SAARC, a manifestation of regionalism, emerged in an institutional form on 8 December 1985 as another effort at attaining regional cooperation, this time in South Asia. In Shah Muhammad Ikhtiar Jahan Kabir's view, “SAARC has been contributing to the regionalism in South Asia as an institution, as a process ami a spirit ' However, further down the book, the author declares: "The SAARC Charter remains a non-starter from the very beginning to guide the regional process." The contradiction in the two observations should not escape the reader, and there are several in Regionalism in South Asia: A Critique of the Functionalist Approach. They mar the quality of a serious undertaking, which purports "to address the question of whether the ongoing process of cooperation in South Asia is on the right track; and if it is not, then to explore alternatives or remedies."

And how does Kabir fare in his venture? To get an answer to that question, let us take a look at different aspects of his work. At the outset, he maintains that South Asian regionalism is following the functionalist line of cooperation. Functionalism is a the-ory that stresses the interdependence of the patterns and institutions of a society, and their interaction in maintaining cultural and social unity. In two consecutive chapters, Kabir discusses at some length theories and concepts of functionalism (following a prominent intellectual fad, a pristine "ism" must surely be followed by prefixes of “neo" and "post”!), although one cannot help but feel that, at times, he tries too hard to stretch the theories to fit his observations. Appropriately, he introduces David Mitrany, who developed the concept of functionalism, believing “that activities in different functional areas could bring various nations together which would ultimately contribute to world peace.” EU is probably the best known, as well as the exem plar, functional organization, but the United Nations system also consists of a plethora of efficacious functional organizations, UNDP, UNHCR. UNICEF, to name a few.

The author begins by taking a pragmatic and cautious look at the prospect of functional coop eration process in South Asia: "Although cooperation is very necessary in the region, the process of cooperation still faces various constraints. Sometimes the process loses dynamism and becomes stagnant because of idiosyncratic behaviour of the national elite, and the stereo -typed policies of the states. Even prudent national leaders may fall prey to the pragmatism of popular pressure at the national level as they seldom brave losing the national election. The fear of losing the governmental power may obstruct resolution to regional problem.”

Since his study is partially based on primary research data (which, it needs to be said, in line with the author's own admission, has some shortcomings), he provides some telling statistics on peoples' attitude towards South Asian regional cooperation: 87 percent of his respondents identified first and foremost with their respective countries, while only 4 percent felt themselves to be South Asian, and 56 percent thought that India's overbearing posture is the biggest impediment to such cooperation. Kabir also makes this shrewd observation: "Not only with Pakistan, India's relations with...Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal are not entirely sound. Their security perceptions also differ from that of India. India feels the necessity of regional cooperation as a step against external powers while her neighbours feel its necessity mainly as a security measure against a commonsource, India." In the face of such realistic scenario, the author at times veers off into painting an extraordinarily rosy picture of SAARC's potency, in the process placing too much emphasis- on the powers of Track 11 and Thick III diplomacy by research institu tions, NGOs, university teachers, former bureaucrats, journalists, cultural activists, and, it seems, almost everyone under the sun. For instance, he exults: “...the

spirit of SAARC has reached far beyond the establishment to accelerate cooperation from one sector to another." Or, “SAARC is an instrument serving what has been labeled the most sensitive region for strategic volatility and after the inception of SAARC there have been no major clashes or sustaining conflict." Of course, India and Pakistan have been on the fringe of all-out war on a number of occasions since SAARC's creation, and was actually engaged in a short intense conflict in Kargil. The primary reason the two countries have pulled back from the brink, or not escalated from limited hostilities, has probably been the possibility of the conflict going nuclear, and not because of any SAARI I bonhomie and goodwill

After all, as Kabir observes, "In South Asia, the primacy of politics is all the more a dominant characteristics (sic) of social reality. The socio-economic agents arc highly underdeveloped, very poorly organized and inept in consideration of skill and articulation. The economic forces are subservient to the political ones." How true! Unless the longstanding disputes between India and Pakistan are amicably resolved, especially that of Kashmir, the efficacy of SAARC as an organization designed to promote regional cooperation will remain limited to low-level interactions and positive outcomes. High politics, crucially, the matter of security, dominates the psyche of the policymakers in the two countries, and that will usually override any thought of regional cooperation. Furthermore, especially applicable to India, they are more inclined towards bilateralism, rather than multilateralism, particularly in the South Asian context.

The author takes cognizance of such inclination, as well as the criticism often leveled against SAARC that "nothing happens but 'meeting, seating and eating'." But, then, he extols the potency of a slew of SAARC professional bodies (like Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Federation of University Women, Diploma Engineers Forum, Surgical Care Society, Teachers' Federation, Cardiac Society, Writers and Litterateurs, et. al) by asserting that they are not mere names or figures on paper only; all of the organizations have their own Secretariats! And so do any number of professional organiza- tions in South Asia! It seems to be the appropriate thing to do — what comes next is for the future to decide • the more organiza tions with registration and Secretariats the better! It appears that Kabir is trying his level best to portray SAARC as a vibrant orga nization destined to bring the nations and nationalities of the South Asian region closer.

One gets the impression that Kabir is torn between a desire to see SAARC succeed in the manner of EU or ASI AN, and a skepticism that pertinent realities of the region would preclude that from happening any time soon He gets down to some sobering assessment regarding SAARC modalities that hold it back from being an effective organization: Article X (2) of the SAARC Charter states that bilateral contentious issues shall be excluded from the delib erations. And, therefore, in his opinion, the “non-inclusion of contentious issues has made it inert and impotent on many counts." So right! And, "Some of these modalities...are producing more problems than prospects."

Kabir falls into the trap of broad generalization in suggest ing ways to strengthen regionalism. For example, in poverty alleviation, "a concerted effort combining the regional forum and the institutional web led by the governments, NGOs, experts and managers, civil society, and the grassroots people are essential....” Might as well say almost the entire population of South Asia. Nevertheless, Regionalism in South Asia: A Critique of the Functionalist Approach is painstakingly researched, and sheds light on an elusive phenomenon that could potentially benefit the vast population of South Asia.

Shahid Alam is Head, Media and Communication Department, Independent University, Bangladesh.