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The South Asian nuclear genie!

IFTEKHAR AHMED CHOWDHURY
THIS month of May marks the eleventh anniversary of the eventful year the South Asian Nuclear genie got out of the bottle, with both India and Pakistan overtly conducting a series of nuclear tests. There was much consternation around the world when it happened, particularly in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the only intergovernmental negotiating forum on disarmament.
The author was then the Bangladesh ambassador to the body, and being a regional member was expected to lead off the protests. Instead, Bangladesh urged calm. After all, India and Pakistan were not the first two countries to have nuclear weapons, and there was no palpable reason at that time to believe that these would be less safe in the hands of heirs to an ancient civilisation than in the case of other nuclear weapon states. Also, neither party had signed die Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Tteaty (CTBT), so there were no commitments broken!
This did not mean, however, that the
situation did not warrant careful monitoring. After all, the region had seen a number of wars, and was widely seen as a flash point. Between India and Pakistan, Indian capabilities, expectedly, are greater, as India also has to factor in China. The size of the Indian arsenal is estimated to be between 45 tolOO warheads, with the capacity to rapidly expand, 75% of which are reportedly maintained in assembled and the balance in unassembled forms.
Pakistan has approximately sixty warheads, and counting, stored unassembled with the fissile core separated from nonnuclear explosives, and all components distinctly from delivery vehicles.
India's delivery capability is far superior, with the ability to strike at targets both close and distant through such missiles as Agni (surface-to-surface), Akash (surface-to-air), Prithvi (medium-range), Shaurya (600 km range) and BrahMo (the product of a joint venture with Russia, and is the world's fastest cruise missile, with submarinelaunchcapability) . Indeed India is looking to becoming a TRIAD country soon with nuclear capability in land, airand sea.
For Pakistan's "Islamic Bomb," as the late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto described
it, China is not a factorindeed it was said to be built with considerable Chinese assistanceand its nuclear-capable F-I6 aircraft and medium-range Ghauri missiles are seen as adequate for her purpose.
India has a publicly pronounced nuclear doctrine briefly stated in a government document in 2003, which says that India seeks "minimum credible deterrent" and includes the principle of "no-first-use" and "no-use" against a non-nuclear weapon state. The Nuclear Command Authority, comprising mostly civilians, is chaired by the prime minister. The arsenal is believed to be well-protected.
The US-lndia nuclear deal of November 2008 of course raised Pakistani ire, and Pakistan has demanded the same perks, but has found no sympathy in Washington. Given the overwhelming conventional military superiority of India, Pakistan eschews the " no-first-use" doctrine, believing ambiguity would enhance deterrence. Interestingly, President Zardari once mentioned it, but his remarks were quickly retracted by officials who said that the president was "notfullyinformed."
Pakistan is currently striving to achieve a "second strike capability"which India already hasthat is, the capacity to absorb a "first strike” and still be able to retaliate massively. Theoretically, in its absence, the entire arsenal could be vulnerable to a "first-strike," and indeed could indeed "invite" it. That is why President Musharraf was said to have ordered the dispersal of the arsenal to "at least six different sites.”
But herein lies the rub. While dispersal enhances security in one sense, it also
increases the vulnerability of falling into Pakistani terrorist hands, both during the transition process and storage in the deep countryside! Despite the strong statements with regard to security from Pakistani policy-makers, the international community remains nervous. There is another scenario, which no one dares to speak ofthe control of the National Command Authority passing into terrorist or Taliban handsbut happily the chances of that are far too remote!
So far, then. Vrith regard to their nuclear capability, both countries have behaved responsibly. Former Indian Army General Shanker Roy Chowdhury said in a seminar in New Delhi in March that Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons prevented India from attacking it on two occasions, one after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament and the other after the Mumbai mayhem.
Be that as it may, while conventional conflicts of some intensity cannot entirely be ruled out, it is clear that no level of such warfare can provide a significant victory to one or the other side! If that be so, the only rational corollary is collaboration between the two countries.
There is, of course, an obvious necessity for confidence building measures on the nuclear front. This can. and should, spread to other issues such as terrorism, since the perceived threats from it arc mutually applicable. The leaderships of India and Pakistan must realise they have to cooperate, and have but a Hobson's Choice in this regard!
The author is a former Foreign Adviser and is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Instate of South Asian Studies, Singapore National University