& çâÌæÚUæð´ ·¤è ¥ôÚU Îð¹Ùæ ÁæÚUè ÚU¹ð´ ¥ÍæüÌ ¥ÂÙð ÜÿØ ÂÚU ŠØæÙ ÚU¹ð´Ð ãæÚU Ù ×æÙð´, €UØô´ç·¤ ·¤æ× ·¤ÚUÙð âð ¥æÂ·¤ô ©gðàØ ·¤è Âýæç# ãôÌè ãñ ¥õÚU ÁèßÙ ·¤æ ¹æÜèÂÙ ÎêÚU ãôÌæ ãñÐ ÖÜð ãè ÁèßÙ ×ð´ ç·¤ÌÙè Öè ·¤çÆÙæ§ü €UØô´ Ù ¥æ°, çÁ™ææâæ ¥õÚU ©ˆâæã ÕÙæ° ÚU¹ð´Ð ŠØæÙ ÚU¹ð´, ÜÿØ ã×ðàææ ¥æÂ·Ô¤ Âæâ ãôÌð ãñ´ çÁ‹ãð´ ÂæÙð ·Ô¤ çÜ° ÂýØæâ ¥æÂ ·¤Öè Öè àæéM¤ ·¤ÚU â·¤Ìð ãñ´Ð

Iran's pro-active foreign policy

Muhammad Zamir
IRAN has been in the news for the last few weeks -- particularly so after the recent overture made towards it by the new US administration. US policymakers are taking special interest knowing that Iran's neutrality is crucial not only for continuing stability in Iraq, as the US disengages from that country, but also to contain the deterioration in .Afghanistan, a consequence of a resurgent Taleban. The US government has also said that it is going to join the talks between Iran and Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia over the Islamic Republic's nuclear program. Syria and TUrkey have also lent their support to bring about a rapprochement between Iran and the USA
Their efforts have, however, not been an instant success. Iranian clergy as well as their political leaderships till now have been playing hard to get and reiterating that their foreign policy is based on "morality" and "principles." Their political narrative suggests that they are not ready for concessions, particularly ahead of their June 12 presidential race.
Iran has a reputation of being cautious, and it is being especially so at this time. It has stressed on the need for concrete details as to the future dynamics of their expected relationship with the USA Iran has also pointed out that it is not happy
that cooperation is being offered against the background of warnings that there might be more comprehensive sanctions if Iran does not toe the line.
It is this scenario that has persuaded Iran to seek its own strategic path to increase its political capital and international standing. Reports coming out of Tehran indicate that Iranian economic cooperation and energy policy within the developing world is now being used as part of its foreign policy planning. This is being dovetailed within its quest for regional hegemony in the greater Middle East and its position vis-i-vis the international community in the context of the ongoing nuclear crisis.
It is clear that, for Tehran, the most important step right now, is not only to invest in the Middle East and in its regional geopolitical environment -- which encompasses Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region - but also to extend its influence beyond its traditional area of reach through political-economic alliances.
This approach has led Iran to strengthen old alliances and seek new partners in a paradigm marked by diplomatic, political and economic global partnerships. In Asia, this has persuaded Tehran to expand its tactical realignment (by ditching North Korea) and reach out to less controversial countries, like China, Pakistan and India.
Iran, according to European analysts, also appears to be "investing heavily in existing structures to facilitate continental cooperation, trying to capitalise on the recent diplomatic and political gains obtained in the Caspian Sea area (where Tehran succeeded in consolidating an embryonic cooperation and security organisation with the neighbouring littoral states)." This has persuaded it to push for a greater role within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a permanent intergovernmental organisation that was created in 2001, with six permanent members (China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). Since 2003, five states have been granted observer status (Iran, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Mongolia). Iran is now lobbying with the permanent members to gain full permanent membership.
Iran is also focusing on its bilateral relations by leveraging its energy resources to create powerful economic incentives to increase state-to-state cooperation. An important example of this development was the recent finalisation of an agreement between Pakistan and Iran to proceed with the creation of the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline. This so-called "peace-pipeline" will be over a 2,600 kilometer long and will cost nearly $7.4 billion. It will initially bring gas from Iran's South Pars field to Pakistan and India. Subsequently, there will also be consideration as to whether such transfer can include China. There has been US opposition to this scheme but it appears that it is very much on the cards.
Sources have also suggested that Pakistan-Iran energy cooperation will also include a $60 million, 100 kilometer elec-
tric line that will allow Pakistan to import an extra 100 megawatts of electricity from Iran. Consolidating economic ties and increasing the level of inter-dependence with Pakistan is being seen by Iran as possessing high strategic value. It is also clear that Iran thinks that an economic alliance with key regional players, particularly, an emerging global power such as India, will have a highly positive impact both in terms of breaking the "policy of isolation" adopted against Iran, and will also gain for it additional leverage with regard to its stand on the nuclear program.
Cooperation with China is also assuming a strategic priority for Iran. Together with China and Malaysia, it has recently agreed on a joint development project of the Iranian Ressalat oil field. China and g Iran have also just signed a Memorandum e of Understanding to store Iranian oil in > Chinese strategic reserves, which would C further enhance economic relations and interdependence between the two countries, and which would tie Iranian oil exports to Chinese interests. Their two-way trade hit $20 billion at the beginning of 2007. China is now Iran's top trade partner. Its support has also enabled Iran to effectively diminish its economic vulnerability to sanctions. It also guarantees, together with Russia, an increasingly friendly power within the UN Security Council.
Iran has also been monitoring the changes in bilateral relations between the USA and Venezuela and Bolivia and their impact on the political configuration within Latin America. Iran is fishing in this sea of troubled waters and understandably trying to establish important regional ties and partnerships, with the objective of improving its international credibility and relative power. With this objective, Iran has joined as an observer, at the invitation of Venezuela, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), which includes the
main allies ofVenezuela and is perceived as an "alternative" to the US-supported Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
Although the majority of the Latin American cooperation projects are not substantial in scope or magnitude, the geopolitical significance of Iran's policy of penetration in the Latin American continent should not be understated, as it contributes to its international standing. President Obama’s latest overtures during the OAS Summit in TYinidad appear to have taken this into account. Iran would obviously like to restore normal relations with the USA and some countries in Europe, but does not feel pushed about this right now.
Iranians no longer appear to be looking for "ideological counterparts." They have, instead, introduced within their foreign policy an element of practical pragmatism. I believed that the possible after-effects of such a strategy might eventually have impli -cations at the local and the regional levels.
Regionally, the increased political capital and international standing might ultimately be leveraged by Iran in the greater Middle East, its most vital area of interest. Economic and political partnerships might serve as power enhancers for the Islamic Republic. Tehran is using its energy policy as a diplomatic tool not only to guarantee its integration within the international community but also to reduce its political isolation.
It is clear that Iran's proactive foreign policy is improving its position at the negotiating table by "reducing the cost of failed negotiations." It is also consistent with the desire of the Iranian theocracy of not demonstrating an early spring thaw but relying on initiatives that might create for Iran an alternative to an imposed solution.
Muhammad Zamir is a former Secretary and Ambassador and can be reached at mzamira@Dhaka net