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The 1971 War: Some defining features

Mumtaz Iqbal
THE 1971 war in Bangladesh was a hybrid: a national liberation struggle (first phase) that became a conventional war as the eastern theatre of the Indo-Pak conflict (second phase).
In the second phase 4-16 December 1971, Pakistan surrendered to a joint IndoBangladesh command where our regulars (Niomito) and freedom fighters (FFs) played a direct role.
Bangladeshis were the main players in the first phase. 25 March/3 December 1971, that contained features different from customarily understood national liberation wars.
FEATURES OF OUR NATIONAL LIBERATIONWAR
Twentieth century wars of national liberation are anti-colonial movements for independence.
Waged by a broad-based popular political part); such conflicts start off as asymmetric warfare against superior imperial power by irregular forces that over time become conventional armies and force the colonial power to withdraw through military defeat or negotiation.
The prime example is Vietnam.
The Indochina Communist Parry (1CP) from 1940 under Ho Chi Minh transformed its guerilla force into a regular army that trounced France at Dien Bien Phu 1954 and fought tfieUS to a standstill 19567S.
The origins of the armed component of our liberation movement lay in the rebellion of five East Bengal Regiment (EBR) battalions. EPR and police to avoid extermination by the Pakistanis, and happened outside political guidance.
In the first week of March '71, Awami League (AL) leadership became aware of the Pakistani build-up. .As a constitutional, not revolutionary party7. AL could not take the responsibility of calling on the EBR to launch preemptive attacks against key targets like e.g. Godenail fuel depot, Dhaka airport and Chittagong pon. for good reasons.
Absent organization, planning and command and control and facing superior mobile Pakistani firepower, sustainable success from such attacks was questionable. Moreover, a call to arms would have provided a justification for a crackdown.
Pakistani action of 25 March 71, combining extreme perfidy with extensive bloodshed, catalysed our liberation movement, just as French naval bombardment of Haiphong in November 1946 that killed 6.000 sanctified Vietnamese resistance.
The first Pakistani shot instantly, unambiguously and unequivocally transformed the constitutional quest for regional autonomy epitomized by the Six Points into a legitimate struggle for national liberation. Blood and iron would determine Bengali fortunes.
Enjoying mass popular support, this transformation guaranteed the liberation movement would take-off whether or not anybody directly or indirectly irrespective of stature called for it.
In Vietnam the ICP organized the armed force. In our case, the military wing came into spontaneous existence autonomously. The political instrument in the form of government-in-exile came later (17 April 71). This ’ sequencing had momentous consequences.
The Bengali services personnel especially army, who fought, died and survived, in contrast to many who spent time in Kolkata, felt that their sacrifice had given them a sense of entitlement in participating if not directing the destiny of the new nation.
After sporadic confrontations with the Pakistanis, by7 end-April 71, EBR units had taken sanctuary in India. Ils strategic implication was that Bengali forces alone could not achieve independence. Indian help with superpower backing was needed. This became a major objective of the exile government.
By contrast, the Vietnamese forces after Haiphong incident retreated io remote rural and mountainous areas within the country from where it fought the I rench. mostly in Tonking Delta (northern Vietnam). I he arrival of Chinese communists on Vietnam border in 1949 boosted the ICP's fortunes through enhanced sanct uary and supplies.
Thus, in our case, regulars trained to Tight set piece all-arms battles suddenly found they had
to learn new skills focused on squad and platoon level hit and run engagements.
This tactical transition was accomplished but not easily or comfortably. It's difficult to discard acquired mindsets and habits and meaningfully acquire new ones in the short time the liberation movement lasted. Change is hard.
EBR regulars arguably never quite got used to unconventional warfare, as evidenced by the move around September 71 to establish three under-strength brigade-sized rille groups (K, S and Z Forces)
Their strategic objective was to remain as forces-in-being in order to form the nucleus of the post-independence Bangladesh Army
This worthy and understandable objective explains the refusal, rightly, of these three Forces to implement Gen. Osmany's operational plan of September 71 to break the EBR battalions into small units to conduct raids behind enemy lines.
This would have destroyed the Forces' cohesion, entailed unwarranted risks and yielded questionable benefits.
This objective, along with the entitlement sy ndrome described above, undoubtedly had an impact on the armed forces organization and on Bangladesh politics after independence.
Despite difficult conditions, the EBR EPR and police extensively harassed Pakistani positions within 10 miles of the frontier. No deep penetration raids were launched with autonomous guerrilla forces e.g. Kaderia Bahini and rightly few set piece attacks were attempted.
For example, the one at Kamalpur in July 71 didn't dislodge the enemy because of poor coordination with Indian artillery7. This shows the difficulty7 of cooperation between armies of differing capabilities even when fighting a common enemy.
The cumulative impact of these raids, and of the extensive sabotage activities of FFs in October and November 71, on the Pakistanis' fighting capacity was limited. But their psychological impact was immense.
They signalled that the Bangladesh movement was alive and well; kept the hope of liberation intact amongst the occupied population and demoralized and softened up the Pakistanis for the conventional phase. This is what the resistance movements accomplished in Nazi-Occupied Europe.
Could the combination of sector regular forces and FFs alone have led to independence? Probably not.
Clandestine sabotage and hit and run operations pinprick rather than defeat occupation armies e.g. Tito's Partisans, while set piece battles invariably see irregulars defeated e.g. Tet Offensive 1968. Guerrillas are most effective while supporting conventional forces when victory is probable e.g. French resistance activities coordinated with Operation Overlord June 1944
As liberation wars go, ours was'short, inevitable given that operations were mounted from Indian sanctuary7. India could not countenance protracted resistance, given the burden of refugees and security considerations.
OVERALL PERSPECTIVE
Despite the differing characteristics of our liberation war and Vietnam’s, its victorious outcome was assured even had the Pakistanis killed Sk. Mujib.
The liberation movement after 26 March . I had become bigger than any individual. Many persons contributed to its success. But those of two individuals are exceptional.
I he first was the powerful symbol of Sk. Mujib as the leader of the liberation movement even though he was in a Pakistani jail facing death. His detention outraged Bengalis and rallied the liberation forces.
Sk. Mujib's pragmatic statesmanship is evident in the calculated ambiguity of his 7 March 71 speech and in coolly awaiting arrest by 2 Commando SSG with strict orders, at US behest, to take him alive.
The second was Tajuddin's skilful piloting of the strategic and tactical aspects of the liberation war as PM of the exile government.
Despite Al. in-fighting (e.g. Mushtaque; Mujib Bahini), Tajuddin kept his domestic constituency united while doggedly assem-bling the inputs needed for success.
The author is a freelancer.