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Time to take lessons and move on

ShaiiedulAnam Khan
TO ask people (o move on is a bold call to make when the tears of the loved ones of those killed in the Pilkhana massacre have not yet run dry. But before moving on we must first ensure that the lessons that should be learnt from the sad event are internalised by all concerned.
One of the lessons that we citizens have learned is that we must close ranks in times of tragedy like February 25, but, regrettably, it seems that our political leaders will never learn this important truth. And thus one is disappointed at what both the ruling party and the opposition are making of the incident.
We do not want to see the parties do politics with the mutiny and all that followed in its wake. While there is reason to be wary of things to come in the future, the matter has been complicated by the various versions of who and what might be the motivation of the mutineers, as well as by the two major parties' casting oblique reference at the other's acts of omission or commission.
However, there is an accord of views between the AL and the BNP that the mutiny was well orchestrated and well planned, and the aim was to destabilise the country.
If the rebels were not alone in this, or if the so-called grievances were exploited to create turmoil to exploit the consequences, then who isor arethe master-mind?That is the moot point that must be unearthed by the investigation committee. And that is why everyone's focus is on
the committee's findings. It is also important to pinpoint the various stakeholders in the deadly game.
It is important to determine as to who would have benefited most by the ensuing chaos. It would be necessary to bring to light external involvement, if any. And while the enquiry commissions are perhaps going about establishing or eliminating external linkages we ought to give due attention to the possibility that the mutiny may well have been engineered fully by an indigenous group or groups who had significant stake in the political uncertainty that was intended.
It may not be out of place to mention that some Indian media had already identified the masterminds, quoting their own sources of course, only a day or two after the mutiny. And some quarters in Dhaka did not hesitate to obliquely point fingers at one another's complicity in the matter.
I bring this out to highlight the fact that such comments not only divert attention from the main issues, they also often lead to the matter being left unresolved, with many questions unanswered. And this is perhaps a very important lesson — when to say, what to say and how much to say. And all these must be related to the likely impact that the remarks will have on the course of the investigations.
One, therefore, feels that the daily revelation of findings of the commissions by the commerce minister, including involvement of different groups in the BDR mutiny, instead of helping the investigation, is likely to affect its outcome negatively. While there is need for the media to be kept informed about the
progress of work of the committee, feeding of selective information may appear to be motivated.
What detract credibility from his comments arc the comments of his colleagues that clearly contradict what the commerce minister has said so far on the matter. If he is also supposed to be the government spokesman on the matter the commerce minister should hold his horses till after the investigation is completed.
But there are two other important lessons that 1 wish to touch upon, briefly.
The government must think seriously of setting up a crisis management group, either independently or as a part of the National Security Council whose formation is long overdue. It is nice to see some, who had been going hammer and tongs against the idea of NSC, fearing that it would amount to indirect military control of the government, are now propagating its cause.
The way that the Pilkhana mutiny was handled at the field level suggests everything but a cogent and rationale process of thinking.
The other important lesson of the heartrending event is the need for a rapid reaction force.
We will not have a Pilkhana situation everyday, but there is always the possibility of hostage situation occurring. We could be faced with a situation where a VIP could be taken hostage, a shopping complex full of shoppers held up, or students in a school taken hostage by some extremists groups.
These are speculative scenarios but not quite beyond the realms of possibility. And this calls for a force that could be quickly inserted in the objective area. We could organise a new force or recast Rsb for the job.
Brig. Gen. (Retd) Shahedul Anam Khan, ndc, psc, is Editor Defence & Strategy Affars. The Daiy Star