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Lessons in global governance

What began as a defensive movement by local fishermen has evolved into an amalgamation of banditry, organised crime, freebooting and insurgency.

Christopher Jasparro
PIRACY in Somalia began in 1991 following the collapse of the Barre regime. Dumping of toxic and hazardous wastes by international companies increased. Unlicensed foreign fishing vessels targeted Somalia's fish-rich waters. Local fishermen claimed that foreign boats used tactics such as ramming and hiring local militants to harass them.
Disaffected fishermen then began attacking foreign vessels in the early 1990s, leading to full-scale piracy and hostage-taking. In 2005 a UN agency estimated that 700 foreign fishing vessels were operating in Somali waters, many employing illegal and destructive fishing methods.
In 2006 the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) seized power in most of southern Somalia. They reasserted some control over Somali waters; foreign incursions and piracy declined.
Ethiopia invaded Somalia to oust the ICU. After (he ICU's ouster the chaos off Somalia increased. Fishermen fruitlessly complained to the UN about renewed poaching and dumping.
What began as a defensive movement by local fishermen has evolved into an amalgamation of banditry, organised crime, freebooting and insurgency. Somali waters emerged as die hotbed of piracy, accounting for close to 32% of attacks reported globally between January and September 2008.
Some fishermen attack foreign vessels, others join well-organised pirate groups who in turn attack foreign vessels, local fishermen, and each other. Organised groups commit most attacks and are well armed, equipped with fast-boats, satellite navigation and radios, and employ large "mother-ships" to launch long-distance operations.
Officials from Somalia’s region of Puntland issue "licenses" to foreign vessels, which dien employ pirates as security. With local and diaspora businessmen and clan leaders providing logistics and capital to pirates Puntland’s coastal cities are experi-encinga piracy fueled economic boom.
The surge in piracy warrants immediate security measures, but ultimately calls for an approach similar to that advocated by counterinsurgency experts. Such an approach should focus on a political solution to Somalia's turmoil. Intermediate efforts should focus on assisting Puntland which is die epicenter of piracy and has as a somewhat dysfunctional government.
UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon emphasised: "Anti-piracy efforts, therefore, must be placed in a comprehensive approach that fostered an inclusive peace process in Somalia and assisted the parties to rebuild security, governance capacity, addressed human rights issues, and harnessed economic opportunities throughout the country." The then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and representatives of the African Union and League of Arab States similarly argued for wider approaches.
He also noted drat he had appealed to 50 countries to commit resources for a broader multinational force for Somalia, but no state was willing to take the lead. At least 20 countries have promised ships for what looks like a 19th century punitive expedition. While over half the nations contributing ships are major global or Indian Ocean fishing nations, none have offered significant resources to help address the deeper roots of piracy.
This military-centric approach erodes the legitimacy of international operations and instead creates anti-imperialist responses that help fuel extremism and discontent. Aljazeera, for instance, has taken up the Robin Hood theme reporting that: " Pirates were victims of a US-EU run system that still uses the developing world as a dumping ground for toxic waste."
One commentary posted on June 12, 2008, alleged: "The dumping continues to this day, even though we have been assured that we're living in a 'post racial era’ following the election of Barak Obama. That rule doesn't apply to the many black and brown people who still find themselves in the imperial crosshairs."
The fact remains that the UN has failed to include in its resolution 1851 the enforcement of Somalia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or the relevant convention that bars dumping of toxic waste.
A cynical view suggests that the powerful still prefer military approaches to problems rather than measures requiring broader, multifaceted solutions. A more charitable assessment would suggest that the capacity and will to tackle every problem comprehensively does not yet exist.
Three points stand-out. First, it is now assumed that un- or under-governed spaces have become breeding grounds for rogue groups. However, this assumption is incomplete. Weakly governed and failed states are often themselves victimised by foreigners.
Second, that the nature of warfare has changed is another accepted truth. War is no longer characterised primarily by conventional clashes between states, but is fought "amongst the people" by combatants including not only states but hybrid networks of criminal gangs, insurgents and international terrorists.
Military force alone is not sufficient to combat such threats; it should be employed to support political solutions and human security. This, however, requires non-military capabilities, resources, patience, and political and public will, which are often lacking.
Third, states often resort to application of force in pursuit of short-term self-interests. Ultimately, the will and capacity to pursue comprehensive strategies that protect both the "winners" and "losers" of globalisation appear insufficient. The question is whether the global commons really can be secured for the common good.
Christopher Jasparro is Associate Professor, National Security Affairs at the U S. Naval War College The news and options expressed are those of the author and do not necessary reflect those of the US Government. US Navy, or US Naval War Coiege.
©Yale Center for the Study of Globalization All rights reserved. Reprinted by arrangement