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The Palestinian dialogue in Cairo

Khaled Khalefeh
TEN days of dialogue between the Palestinian Movements ended without any real and substantial results. All the parties came with the will to succeed in the dialogue but there were too many obstacles that prevented such success. The main obstacles that prevented any progress in the talks were:
• Abu Mazen and his inability to influence any political process, along with his total dependence on the US and Israel.
• Israel has no real interest in a Palestinian reconciliation. Israel prefers to play on the two Palestinian tracks: the Gaza track and the West Bank track, which is headed by Abu Mazen. Israel is also keeping the key to the Gaza reconciliation close within its reach and maneuvering between the two tracks. Israel did not interfere during the talks because it was sure that Abu Mazen would neutralize any possibility of reconciliation. Dr. Salam Fayyad acted in such a way when he gave his resignation the impression was that he was with the reconciliation. However, he actually expected that the dialogue would fail and that he would be asked to be Prime Minister again, from April 2009 until January 2010. Israel and Abu Mazen are working concurrently by imposing the demand on Hamas that it recognize Israel and all the agreements that have been signed between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Abu Mazen also unequivocally asked Hamas to recognize Israel during the talks in Cairo. The parties did not discuss the matter directly and differed on the issue.
• The Egyptian side conducted the talks in Cairo by inviting all the Palestinian organizations, but at the same time did not give any real incentive to encourage any party to reach an agreement. Egypt also wanted to show that it was the regional hegemonic power. Egypt did not freely open the Rafah Crossing in an ongoing manner, but only from time to time. The Palestinian parties did not take the Egyptian side seriously as a force to stand up to Israel. General Omar Suleman, the Director of Egyptian Intelligence, left in the middle of the talks to visit Washington, without monitoring the conclusion of the dialogue. What he actually wanted to say was that the position of the US is very important. At the same time. I can argue that US policy has not changed during the Obama era and continues to insist on the need for Hamas to recognize Israel and its right to exist, a demand that was rejected before.
Although there is no change in the Israel and American positions, we notice some changes in the European position, although not as perceived by the Czech position, which is far away from changing its Middle East policies, or by Mr. Tony Blair, the Head of the Quartet. Some analysts perceive his role as maintaining international continuity in order to receive a future position, such as a leading post in the international system or with the World Bank.
Nevertheless, the Palestinians are aware of these strategic positions, mainly after the rise of Netanyahu and Lieberman, the War in Gaza and the new American Administration of Barack Obama. In that sense, the Cairo talks that Egypt sponsored were critical and acute in promoting the Palestinian Dialogue between the different factions. The general feeling, even among Palestinians, is that the new American Administration will come up with new ideas and proposals to face and confront the Palestinian problem. My argument, however, is that while everyone is looking at the American policies in the Middle East and the Engagement Doctrine, the economic crisis in the US will not go away for a while and the Engagement Doctrine will not affect Israel.
What might affect the Palestinian talks and maybe push and intensify the Palestinian Dialogue is the rising of the ultra national right wing government with its four nays:
• More settlements in the West Bank and in the Jerusalem area
• No recognition ofa Palestinian State
• No recognition of the United Nations decisions
• No right for the right of return There is support to push the Palestinians to leave and to implement a transfer policy. In that sense I can say that the right wing government, which will be lead politically by Netanyahu and Lieberman and militarily by Ehud Barak, will sooner or later implement the targeted killing policy against figures of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and at the same time, will try to neutralize the Hamas regime in Gaza. However, the region will act in an escalated matter in all areas. In that sense, if we saw two wars during the three and a half years of the Olmert regime, we can face another 2-3 battles in the coming four years, if this government survives.
The Palestinians are conducting two strategies, that of Abu Mazen in which he believes in the continuation of the negotiations with Israel without any regional and international backing, and that of Hamas, which does not believe in the recognition of Israel and in the conditions of the Quartet but recognizes international resolutions. However, with the new reality of the imposing siege on Gaza, the Palestinians are trying to reach a compromise between the two political ways by creating a national reconciliation government. All the parties in Cairo agreed to create this National Reconciliation Government, which will try to reach several goals of creating presidential and parliamentary elections, electing a Prime Minister and rebuilding the security forces, while at the same time working to lift blockade and the siege on Gaza and restarting the reconstruction.
There are contradictory perceptions, however, between the two ways. Abu Mazen, Mahmoud Abbas, insists that Hamas must recognize the Oslo Agreement, the Quartet's conditions, the Arab Summit proposal and other international decisions. Abu Mazen is not interested in incorporating Hammas into his government. He actually wants them to be out of the government and wants to move to create a government of "experts." Abu Mazen is also aware that the Hamas will not surrender to his demands to recognize Israel. In that sense, the dynamics of the conflict will continue between the sides.
Currently, although PM Salam Fayyad resigned, he was asked by Abu Mazen to come back and function as Prime Minister. As for President Abu Mazen himself, although he completed his term on the 9th of January, 2009, he continues with the role as President without paying any attention to the fact that his position is no longer valid.
Egypt is also not decisive in the role of overseeing the Palestinian Dialogue. It has also closed its crossing entrance to Gaza and behaves not as a sister Arab ally to Gaza but as the last of its enemies as it closed all the gates to Egypt, even for humanitarian purposes. Even so, Israel continues to criticize it for its role in the smuggling of arms from the Philadlephi Corridor.
Meanwhile, Abu Mazen has all the reasons to veto the dialogue. This dialogue is not under his authority and does not serve his own interests. Both Israel and the US are against any progress in the Palestinian Dialogue. The two sides still achieved much success in all the topics in Cairo: the elections, the authority of the government and modernization of the security forces.
As I explained before, Abu Mazen raised the subject of recognizing the Quartet’s resolution without demanding from Israel to recognize the Palestinian rights for sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza. Omar Suliman, Chief of Egyptian Intelligence, visited Washington to push for a Palestinian Unity government. The Obama Administration, however, informed him that it has no policy toward the Middle East and Hillary Clinton's staff informed him that Hamas has to recognize the Quartet's resolution. This means that US policy still follows the Israeli policy towards the Palestinians.
Efraim Halevy, former Mossad Head and former Chairman of the National Security Council, argued on Koi Yisrael (4/4/09) that national security advisers has to submit to the new government alternative and policy to any formation of the Palestinian Dialogue in order to neutralize the dialogue on the political level. He also urged the government to form policies toward the Iranian-American Dialogue and the political integration of Syria in the international system.
1 can also argue that Abu Mazen will try to continue with the negotiations with Israel in order to gain additional precious political time and in order to give Israel legitimacy to promote its low intensity conflict in Gaza until the upcoming escalation. Netanyahu will continue with the assassination policy in order to activate the Gaza Front and to give pretext to some extremists in his government to act.
The author Is a journalist and member of The Arab Council for Foreign Relations.