could emerge as prosperous as Singapore.
Bamster Harun ur Rashid is a Former Bangladesh Ambassador to the U N. Geneva.